Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory by Shayganfar, Mohammad
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Doctoral Dissertations (All Dissertations, All Years) Electronic Theses and Dissertations
2017-01-25
Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory
Mohammad Shayganfar
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/etd-dissertations
This dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations (All
Dissertations, All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact wpi-etd@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Shayganfar, M. (2017). Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/etd-
dissertations/45
Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory
by
Mohammad Shayganfar - mshayganfar@wpi.edu
A PhD Dissertation
Presented at
WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
Computer Science
January 2017
Approved
Professor Charles Rich, Thesis Advisor
Professor Candace L. Sidner, Thesis Co-Advisor
Professor John E. Laird, Thesis Committee Member
Professor Stacy Marsella, Thesis Committee Member
c© Copyright by Mahni Shayganfar 2016
All Rights Reserved
ABSTRACT
Existing computational theories of collaboration explain some of the important con-
cepts underlying collaboration, e.g., the collaborators’ commitments and commu-
nication. However, the underlying processes required to dynamically maintain the
elements of the collaboration structure are largely unexplained. Our main insight is
that in many collaborative situations acknowledging or ignoring a collaborator’s af-
fective state can facilitate or impede the progress of the collaboration. This implies
that collaborative agents need to employ affect-related processes that (1) use the
collaboration structure to evaluate the status of the collaboration, and (2) influence
the collaboration structure when required. This thesis develops a new affect-driven
computational framework to achieve these objectives and thus empower agents to
be better collaborators. Contributions of this thesis are: (1) Affective Motivational
Collaboration (AMC) theory, which incorporates appraisal processes into Shared-
Plans theory. (2) New computational appraisal algorithms based on collaboration
structure. (3) Algorithms such as goal management, that use the output of appraisal
to maintain collaboration structures. (4) Implementation of a computational system
based on AMC theory. (5) Evaluation of AMC theory via two user studies to a)
validate our appraisal algorithms, and b) investigate the overall functionality of our
framework within an end-to-end system with a human and a robot.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The idea of robots and other intelligent agents sharing human environments has been
a persistent aspiration in science fiction books, artificial intelligence and robotics
laboratories. Collaborative robots are expected to become an integral part of human
environments to accomplish industrial and household tasks. In many of these cases,
humans will be involved in the robots’ operations and decision-making processes.
This involvement influences the efficiency of robots’ interaction and performance,
and makes the robots sensitive to human cognitive abilities and behaviors.
Current computational theories of collaboration are too task-driven. These the-
ories explain many of the important concepts underlying collaboration, focusing on
tasks, their constraints and their requirements, including the collaborators’ commit-
ments, and the necessity of communicating about mental state in order to maintain
progress over the course of a collaboration. However, a key aspect of collabora-
tive robots missing from those theories is being able to show behaviors that make
them more likable, trustworthy, and understanding of human’s feelings and goals.
These aspects of collaborative behaviors can greatly influence the performance of
a collaboration. Therefore, collaborative robots need to take into account human
collaborator’s affective state, and not only focus on executing different actions with
respect to their plan to maintain the collaboration process.
According to [103] collaboration is a coordinated activity in which the partici-
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pants work jointly to satisfy a shared goal. We believe that in addition to the status
of the shared plan, mutual beliefs and intentions, or other task-driven details of
the collaboration, human’s decisions are also influenced by affect-driven functions.
Humans perceive, assess, and interpret their collaborator’s activities in order to co-
ordinate their own acts. Therefore, collaborators need mechanisms to a) perceive
their counterpart’s affective states (and perhaps their meanings), and b) commu-
nicate their own understanding of these perceptions. This aspect of reasoning is
missing in the existing computational collaboration theories and their applications.
From a different point of view the most prominent computational collabora-
tion theories, i.e., SharedPlans [101, 103] and Joint Intentions [54], explain only
the structure of a collaboration. For example, in SharedPlans theory collaborators
build a shared plan containing a collection of beliefs and intentions about the tasks
in the shared plan. Collaborators communicate these beliefs and intentions. This
communication leads to the incremental construction of a complete shared plan,
and successful completion of the collaboration. Although these theories explain the
important elements of a collaboration structure, the underlying processes required
to dynamically create, use, and maintain the elements of this structure are largely
unexplained. In particular, a general mechanism has yet to be developed that al-
lows an agent to effectively integrate the influence of its collaborator’s perceived or
anticipated affective state into its own cognitive mechanisms to prevent shared task
failures. Therefore, a process view of collaboration should inherently involve so-
cial interactions, since all collaborations occur between social agents, and it should
contain a means of modifying the content of social interaction as the collaboration
unfolds. The social functions of emotions explain some aspects of the underlying
processes in collaboration. This thesis makes the case for affect-driven processes
within collaboration and demonstrates how they further collaboration between hu-
mans and robots.
2
1.2 Thesis Statement and Scope
In this thesis, we develop and evaluate a framework called Affective Motivational
Collaboration (AMC) which can improve the effectiveness of collaboration between
agents/robots and humans. We address only two-participant collaboration; larger
team collaboration is out of our scope. This thesis focuses on the reciprocal influence
of the collaboration structure and the appraisal processes in a dyadic collaboration,
specifically: a) the influence of affect-regulated processes on the collaboration struc-
ture, and b) the prediction and interpretation of the observable affective behaviors
of the other during a collaborative interaction.
The AMC framework relies theoretically on the collaboration structure described
by SharedPlans theory, and its implementation uses the collaboration manager,
Disco. Disco is the open-source successor to COLLAGEN [203, 204] which incor-
porates algorithms based on SharedPlans theory for discourse generation and in-
terpretation. AMC theory deals with the major affect-driven processes having an
impact on the collaboration structure and ultimately a collaborative robot’s behav-
ior. This theory is informed by research in psychology and artificial intelligence,
which is reviewed in Chapter 2. Our contribution, generally speaking, has been
to synthesize prior work on appraisal1, SharedPlans theory’s description of collab-
oration, and motivation to provide a new computational theory of affect-regulated
dyadic collaboration.
1.3 Contributions
Throughout this work we aim to show how a robot can leverage affect-driven pro-
cesses, specifically appraisal algorithms, to improve collaboration with humans. As
such, we first introduce our foundational theoretical concepts under the title Affec-
tive Motivational Collaboration theory, and then we introduce a novel computational
1We have chosen appraisal-based modeling of emotions among several theories of emotions.
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framework, based on this theory, which allows an agent to collaborate with a human
incorporating underlying affect-driven processes and the affective expression of the
human. The following summarize our contributions:
1. Affective Motivational Collaboration (AMC) theory:
(Chapter 3) The theoretical foundations of AMC framework are SharedPlans
theory of collaboration [101, 103] and the cognitive appraisal theory of emo-
tions [162] [223]. Applying cognitive appraisal theory in the collaboration con-
text described by the SharedPlans theory is novel. AMC theory accounts for
several key functions of affect in collaboration: goal management, motivation,
social regulation, and attentional focus.
2. New appraisal algorithms based on collaboration structure:
(Chapter 4) We use SharedPlans description of the collaboration structure
in four appraisal algorithms. i.e., relevance, desirability, expectedness and
controllability, to compute the value of appraisal variables in a dyadic collabo-
ration. These algorithms are inspired by [162], and as a novel approach these
algorithms are designed based on different elements of mental state and human
collaborator’s affective state.
3. New algorithms to influence collaboration structure:
(Chapter 4) We use the evaluative nature of the appraisal to make recipro-
cal changes to the collaboration structure as required. We have developed
new algorithms for different functions of emotions such as affect-driven goal
management in the context of collaboration.
4. Implementation of a computational system based on Affective Mo-
tivational Collaboration theory:
We implemented a computational system which employs our models and algo-
rithms in Affective Motivational Collaboration framework. Our computational
4
Figure 1.1: A robotic arm collaborating with a human (in our end-to-end sys-
tem evaluation) to achieve a shared goal using Affective Motivational Collaboration
framework.
system implements the key concepts related to Affective Motivational Collab-
oration theory as well as minimal implementation of other processes which
are required for validation of the model but are not part of this thesis’ contri-
butions. We use Disco as our collaboration manager to receive and maintain
the collaboration structure. The emphasis of the implementation is on the
underlying cognitive processes of collaboration and appraisal, however the im-
plementation also includes the Perception and the Action mechanisms.
5. Evaluation of Affective Motivational Collaboration theory:
(Chapter 5) We conducted two user studies to a) evaluate our appraisal algo-
rithms before further development of our framework, and b) investigate the
overall functionality of our framework within an end-to-end system evalua-
tion with participants and a robot (see Figure 1.1). In the first user study,
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we crowd-sourced questionnaires to test our hypothesis that our algorithms
will resonate with humans’ decisions by providing answers similar to humans’
responses to questions related to different factors within our appraisal algo-
rithms. In the second user study, we investigated the importance of affect-
awareness in human-robot collaboration, and the overall functionality of the
AMC framework with the participants in our study environment.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we start by reviewing the background of prominent collaboration
theories including SharedPlans theory [101, 103]. We discuss the similarities and
differences between these collaboration theories (see Section 2.2.5) as well as related
theoretical and practical work and applications. We continue by discussing the con-
cept of affective computing and the social and communicative aspects of emotions
from a psychological point of view. Understanding the social aspects of emotions is
important in our work, since our work is focused on collaboration which is a social
phenomenon in human environments. We also present the concept of artificial emo-
tions and provide some examples of the existing computational models of emotions.
Then, we provide the background of the cognitive appraisal theory of emotions as the
second theoretical foundation in our work as well as other computational models of
emotions and the related concepts such as some examples of cognitive architectures
and the influence of affect in decision-making procedures. This chapter continues
with a description of motives and related theories in psychology and Artificial In-
telligence (AI). The role of motives as goal-driven affective components is crucial in
our work, since the collaboration structure is based on the concept of a shared goal
between collaborators. Finally, a brief description and the related work on theory
of mind in psychology and artificial intelligence is provided as another concept used
in a limited scale in our work.
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2.2 Computational Theories of Collaboration
The construction of computer systems and robots that are intelligent, collaborative
problem-solving partners is important in artificial intelligence and its applications.
It has always been important to make computer systems better at helping humans
do whatever these systems are designed for. To build collaborative systems, we need
to identify the capabilities that must be added to individual agents so that they can
work with humans or other agents. As Grosz says, collaboration must be designed
into systems from the start; it cannot be patched on later [97].
Collaboration is a special type of coordinated activity in which the participants
work jointly, together performing a task or carrying out the activities needed to
satisfy a shared goal [101]. Collaboration involves several key properties at both the
structural and functional levels: most collaborative situations involve participants
who have different beliefs and capabilities; most of the time, collaborators only have
partial knowledge of the process of accomplishing the collaborative activities; collab-
orative plans are more than the sum of individual plans; collaborators are required
to maintain mutual beliefs about their shared goal throughout the collaboration;
they need to be able to communicate with others effectively; they need to com-
mit to the group activities and to their role in it; collaborators need to commit to
the success of others; they need to reconcile between commitments to the existing
collaboration and their other activities; and they need to interpret others’ actions
and utterances in the collaboration context [98]. These collaboration properties are
captured by existing computational theories of collaboration.
As mentioned above, to be collaborative, partners, e.g., a robot and a human,
need to meet the specifications stipulated by collaboration theories. These theories
argue for an essential distinction between a collaboration and a simple interaction
or even a coordination [96, 152]. This section briefly provides descriptions of major
computational collaboration theories, their similarities and differences, and their
application in AI and robotics. It primarily focuses on Joint Intention, SharedPlans
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and hybrid theories of collaboration. In this section, we do not present the theories
in formal language, but rather describe their features in general terms.
The prominent collaboration theories are mostly based on plans and joint inten-
tions [54] [103] [150], and were strongly influenced by the BDI paradigm introduced
by Bratman [26] which is fundamentally reliant on folk psychology [198]. The two
theories, Joint Intentions [54] and SharedPlans [101, 103], have been used extensively
to analyze and implement teamwork and collaboration.
The SharedPlans theory grew out of the theories of Bratman and Pollack [29,
189, 190], who outlined a mental-state view of plans in which having a plan is not
just knowing how to do an action, but also having the intention to do the actions.
Bratman’s views of intention goes back to the philosophical views of Anscombe [6]
and Castan˜eda [44] about intention. Also, as Grosz and Sidner mention in [103] the
natural segmentation of discourse reflects intentional behaviors in each segment.
Cohen and Levesque also mention that in Joint Intentions theory their view of
intention is primarily future-directed [55] which makes their view similar to Brat-
man’s theory of intention [27], and contrary to Searle [230].
Commitment – One of the most important concepts in teamwork and collabo-
ration is commitment. Collaboration theories are required to address the notion of
commitment, otherwise the participants are just doing some coordinated activities.
Since the prominent computational collaboration theories, reviewed in this paper,
are based on Bratman’s view of intention, we briefly provide his view of commitment
here before describing these theories. Bratman defines certain prerequisites for an
activity to be considered shared and cooperative [28]. He stresses the importance
of:
a) Mutual commitment to joint activity – which can be achieved by agreement
on the joint activity, and prevention of abandoning the activity without involving
teammates;
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b) Mutual support – which can be achieved by team members if they actively try
to help teammate activity;
c) Mutual responsiveness – which means team members should take over tasks
from teammates if necessary.
In the following sections, we will see how each collaboration theory addresses the
notion of commitment.
2.2.1 SharedPlans Theory
The SharedPlans theory of collaborative action, developed by Grosz and Sidner
[100, 101, 103], aims to provide the theoretical foundations needed for building col-
laborative robots or agents [97]. SharedPlans is a general theory of collaborative
planning that requires no notion of joint intentions (see Section 2.2.2), accommo-
dates multi-level action decomposition hierarchies and allows the process of expand-
ing and elaborating partial plans into full plans. SharedPlans theory explains how
a group of agents can incrementally form and execute a shared plan which then
guides and coordinates their activity towards the accomplishment of a shared goal1.
SharedPlans is rooted in the observation that collaborative plans are not simply a
collection of individual plans, but rather a tight interleaving of mutual beliefs2 and
intentions of different team members. In [101] Grosz and Kraus use first-order logic
to formalize SharedPlans.
Grosz and Sidner in [103] present a model of plans to account for how agents
with partial knowledge collaborate in the construction of a domain plan. They are
interested in the type of plans that underlie discourse in which the agents are col-
laborating in order to achieve a shared goal. They propose that agents are building
a shared plan in which participants have a collection of beliefs and intentions about
1In our framework we also have the notion of private goals (vs. shared goals) which are the goals
that each collaborator might pursue privately; i.e., the other collaborator does not know about
these goals.
2In our framework we also have the notion of private beliefs (vs. shared beliefs) which the other
collaborator does not know about these beliefs.
10
the actions in the plan. Agents have a library of how to do their actions, i.e. recipes.
These recipes may partially specify how an action is executed, or contributes to a
goal. Then, each agent communicates its beliefs and intentions by making utterances
about what actions they can contribute to the shared plan. This communication
leads to the construction of a shared plan, and ultimately termination of the col-
laboration with each agent mutually believing that there exists one agent who is
going to execute an action in the plan, and the fact that that agent has intention
to perform the action, and that each action in the plan contributes to the goal [103]
[153].
Later, we will see that to successfully complete a plan the collaborators must
mutually believe that they have a common goal and have agreed on a sequence of
actions for achieving that goal. They should believe that they are both capable of
performing their own actions and intend to perform those actions while they are
committed to the success of their plans.
Recipes
The SharedPlans theory differentiates between knowing how to accomplish a goal (a
recipe) and having a plan, which includes intentions. The SharedPlans definition of
mutual beliefs states that when agents have a shared plan for doing some action, they
must hold mutual beliefs about the way in which they should perform that action
[101, 103]. Following Pollack [190], the term recipe refers to what collaborators know
when they know a way of doing an action. Recipes are specified at a particular level
of detail. Although the agents need to have mutual beliefs about actions specified
in the recipe, they do not need to have mutual beliefs about all levels of performing
actions. Therefore, having mutual beliefs of the recipe means that the collaborators
hold the same beliefs about the way in which an action should be accomplished.
Consequently, the collaborators need to agree on how to execute an action. Recipes
are aggregations of action-types and relations among them. Action-types, rather
than actions, are the main elements in recipes. Grosz and Sidner in their earlier
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work [103] have considered only simple recipes in which each recipe consisted of only
a single action-type relation [153]. Recipes can be partial, meaning they can expand
and be modified over time.
Grosz and Sidner propose that collaboration must have the following three ele-
ments:
1. the participants must have commitment to the shared activity;
2. there must be a process for reaching an agreement on a recipe for the group
action;
3. there must be commitment to the constituent actions.
Shared plan is an essential concept in the collaboration context. The definition
of the shared plan is derived from the definition of plans Pollack introduced in
[189, 190] since it rests on a detailed treatment of the relations among actions and
it distinguishes the intentions and beliefs of an agent about those actions. However,
since Pollack’s plan model is just a simple plan of a single agent, Grosz and Sidner
extended that to plans of two or more collaborative agents. The concept of the
shared plan provides a framework in which to further evaluate and explore the roles
that particular beliefs and intentions play in collaborative activity [153]. However,
Pollack’s formulation of shared plans (a) could only deal with activities that directly
decomposed into single-agent actions, (b) did not address the requirement for the
commitment of the agents to their joint activities, and (c) did not adequately deal
with agents having partial recipes [101]. Grosz and Kraus in [101], reformulate
Pollack’s definition of the individual plans [190], and also revise and expand the
SharedPlans to address these shortcomings.
Figure 2.1 shows what we need to add to individual plans in order to have plans
for group actions. The top of the figure lists the main components for individual
plans. First, an individual agent needs to know the recipe for an action, whereas
agents in a group need to have a mutual belief of a recipe for an action (bottom of
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the figure). In the case of a group plan, having a mutual belief of a recipe, leads
the agents to agree on how they are going to execute the action. Then, similar to
individual agents that need to have the ability to perform the constituent actions
in an individual plan and must have intentions to perform them, the participants in
a group activity need to have individual or group plans for each of the constituent
actions in the mutually agreed recipe [97, 103].
Figure 2.1: Plans for collaborative action [97].
As shown in Figure 2.1 (bottom), plans for group actions include two essential
constituents that do not have correlates in the individual plan. First, the agents
need to have a commitment to the group activity; All the agents need to intend
that the group will do the action. For instance, when a robot and an astronaut are
collaborating to install a solar panel, they need to have intentions to install the solar
panel together. Among other things, these intentions will keep them both working
on the panels until the panels are installed. Second, the participants need to have
some commitment to the other agents to succeed in their own their actions. For
instance, the robot must have an intention that the astronaut be able to measure
the quality of installation successfully. This intention will prevent the robot from
interrupting the astronaut’s measurement action or prevent the robot from using
the astronaut’s measurement tool [97, 103].
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Full Vs. Partial Shared Plan
The SharedPlans formalization distinguishes complete (full) plans and partial plans.
A shared plan can be either a Full Shared Plan (FSP) or a Partial Shared Plan
(PSP). A FSP is a complete plan in which agents have fully determined how they
will achieve a shared goal. A PSP definition provides a specification of the minimal
mental state requirements for collaboration to exist and gives criteria governing the
process of completing the plan.
A FSP to do α represents a situation where every aspect of a joint activity α is
fully determined. This includes mutual belief and agreement in the complete recipe
to do α. A recipe is a specification of a set of actions Ai, which constitutes the per-
formance of α when executed under specified constraints. FSP(P, Θ, α, Tp, Tα,Rα)
denotes a group Θ’s plan P at time Tp to do action α at time Tα using recipe Rα.
Usually a team and its members do not possess a FSP to achieve their shared
goal until it is done. SharedPlans uses the concept of PSP as a snapshot of the
team’s mental state in different situations, which further leads to communication
and planning to fulfill the conditions of a FSP. The idea behind PSP is enabling
the agents to modify the shared plan over the course of planning without impairing
the achievement of the shared goals. Notice that for the same reason recipes also
can be partial [101, 103].
Communicating Intentions
In SharedPlans, Grosz and Sidner are interested in the type of plans that underlie a
discourse in which the agents collaborate to achieve a shared goal. Here we briefly
present their view of discourse structure, since it is related to the intentions behind
collaborators’ actions. In [103], Grosz and Sidner argue that the SharedPlans theory
recognizes three interrelated levels of discourse structure, and the components of
the discourse structure are a trichotomy of linguistic structure, intentions structure
and the attention state. In their work, the linguistic structure of a discourse is a
14
sequence of utterances aggregating into discourse segments just as the words in a
single sentence form constituent phrases. They also discuss the idea of the discourse
purpose as the intention that underlies engagement in the particular discourse. They
believe this intention is the reason behind performing a discourse rather than some
other actions, and also the reason behind conveying a particular content of the
discourse rather than some other contents. Finally, the third component in their
theory, the attentional state, provides an abstraction of the agent’s focus of attention
as the discourse unfolds. In short, the focusing structure is the central repository
for the contextual content required for processing utterances during the discourse
[103].
Intention-to and Intention-that
In Grosz and Sidner’s SharedPlans theory [103], two intentional attitudes are em-
ployed: intending to (do an action) and intending that (a proposition will hold).
The notion of intention to, as an individual-oriented intention, models the intention
of an agent to do any single-agent action while the agent not only believes that it
is able to execute that action, but it also commits to doing so. In short, it is an
intention to perform an action, similar to Bratman’s view of intention. In contrast
with intention to, an intention that, as an intention directed toward group activity,
does not directly imply an action. In fact, an individual agent’s intention that is
directed towards its collaborators’ action or towards a group’s joint action. Inten-
tion that guides an agent to take actions (including communication), that enable or
facilitate other collaborators to perform assigned tasks. This leads an agent to be-
have collaboratively. Therefore, agents will adopt intentions to communicate about
the plan [101]. As another difference, Intention to commits an agent to means-end
reasoning and acting [26] while Intention that does not necessarily entail this com-
mitment. The key point about Intention to and intention that is that both commit
an agent not to adopt conflicting intentions, and constrain replanning in case of
failure. Further, an agent can intention that another agent achieve the specified
proposition.
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2.2.2 Joint Intentions Theory
Also starting with Bratman’s guidelines, Cohen and Levesque propose a different
and more formal approach to building artificial collaborative agents. The Joint
Intentions theory of Cohen and Levesque [54, 55, 56, 57, 146] represents one of the
first attempts to establish a theory of collaboration expressed in formal logic, and
due to its clarity, is a widely used teamwork theory.
A joint intention is a shared commitment to perform an action while in a group
mental state [55]. Joint Intentions theory is based on individual and joint intentions
(as well as commitments) to act as a team member. A joint intention is viewed not
only as a persistent commitment of the team to a shared goal, but also implies a
commitment on the part of all its members to a mutual belief about the state of the
goal. In other words, Joint Intentions theory describes how a team of agents can
jointly act together by sharing mental state about their actions where an intention
is viewed as a commitment to perform an action.
In [54] Cohen and Levesque establish that a joint intention cannot be defined
simply as individual intention with the team regarded as an individual. The reason
is that after the initial formation of an intention, team members may diverge in
their beliefs and their attitudes towards the intention. Instead, they first present a
definition of individual persistent goal and individual intention. Then, they define
team analogues of these concepts by presenting mutual belief in place of individual
belief. The definition of joint persistent goal requires each team member to commit
to informing other members, if it comes to believe that the shared goal is in its
terminal status. As a result, in Cohen and Levesque’s theory, a team with a joint
intention is a group that shares a common objective and a certain shared mental
state [121].
In this theory, once an agent entered into a joint commitment with other agents,
the agent should communicate its private beliefs with other team members if the
agent believes that the joint goal is in its terminal status, i.e., either the joint goal
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is achieved, or it is unachievable, or irrelevant [263]. Thus, as we mentioned above,
team members are committed to inform other team members when they reach the
conclusion that a goal is achievable, impossible or irrelevant. For instance, if a robot
and an astronaut are collaborating to install a solar panel, and the robot reaches
the conclusion that the welding tool has a deficiency, it is essential for the robot
to have an intention to communicate with the astronaut and make this knowledge
common. Therefore, according to this theory, in a collaboration, agents can count
on the commitment of other members, first to the goal and then to the mutual belief
of the status of the goal.
Individual Commitment
As we mentioned earlier, intentions and commitments are the basic ideas of Joint
Intentions theory. Here, we provide the definition of “individual commitment” (also
called persistent goal) by Cohen et. al. in [53]. According to their definition an agent
has a persistent goal relative to q to achieve p only when:
1. agent believes that p is currently false;
2. agent wants p to be true;
3. it is true (and agent knows it) that (2) will continue to hold until the agent
comes to believe either that p is true, or that it will never be true, or that q
is false.
Note that the condition q is an “escape” clause, which can be omitted for brevity,
or it can be used as a reason for the agent to drop a commitment, even though it
could be quite vague.
Individual Intention
As we mentioned above, Joint Intention theory adopts Bratman’s view of future-
directed properties of intention. In this theory, an intention is defined to be a
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commitment to act in a certain mental state. In other words, an agent intends
relative to some condition to do an action when it has a persistent goal or commit-
ment (relative to that condition) of having done the action and, moreover, believing
throughout that it is doing that action [54].
Intention inherits all the properties of commitment (e.g., consistency with mental
state). Typically, an agent uses an intention as a decision within a goal hierarchy
to do a particular action. For instance, initially, the agent commits to p becoming
true without having any concern about who or how p is going to be accomplished.
Then, the agent commits to x or y as a mean to accomplish p. Lastly, the agent
selects one of the actions (e.g., x) and forms an intention to do it. This intention
will be given up when for whatever reason p is accomplished.
An agent has a Weak Achievement Goal (WAG) relative to q and with respect
to a team to bring about p if either of the following conditions holds:
• The agent has a normal achievement goal to bring about p; that is, the agent
does not yet believe that p is true and wants p to be true as a goal.
• The agent believes that p is true, will never be true, or is irrelevant, but has
as a goal that the status of p be mutually believed by all the team members.
Joint Commitment and Joint Intention
A joint intention of a team is based on its joint commitment, which is defined as a
Joint Persistent Goal (JPG)1. A JPG to achieve a team action p, requires all team
members to mutually believe that p is currently false and want p to eventually be
true. A JPG guarantees that team members cannot decommit until p is mutually
known to be achieved, unachievable or irrelevant. This commitment typically makes
an agent communicate with its teammates [54].
1Castelfranchi in [45] criticizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the joint persistent
goal. He argues that these conditions are not sufficient for the collaborators working as a team.
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Therefore, an important consequence of achieving joint commitment in a team
is that it predicts future communication which is critical within the course of a
collaboration. Thus, this communication leads team members to attain mutual
beliefs which is a fundamental concept in teamwork activities. Notice that the
minimum mutual belief for team members to attain is the achievement or failure of
the shared goal which terminates collaboration.
Joint intention is defined to be a joint commitment to the team members trying
to do a joint action. Based on Cohen and Levesque’s definition of joint intention,
a team of agents jointly intends (relative to some escape condition) to do an action
if and only if the members have a JPG (relative to that condition) of them having
the action completed, and having it completed mutually believing throughout that
they are doing it (knowingly) [54].
Teamwork & Communication
In summary, according to Joint Intentions theory, the notion of teamwork is char-
acterized by joint commitment, also known as joint persistent goal (JPG). The
definition of JPG states that the agents mutually believe they have the appropriate
goal, and that they mutually believe a persistent weak achievement goal (which rep-
resents the one-way commitment of one agent directed towards another) to achieve
it persists until the agents mutually believe that the goal has either been achieved,
or become impossible or irrelevant.
Joint Intentions theory claims that an efficient collaboration requires communica-
tion. Sharing information through communication is critical given that collaborators
have different capabilities, and each individual often has only partial knowledge rel-
evant to solving the problem, and sometimes diverging beliefs about the state of the
collaborative activity. Communication is important in coordinating team members’
roles and actions to accomplish their goal. For instance, it can help team members
to establish and maintain a set of mutual beliefs regarding the current state of the
collaboration, and the respective roles and capabilities of each member.
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2.2.3 STEAM – A Hybrid Approach
Tambe in [249] argues that teamwork in complex, dynamic, multi-agent domains
requires the agents to obtain flexibility and reusability by using integrated capabil-
ities. Tambe created STEAM (Shell TEAMwork) based on this idea. STEAM’s
operationalization in complex, real-world domains is the key in its success in ad-
dressing important teamwork issues, some of which are discussed in Section 2.2.6.
STEAM is founded on the Joint Intentions theory and it uses joint intentions as
the basic building block of teamwork but is also informed by key concepts from
SharedPlans theory.
Building on the well developed theories of Joint Intentions and SharedPlans,
the STEAM teamwork model was operationalized as a set of domain-independent
rules that describe how teams should work together. According to Tambe, there
are several advantages due to his use of Joint Intentions theory, including achieving
a principled framework for reasoning about coordination and communication in a
team. Another advantage is guidance for monitoring and maintenance of a team
activity which the joint commitment concept in joint intention provides. And lastly,
Tambe believes the joint intention in a team can facilitate reasoning about team
activity and team members’ contribution to that activity.
However, he also believes that for a high level team goal, one single joint intention
is not sufficient to achieve all these advantages. STEAM therefore borrows some of
the concepts of SharedPlans theory. First, STEAM uses the concept of “intention
that” (see Section 2.2.1) towards an activity as well as the fact that SharedPlans
theory mandates team members’ mutual belief in a common recipe and shared plans
for individual steps in the common recipe. Thus, in this case, SharedPlans helps
STEAM to achieve coherency within the teamwork. In addition, STEAM uses joint
intentions to ensure the teamwork coherency to build the mental attitudes of team
members. In other words, as the recipe evolves, STEAM requires all team members
to agree on the execution of a step and form joint intentions to execute it while
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other joint intentions are formed, leading to a hierarchy. A second concept STEAM
borrows from SharedPlans is the amount of information that a team member needs
to know to perform an action. According to SharedPlans, team members require
to know only that a recipe exists to enable them to perform actions (not the recipe
details – see Section 2.2.1). Similarly in STEAM, team members only track the sub-
team or individual team member responsible to perform a specific step; this tracking
does not need detailed plan recognition. The third concept is parallel to what is
called an unreconciled case in SharedPlans theory, which in STEAM is handled by
replanning and communication between team members assigning the unassigned or
unachieved task. The last concept is communication between team members which
also borrows the concept of “intention that” from SharedPlans theory, to help the
generalization of STEAM’s communication capabilities beyond what Joint Inten-
tions theory offers.
In summary, STEAM builds on both Joint Intentions theory and SharedPlans
theory and tries to overcome their shortcomings. Based on Joint Intentions, STEAM
builds up hierarchical structures that parallel the SharedPlans theory. Hence,
STEAM formalizes commitments by building and maintaining Joint Intentions, and
uses SharedPlans to formulate the team’s attitudes in complex tasks.
In [249] Tambe argues that the novel aspects of STEAM relate to its teamwork
capabilities. A key novelty in STEAM is team operators. In STEAM, when agents
select a team operator for execution, they instantiate a team’s joint intentions. Team
operators explicitly express a team’s joint activities, unlike the individual operators
which express an agent’s own activities. Hence, STEAM agents maintain their own
private (to apply individual operators) and team states, e.g., mutual belief about
the world (to apply team operators).
Tambe added further practical concepts into STEAM’s architecture. For in-
stance, STEAM has a team synchronization protocol to establish joint intention,
and it has constructs for monitoring joint intentions which helps the agent to moni-
tor team performance. STEAM facilitates this monitoring by exploiting its explicit
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representation of team goals and plans. In particular, STEAM allows an explicit
specification of monitoring conditions to determine achievement, unachievability or
irrelevancy conditions of team operators. Finally, in STEAM, communication is
driven by commitments embodied in the Joint Intentions theory, i.e., team mem-
bers may communicate to obtain mutual belief while building and disbanding joint
intentions. Thus, joint intentions provide STEAM with a principled framework for
reasoning about communication. Also, STEAM addresses some practical issues not
addressed in other teamwork theories. One of these issues is STEAM’s detailed
attention to communication overheads and risks, which can be significant [248].
Furthermore, operationalization of STEAM is based on enhancements to the Soar
architecture [137], plus a set of about 300 domain-independent Soar rules.
2.2.4 Other Approaches
There are other frameworks, approaches, and models focusing on teamwork and col-
laborative agents. For instance, Jennings developed the Joint Responsibility frame-
work which is specified formally using modal temporal logic. Joint Responsibility
stresses the role of joint intentions (based on Joint Intentions theory) specifying how
both individuals and teams should behave whilst engaged in collaborative problem
solving [122, 123, 124, 125]. Jennings has developed Generic Rules and Agent model
Testbed Environment (GRATE) as a prototype system based on the Joint Respon-
sibility framework. In [131] Kinny et. al. elaborate the concept of Planned Team
Activity and introduce a language for representing joint plans for teams of agents
and describe how agents can organize the formation of a skilled team to achieve a
joint goal. They use joint intentions to capture the mental properties which char-
acterize team activity.
2.2.5 Similarities and Differences
There are some similarities between SharedPlans and Joint Intentions theories:
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1. Similar to SharedPlans theory, Joint Intentions theory specifies what it means
for agents to execute actions as a team [246].
2. Both theories follow Bratman’s basic ideas about the roles of intention in rela-
tional actions which prevent the collaborative agents from adopting conflicting
intentions. Both theories also follow Bratman’s BDI model.
3. Just as SharedPlans theory, Joint Intentions theory states that a joint action
cannot be seen simply as a collection of individual actions, but rather as agents
working together who need to share beliefs.
4. Both theories in their mature forms emphasize that agents are required to
communicate to maintain collaboration. SharedPlans theory requires collab-
orators to communicate to establish and maintain the shared plan, which is
crucial especially when collaborators only have a partial shared plan. Similarly
in Joint Intentions theory, communication is an explicit requirement of collab-
orative agents until the shared goal is achieved, unachievable or irrelevant.
5. Both Joint Intentions and SharedPlans theories are concerned about commit-
ment to the joint activity. However, these two theories use different concepts
to fulfill the requirements of commitment during collaboration.
There are also differences between SharedPlans and Joint Intention theories:
1. The crucial components of the SharedPlans theory (see Section 2.2.1) lack
the notion of a joint intention, which is the most significant notion within
the Joint Intentions theory. For philosophical reasons, Grosz and Sidner do
not believe that such a phenomenon (joint intention) exists in a collaboration.
They believe their notion of “intention that” and mutual beliefs about states
of the collaboration can provide similar functionalities as described in Joint
Intentions theory (see Section 2.2.2).
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2. In SharedPlans theory teammates agree on the shared plan, whereas in Joint
Intentions theory teammates agree on intentions.
3. In contrast to Joint Intentions, the SharedPlans theory employs hierarchical
structures over intentions, thus overcoming the shortcoming of a single joint
intention for complex team tasks.
4. The SharedPlans theory describes the way to achieve a common goal through
the hierarchy of plans, whereas the Joint Intentions theory describes only this
common goal [239].
5. Joint Intentions theory assumes that knowledge about the teammates is always
available, whereas SharedPlans theory uses the concept of partial plan/recipe
to make the process of dynamically achieving information possible throughout
the collaboration.
6. Communication requirements are derived from “intention that” in Shared-
Plans theory, as opposed to being “hard wired” in Joint Intentions theory.
2.2.6 Applications of Collaboration Theories
There is significant practical research focusing on different aspects of collaboration
based on different collaboration theories, i.e., SharedPlans, Joint Intentions, and
hybrid theories of collaboration. In this section, we provide some examples of im-
plemented homogeneous and heterogeneous agent/robot and human collaborations.
Some of these works also integrate the concept of emotions, but neither of them
focuses on using affect-driven process to maintain collaboration structure.
Some work focuses on the concepts of robot assistants [49], or teamwork and its
challenges at cognitive and behavioral levels [177, 214]. Some researchers have taken
an overall look at a collaboration concept at the architectural level. In [82] authors
present a collaborative architecture, COCHI, to support the concept of emotional
awareness. In [75] authors present the integration of emotional competence into
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a cognitive architecture which runs on a robot, MEXI. In [244] authors discuss
the challenges of integrating natural language, gesture understanding and spatial
reasoning of a collaborative humanoid robot situated in space. The importance of
communication during collaboration has also been considered by some researchers
from human-computer interaction and human-robot collaboration [48, 166, 204] to
theories describing collaborative negotiation, and discourse planning and structures
[5, 102, 236]. There are other concepts such as joint actions and commitments [99],
dynamics of intentions during collaboration [146], and task-based planning providing
more depth in the context of collaboration [39, 202]. The concept of collaboration
has also received attention in industries and academic robotic laboratories [93].
Applications of SharedPlans Theory – COLLAGEN [203, 204] is the first
implemented general tool for collaboration based on the SharedPlans theory. It
incorporates algorithms for discourse generation and interpretation, and is able to
maintain a segmented interaction history, which facilitates the discourse between
the human user and the intelligent agent. The model includes two main parts: (1)
a representation of a discourse state and (2) a discourse interpretation algorithm
for the utterances of the user and agent [205]. In [108] Heeman presents a compu-
tational model of how a conversational participant collaborates in order to make a
referring action successful. This model is based on the view of language as goal-
directed behaviour, and in his work, he refers to SharedPlans as part of the planning
and conversation literature. In [153], Lochbaum and Sidner modify and expand the
SharedPlan model of collaborative behavior [103]. They present an algorithm for
updating an agent’s beliefs about a partial shared plan and describe an initial imple-
mentation of this algorithm in the domain of network management. Lochbaum, in
[152], provides a computational model (based on the collaborative planning frame-
work of SharedPlans [101]) for recognizing intentional structure and utilizing it in
discourse processing. CAST (Collaborative Agents for Simulating Teamwork) [266]
[267] is a teamwork framework based on SharedPlans theory. CAST focuses on
flexibility in dynamic environments and on proactive information exchange enabled
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by anticipating what information team members will need. Petri Nets are used to
represent both the team structure and the teamwork process, i.e., the plans to be ex-
ecuted. Researchers in [114] discuss developing an ontology of microsocial concepts
for use in an instructional system for teaching cross-cultural communication. They
believe being acquainted with one another is not a strong enough relationship from
which to create a society. Hence, there is a need for commitment and shared plans
(as the basis of social life) to achieve a shared goal. In this work, Grosz and Sid-
ner’s SharedPlans theory [103] is used to explain the concept of shared plans within
the interpersonal relationships of societies in an industrial environment. In [119]
Hunsberger and Grosz discuss the idea of how rational, utility-maximizing agents
should determine commitment to a group activity when there is an opportunity
to collaborate. They call this problem the “initial-commitment decision problem”
(ICDP) and provide a mechanism that agents can use to solve the ICDP. They use
the representation of action, act-types and recipes in the SharedPlans theory in this
work. In [269] an integrated agent-based model for Group Decision Support Systems
is proposed and discussed. The decisional model that authors outline in this paper
is based on the SharedPlans theory. Rauenbusch and Grosz in [197] formally define
a search problem with search operators that correspond to the team planning deci-
sions. They provide an algorithm for making three types of interrelated decisions by
recasting the problem as a search problem. Their model respects the constraints on
mental state specified by the SharedPlans theory of collaboration. Babaian et. al. in
[12] describe Writer’s Aid, a system that deploys AI planning techniques to enable it
to serve as an author’s collaborative assistant. While an author writes a document,
Writer’s Aid helps in identifying and inserting citation keys and by autonomously
finding and caching potentially relevant papers and their associated bibliographic
information from various on-line sources. They believe the underlying concepts of
SharedPlans are relevant since in collaborative interfaces like Writers Aid, the users
establish shared goals with the system, and user and the system both take initiative
in satisfying them. In [171] researchers address high-level robot planning issues for
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an interactive cognitive robot that acts in the presence of or in collaboration with
a human partner. They describe a Human Aware Task Planner (HATP) which is
designed to provide socially acceptable plans to achieve collaborative tasks. They
use notions of plans based on SharedPlans theory. In [237] Sidner and Dzikovska
conducted an initial research on engagement in human-human interaction and ap-
plications to stationary robots performing hosting activities, such as tutoring and
sales. They believe hosting activities are collaborative because neither party com-
pletely determines the goals to be undertaken nor the means of reaching the goal.
To build a robot host, they rely on an agent built using COLLAGEN which is a tool
based on the SharedPlans theory.
Applications of Joint Intentions Theory – In [131] authors introduce a lan-
guage for representing joint plans for teams of agents. They describe how agents
can organize the formation of a suitably skilled team to achieve a joint goal, and
they explain how such a team can execute these plans to generate complex, syn-
chronized team activity. In this work, authors adopt the underlying concepts of the
Joint Intentions theory as the structure of their collaborative agents. Breazeal et.
al. in [34] present an overview of their work towards building socially intelligent,
cooperative humanoid robots, such as Leonardo, that can collaborate and learn in
partnership with humans. They employ the Joint Intentions theory of collaboration
to implement the collaborative behaviors while performing a task in collaboration
with humans. In [246] the researchers’ goal is to develop an architecture, based on
the concepts of Joint Intentions theory, that can guide an agent during collaborative
teamwork. They describe how a joint intention interpreter that is integrated with a
reasoner over beliefs and communicative acts can form the core of a dialogue engine.
Ultimately, the system engages in dialogue through the planning and execution of
communicative acts necessary to attain the collaborative task at hand. Mutlu et.
al. in [175] discuss key mechanisms for effective coordination toward informing the
design of communication and coordination mechanisms for robots. They present two
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illustrative studies that explore how robot behavior might be designed to employ
these mechanisms (particularly joint attention and action observation) to improve
measures of task performance in human-robot collaboration. Their work uses Joint
Intentions theory to develop shared task representations and strategies for task de-
composition. The GRATE* system by Jennings [124] is based on the Joint Intention
theory. GRATE* provides a rule-based modeling approach to cooperation using the
notion of Joint Responsibilities, which in turn is based on Join Intentions. GRATE*
is geared towards industrial settings in which both agents and the communication
between them can be considered to be reliable.
Applications of Hybrid Theories – The domain independent teamwork sys-
tem, STEAM, has been successfully applied to a variety of domains. From combat
air missions [112] to robot soccer [134] to teams supporting human organizations
[195] to rescue response [215], applying the same set of STEAM rules has resulted
in successful coordination between heterogeneous agents. The successful use of the
same teamwork model in a wide variety of diverse domains provides compelling ev-
idence that it is the principles of team-work, rather than exploitation of specific
domain phenomena, that underlies the success of teamwork based approaches. In
[159] authors provide their RoboCup (robotics soccer testbed) in which their focus
is on teamwork and learning challenges. Their research investigation in RobotCup
is based on ISI Synthetic, a team of synthetic soccer-players. They also investi-
gate the use of STEAM as their model of teamwork which is influenced by the Joint
Intentions and SharedPlans theories. In [127] researchers propose a behavioral archi-
tecture C2BDI that allows the enhancement of the knowledge sharing using natural
language communication between team members. They define collaborative con-
versation protocols that provide proactive behavior to agents for the coordination
between team members. Their agent architecture provides deliberative and conver-
sational behaviors for collaboration, and it is based on both the SharedPlans and
Joint Intentions theories.
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2.3 Emotions and Affective Computing
According to Picard [187], the term affective computing encompasses a new approach
in artificial intelligence to building computers that show human affection. Studies
show that the decision making of humans is not always logical [95], and in fact, not
only is pure logic not enough to model human intelligence, but it also shows failures
when applied in artificial intelligence systems [69].
If we want robots and virtual agents to be more believable and efficient partners
for humans, we must consider the personal and social functionalities and charac-
teristics of emotions; this will enable our robots to coexist with humans, who are
emotional beings. To have a better understanding of applications of affective com-
puting, we can categorize the existing literature of computational emotion modeling
into four major categories: a) detecting and recognizing human emotions, b) inter-
preting and understanding human emotions, c) generating artificial emotions and
applying the underlying processes to exploit emotion functions, and d) expressing
human-perceivable emotions during interaction.
The major approaches to model emotions are appraisal, dimensional and discrete
(basic), some of which have corresponding computational models, e.g., EMA [162]
and WASABI [22, 23]. These models have been used in different domains including
AI and robotics. Applying these models can help robots and virtual agents to
achieve communicative, evaluative, interpretive, and regulatory aspects of emotions
in some or all of the four categories mentioned above.
This section provides descriptions of the major computational emotion theories,
their comparison, and their applications in AI and robotics. It includes the existing
influential computational emotion theories as well as the underlying psychological
theories; we mainly focus on appraisal theory since it emphasizes and explains the
connection between affective state and cognition, although we also discuss dimen-
sional theory, and we briefly cover other approaches, e.g. discrete (basic) emotions.
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2.3.1 Affect and Emotions
Affect is the representation of an agent’s emotional state in some form, which can
be the current instance of the agent’s affective state. Emotion influences not only
what people do, but also the way they do it [60]. Aristotle in The Nicomachean
Ethics reveals his idea about emotions. He says “Anyone can become angry–that is
easy. But to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time,
for the right purpose, and in the right way–this is not easy [7].”
Intelligence is a set of mental abilities that enables a human to comprehend,
reason and adapt in the environment, and as a result, act effectively and purpose-
fully in that environment. Emotions play a crucial role in scientists’ explanation
of humans’ intelligent behaviors. Emotions significantly impact the processes of
action generation, execution, control, and interpretation [272] in different environ-
ments. Emotions are conceptualized as ongoing processes rooted in dynamic social
contexts, which can shape both implicit and explicit emotional responses [156]. An
emotion is a dynamic episode that not only involves changes in cognitive states, but
also produces a sequence of response patterns on body movements, posture, voice
and face [222]. Emotions typically occur in response to an event, usually a social
event, real, remembered, anticipated, or imagined. Emotions are associated with
distinctive relational meanings [185]. These relations can be with the individual’s
past experience, the individual’s surrounding objects and environment, or the other
individuals with or without mutual beliefs in a dyadic or a group setting. Emo-
tions are evaluative and responsive patterns that serve the function of providing
appraisal about whether the ongoing event is harmful, threatening or beneficial for
the well-being of an individual [272]. Consequently, intelligence and emotional pro-
cesses have an integral and a supportive relationship, rather than an antagonistic
or a conflicting one.
A better question than what emotions are, is the question of what they can do,
and how they impact human life. Emotions impact fundamental parts of cognition
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including perception, memory, attention and reasoning [50]. This impact is caused
by the information emotions carry about the environment and event values. The
influence of emotions depends on an individual’s focus of attention. For instance,
a positive affect can cause a positive attitude towards an object if the individual’s
focus is on the object, whereas the same positive affect can be interpreted as a
positive feedback towards one’s partner during the course of a collaboration. As
another example, a positive feedback can promote certain cognitive processes, or it
can inhibit other cognitive processes according to the conditions in the environment
[51]. In both cases, emotions play a regulatory role for cognitive processes [94].
Some of these effects flow from underlying shifts in the way people perceive and
think under the influence of emotion.
2.3.2 Emotion in Social Context
In this section, we discuss the importance of studying emotions within a social con-
text. This perspective is important in our research because our work is focused
on collaboration as a particular social setting between individuals. Understand-
ing the dynamics of collaboration requires one to understand influential underlying
components.
Emotions are involved in developing social contexts. Humans are social and most
of the causations and constitutions of their emotions are social. Brian Parkinson
in [183] argues that many of the causes of emotions are interpersonal and commu-
nicative rather than internal and reactive phenomena. There are different social
aspects of emotions influenced by various factors such as social context and social
relationship type. For instance, a dominant-submissive social relationship can cause
and contain different emotions with different intensities compared to a reciprocal or
a friendship social relationship. As another example, an emotion can be interpreted
in a certain way when an individual is situated in an environment with other people
who are expressing a particular emotion.
As mentioned earlier, the social context is an important factor influencing one’s
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emotions. A dyadic interaction is one type of social setting [52]. Dyadic interaction
tasks make it possible to examine how individuals experience and express emotions
during social interactions and how emotions shape and are shaped by the reciprocal
interactions between individuals. In addition, eliciting and monitoring emotional
processes yields useful information about the role emotion plays in interpersonal
relationships. Compared with other emotion-eliciting events, events in a dyadic
interaction can better help us study an ongoing emotional relationship between two
individuals in addition to their internal emotional and cognitive processes. Dyadic
interaction tasks are ideal for studying a range of emotional responses because of the
fairly unstructured conversations between the individuals. Thus, dyadic interaction
tasks will generate a wide range of emotions in comparison with the controlled
emotion-eliciting events.
There are numerous ways that emotions can be social [254]. There is a consensus
on the fact that social events and entities surrounding the individual play an essential
role in the generation of emotion. There are several ways in which other people
elicit emotional responses in us. One is that we feel the emotions of those around
us. Also, we have emotions about actions of those people around us. Another is
we have emotions about the things that happen to other people. Yet another is our
concern about our relationship with others that elicits emotion in us. The groups to
which we belong can also elicit our emotions. Moreover, we can feel emotion about
the success and failure of our own group or of other groups. In addition, groups
or individuals may make salient cultural concerns or societal expectations that can
elicit our emotions.
Beside the fact that social context can elicit emotions in individuals, social con-
text provides information about what emotion should be expressed, by whom, and
in what situations. For instance, people are well aware of the inappropriateness of
expressing too much emotion to acquaintances [254]. However, the social knowl-
edge of emotion expression is only partially delivered in an explicit fashion. There
are studies on the regulatory role of society and social relationships on emotions,
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showing that people’s emotions become socialized in implicit and unconscious ways.
From this perspective, social context can control and direct our attention toward
certain types of events and away from others.
Humans are emotional and social beings. Their emotions and the social context
in which they are involved have mutual impacts on each other. Humans can share
their emotions with others just as they share their thoughts, resources and their
environment. Sharing an emotion with others may alter the experience of an event.
For instance, according to the nature of the relationship between the individuals, the
expression of emotions can either restrain them from further interactions or improve
their relationship. Furthermore, individuals sharing emotions might possess a shared
understanding of their environment. Socially shared and regulated emotions also
provide social meanings to the events happening in the environment [264]. For
instance, people are likely to make social inferences based on the presence or absence
of particular emotions in their social environment. Moreover, emotions can provide
a basis for judgment depending on the individual’s relationships with others. In
other words, emotions can associate or disassociate an individual, therefore, they
can change or maintain the individual’s social relationships [254].
Emotions can also play the role of a motivator in a social context. There is a
subset of social emotions delineated as role-taking emotions. In [233] Shott provides
two categories of reflexive (e.g., shame or pride) and empathic (e.g., empathy or pity)
role-taking emotions. Reflexive emotions can motivate the individual’s self-control
which depends on the anticipated reactions of others to the individual’s behaviors.
For instance, guilt might lead the individual to behave altruistically to restore a
positive social stance for that individual. Empathic (or vicarious) emotions are
based on an individual mentally placing himself in other’s situation to understand
how the other feels in that situation. These emotions motivate prosocial behaviors
to maintain an individual’s internal well-being [252].
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2.3.3 Communicating Emotions
Humans need to communicate their emotions within a social context for different
reasons. In [85] Goffman argues that human behaviors around others are performa-
tive; i.e., they are often intended to convey information to others. When a human’s
actions are visible in a social context, they behave differently [268]. The social life
of an individual is comprised of the individual’s internal cognitive competencies and
his interactions in the society. Lazarus says, if society is a fabric, then emotion
is its color [140]. Although emotions undeniably have personal aspects, they are
usually experienced in a social context and acquire their significance in relation to
this context [156].
There are several events that can elicit emotions in social contexts. For instance,
during the interaction the cause of an emotion can be verbal (an utterance during
conversation), nonverbal (someone’s gesture), personal thoughts (interpretation of
an event), or even emotions themselves (e.g., happiness for a partner’s sense of
pride). An utterance can include content and relational meaning. The content
carries the information about the topic or the subject of the interaction, and the
relational meaning reveals the meaning between the speaker and the hearer. An
emotion might seem to be elicited by the content of the utterance, but in fact it is
an individual’s response to the relational meaning [188].
The interpretation of these relational meanings are handled by the appraisal
of the events. Appraisal processes (see Section 4.3) also give us a way of viewing
emotion as social [258]. Meaning is created by an individual’s social relationships and
experiences in the social world. Individuals communicate these meanings through
utterances. Utterances in emotionally charged conversations, by their very nature,
are supposed to inform the others about something novel. Novelty is an essential
component of an event for appraisal. Conversations also possess the concept of
consistency, because utterances with consistent meaning constitute the individual’s
underlying beliefs. Relevancy is another component of an event that can be assessed
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by appraisal. The degree to which the individual’s personal and mutual beliefs are
strong and related controls emotionally rich social contexts. In other words, the
more divergent the individual’s beliefs, the more effort is required to converge (to
be understood) which leads to more emotional responses in individuals. Human
speech carries emotional information in the semantics and in the speech prosody.
The semantics or the content of what an individual says includes obvious expression
of emotion. The prosody holds more detailed emotional information by combining
non-semantic cues in spoken language (e.g., rhythm and intonation) [154].
Interpretation of the events in a social context requires a baseline for the indi-
vidual’s assessment process. Goals, as the pillar of collaborative interactions, can
provide this baseline for an individual. Goals are crucial in relational meanings of
the events in a social context. The facilitation, interference and inhibition of goals
are each correlated with certain type of emotions. In most conversations during
collaboration, goals can be categorized into three different groups: goals related to
accomplishing a task, goals to reveal one’s personal beliefs, and goals to regulate
one’s social relationships [188]. For instance, for task-related goals, utterances re-
lated to accomplished tasks reveal joyful relational meaning; utterances related to
impeded tasks reveal disappointing relational meanings which can lead to anger,
and utterances related to tasks with no or little progress reveal the frustration of
the individuals. Lastly, all these emotional responses in a social context will not
only regulate or maintain individual’s actions to reveal or hinder an intention, but
also can control the way that action should be taken.
A successful and effective emotional communication necessitates ongoing recip-
rocal adjustments between interacting individuals that can happen by interpreting
each other’s behaviors [156]. It not only requires proper interpretation of the other’s
expressions, but also correct assessment of the extent to which others can read an
individual’s expressions. In emotional communication, individuals are constantly ex-
changing messages about their mental state, and modifying each other’s emotional
responses as they occur. Individuals perceive others’ emotional states by processing
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verbal and nonverbal messages during the interaction. Communication dynamics
represent the temporal relationship between these communicative messages. The
verbal and nonverbal messages from one participant are interpreted inside the con-
text including the history and the ongoing messages from the other individuals.
Interpersonal dynamics (also known as micro-dynamics in sociology) represent this
influence of relationships between individuals [172].
2.3.4 Social Functions of Emotions
Humans are able to communicate their emotions in a social context. The social
functions of emotions are the reason behind why humans try to communicate their
emotions. Ekman in [70] asserts that the primary function of emotions is to mobi-
lize the organism to deal with important interpersonal encounters. Darwin in [62]
argues the significance of social communicative functions of emotions. Emotions
describe interpersonal dynamics in a way that they can constitute individuals’ re-
lationships [183, 254]. One aspect of expressing and communicating emotion in a
social context is to express one’s social motives and intentions [110]. Another aspect
of communicating emotions is to reveal the underlying mental state of an individual
[184]. In other words, emotions constitute two different functionalities of expressing
communicative signals associated with one’s social motives and intentions as well
as expressing one’s internal states and how one feels about something. In [135] Van
Kleef has discussed the idea of inferential processes with which individuals can infer
information about others’ feelings, relational orientations and behavioral intentions
based on their emotional expressions. He also argues that emotional expressions can
impact social interactions by eliciting others’ affective responses.
Functional accounts of emotions vary according to the kind of system being
analyzed. Thus, functional approaches to the emotions vary by level of analysis.
Social functions of emotions can be analyzed in individual, dyadic, group and cul-
tural levels. The focus of this research is on social functions in dyadic interaction
(more specifically collaboration); these functions are also considered at the individ-
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ual’s level especially when interpreting the other collaborator’s behaviors. Studies
in all these levels share a few assumptions: a) individuals are social by nature and
pursue solutions to survival problems in social relationships, b) individuals apply
their emotions to coordinate their social interactions and relationships to address
these survival problems, c) emotions are processes mediating the individuals’ re-
lations to their dynamic environment [129]. In dyadic interactions, studies focus
on how emotions impact the interactions of individuals in meaningful relationships.
In [129] Keltner and Haidt discuss that in a dyadic setting, researchers mostly
focus on communication of emotion (e.g. Scherer [217], DePaulo [66]), properties
(e.g. emotion contingency, emotion synchrony) of dyadic emotions (e.g. Levenson &
Gottman [144]), discourse (e.g. Bretherton [36]), and attachments (e.g. Hazan &
Shaver [107]).
Examples of Social Emotions:
There are many different types of emotions, only some of which are considered so-
cial, since they appear and provide meaning in social context. Here, we provide
four examples of such emotions as well as their social functions to show how social
functions of emotions impact individuals and the groups they belong to, and what
causes them to be expressed by an individual.
Guilt – The function of guilt is to positively direct our behavior toward our group.
We feel guilt when we hurt someone in our group, or when we fail to reciprocate
care or kindness. Guilt motivates us to not hurt people in our group and to give
back to others who have given to us, and in this way we strengthen the survival
prospects of both the group and ourselves.
Shame – The function of shame is twofold. On the one hand, it keeps us within the
rules and norms of society by informing us when we have done something dishon-
orable, disgraceful, or in some way condemned by our group. On the other hand,
it informs the other members of our group that we know that we have dishonored
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ourselves. The main difference between guilt and shame is that guilt is focused on
a behavior, whereas shame is focused on ourselves.
Embarrassment – Embarrassment is related to shame, but includes some impor-
tant differences. Embarrassment can only happen in public, whereas shame can
happen when we are alone. We can feel embarrassment about very minor issues
that have no moral implications, such as body odor, whereas shame typically con-
cerns more grave issues with moral implications.
Pride – The function of pride is to reinforce when we or another person has done
or represented something the group finds excellent. In this way, group values are
reinforced and incentivized, which again helps the group to function better and
motivates us to do things the group values. There is a negative form of pride in
which our internal appraisal of our worth is inflated compared to the opinions of
others, which is more correctly called hubris.
2.3.5 Artificial Emotions
Emotions, as an integral part of rational behavior, provide adaptive values for an
artificial creature. They can control an agent’s attention to focus on the most salient
and relevant stimulus to solve the immediate problem. They can also help an agent
to monitor its own performance so that the agent can make alterations on goals and
plans. Emotions can act as a memory filter allowing a better recall of the events
that are congruent with current cognitive and emotional states [30]. Assisting the
reasoning process is another role of emotions; they assist the reasoning process by di-
recting the cognitive information processes to the perceptual cues. Emotions impact
the transformation of the agent’s decision-making behavior [84] leading to a partic-
ular type of actions in a certain type of environment [272]. Emotions can govern
behavior tendencies by providing immediate emotional responses, e.g., avoidance
of elaborate reasoning because of lack of time or an unconcerned situation. Fur-
thermore, emotions provide support for social interactions by helping the agent to
understand others’ behaviors as well as making expressions of the agent’s internal
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states more perceivable during the interaction [81].
The importance of these values of emotions for designing social agents having
artificial emotions is apparent. However, the question is what problems are we
facing in designing an effective social agent? In [63] authors discuss some of these
problems and provide references speculating on the nature, function and mechanisms
of emotions. Also, the importance of emotions and the incorporation of emotions
in intelligent systems as well as implementation of emotions in several multi-agent
systems are presented in [164]. Scheutz discusses the role of emotions in artificial
intelligence and how we can determine the utility of emotions for the design of an
artificial agent [225]. In [25] the authors present a definition and theory of artificial
emotions viewed as a sequential process comprising the appraisal of the agent’s
global state; they also show how emotions are generated, represented and used in the
Salt and Pepper architecture for autonomous agents. From the behavior perspective,
appropriately timed and clearly expressed emotions are a central requirement for
believable agents [19].
There are several architectures modeling emotions for the purpose of enhancing
the believability and effectiveness of the agents and robots. But the question is
how do we model emotions? Hudlika in [117] deconstructs the concept of emotion
modeling into: (a) fundamental categories of processes for emotion generation and
emotion effects, and (b) identification of some of the fundamental computational
tasks required to implement these processes. These building blocks can be helpful
as a guideline for the systematic development of new computational models, or for
the assessment of existing computational models of emotions as discussed in [148]
and [163]. There are also logical formalizations of emotions and emotional attitudes
(including speech acts) and corresponding mental state to provide a systematic
analysis of computational models of emotions [1, 88, 104].
From another perspective, the necessity of employing emotions in robotics and
more specifically social robots has been argued in [186] and [242]. Social robotics
and cognitive robotics have many overlapping concepts, especially when they focus
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on interaction between a robot and a human. The relationship between cognition
and emotion receives more attention due to the mutual influences they have on each
other [173, 228]. For instance, in [81] the authors employ emotions in the learn-
ing procedure of a robot, and in [38] and [224] authors discuss the importance of
emotions in the action selection procedure of an agent or a robot, impacting the be-
havior arbitration and self-adaptation mechanisms. Ultimately, employing artificial
emotions will impact the context of human-robot/computer interaction [115] and
how humans and robots understand each other’s emotions in a social environment
[132, 176]. In [207] the authors selected twelve autonomous agents that incorporate
an emotion mechanism into the action selection procedure to compare. They in-
troduced a framework based on correlations between emotion roles performed and
aspects of emotion mechanisms used to perform those roles. Gratch and Marsella
also present a method to evaluate a computational model of emotion in [90] which
compares behavior of the model against human behavior.
2.3.6 Cognitive Architectures
There are several integrated cognitive architectures that try to produce all aspects
of behavior as a single system in different domains [126, 137]. Surveys on the
comparison of underlying philosophy and functional description of the most promi-
nent cognitive architectures introduce several criteria to evaluate such architectures
[47, 139, 253]. The necessity of integrating these cognitive architectures into robots
has been discussed from the perspective of developmental psychology [10, 67, 128].
There are also many examples emphasizing the importance of cognitive robotics
from this perspective, while some of them also incorporate the concept of affect in
their design [40]. Some of these cognitive architectures are biologically inspired,
e.g., eBICA [211], or [20] and [199], while some others are inspired by psychological
theories, e.g., ACT −RΦ [61], or [170] and [68].
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2.4 Computational Models of Emotions
There are different types of computational theories of emotion such as appraisal
and dimensional theories. These theories differ in the type of relationships between
their components and whether a particular component plays the crucial role in an
individual emotion. For instance, the basic component of an emotion can be the
behavioral tendencies, the cognitive elements, or the somatic processes. Emotion
theories can also differ based on their representational distinctions.
2.4.1 Appraisal Theory
Appraisal theories of emotion were first formulated by Arnold [9] and Lazarus [140]
and then were actively developed in the early 1980s by Ellsworth and Scherer and
their students [206] [212] [216] [221] [223]. In general, the emotional experience is
the experience of a particular situation [79]. Appraisal theory describes the cog-
nitive process by which an individual evaluates the situation in the environment
with respect to the individual’s well-being and triggers emotions to control internal
changes and external actions. In this section, we are going to review sequential and
structural approaches incorporating the appraisal concept.
Componential Approach
This approach emphasizes the distinct components of emotions, and is often called
the componential approach [145]. The “components” referred to in this approach
are the components of the cognitive appraisal process. These are referred to as ap-
praisal variables, and include novelty, valence, goal relevance, goal congruence, and
coping abilities (later in this section some of the appraisal variables used in compu-
tational models are introduced) [216, 223]. A stimulus, whether real or imagined, is
analyzed in terms of its meaning and consequences for the agent, to determine the
affective reaction. The analysis involves assigning specific values to the appraisal
variables. Once the appraisal variable values are determined by the organism’s eval-
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Figure 2.2: Schematic view of the componential theory of emotion [118].
uative processes, the resulting vector is mapped onto a particular emotion, within
the n-dimensional space defined by the n appraisal variables. The semantic primi-
tives for representing emotions within this model are thus these individual appraisal
variables. Figure 2.2 shows the relationship of the individual appraisal dimensions
to the broader categories of evaluations taking place during appraisal (Relevance,
Implications, etc.).
Component Process Model
The Component Process Model (CPM) is Scherer’s influential appraisal theory of
emotions [218, 223]. This theory focuses on the dynamic unfolding of emotions.
The CPM suggests that an event and its consequences are appraised with a set of
criteria on multiple levels of processing (the appraisal component). The result of
the appraisal will generally have a motivational effect, often changing or modifying
the motivational state (see Section 2.5) before the occurrence of the event. Based
on the appraisal results and the motivational changes, some effects will occur in the
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autonomic and somatic nervous system. The CPM considers emotions as the syn-
chronization of many different cognitive and physiological components. Emotions
are identified with the overall process whereby low level cognitive appraisals, in par-
ticular the processing of relevance, trigger bodily reactions, behaviors and subjective
feelings. The model suggests that there are four major appraisal objectives required
to adaptively react to a salient event [220]:
a) Relevance: How relevant is this event for the agent? Does it directly affect the
agent or its social reference group?
b) Implications: What are the implications or consequences of this event and how
do they affect the agent’s well-being and its immediate or long-term goals?
c) Coping Potential: How well can the agent cope with or adjust to these conse-
quences?
d) Normative Significance: What is the significance of this event for the agent’s
self-concept and for social norms and values?
To attain these objectives, the agent evaluates the event and its consequences
on a number of criteria or Stimulus Evaluation Checks (SECs), with the results
reflecting the agents subjective assessment of consequences and implications on a
background of personal needs, goals, and values [223]. Figure 2.3 shows the postu-
lated sequence, the cognitive and motivational inputs and the effects on response
systems. Also, the bidirectional effects between appraisal and other cognitive func-
tions are illustrated by the arrows in the upper part of Figure 2.3.
Appraisal Process
According to appraisal theory, appraisals are separable antecedents of emotion, that
is, the individual first evaluates the environment and then feels an appropriate emo-
tion [223]. The appraisal procedure begins with the evaluation of the environment
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Figure 2.3: Comprehensive illustration of the CPM of emotion [220, 223].
according to the internalized goals and is based on systematic assessment of several
elements [218]. The outcome of this process triggers the appropriate emotions. In
many versions of appraisal theory, appraisals also trigger cognitive responses often
called coping strategies. In fact, the coping mechanism manages the individual’s ac-
tion with respect to the individual’s emotional state and the existing internal and/or
external demands [77]. The majority of computational models of emotions take this
approach. An individual can also use knowledge about the emotional reactions of
others to make inferences about the others. According to the appraisal patterns,
different emotions can be experienced and expressed. Since expression of emotions
reflects one’s intentions through the appraisal process, the reverse appraisal mech-
anism helps one to infer others’ mental state based on their expressions. [64, 106].
The appraisal process is typically viewed as the cause of emotion and the cog-
nitive and behavioral changes associated with emotion. For instance, a particular
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pattern of the appraisal variables (i.e., individual judgments) will elicit a certain
emotion or emotional expressions. Some of the (computational) appraisal variables
include [162]:
• Relevance: A relevant event has non-zero utility for an agent. This relevancy
can either be based on a negative influence of an event on the agent or a positive
one.
• Perspective: The point of view in which an event will be judged, e.g. self or
other.
• Desirability: A desirable event advances the utility for an agent whose per-
spective is being taken, or if it is an undesirable event, inhibits that.
• Likelihood: A measure of how likely is the outcome.
• Expectedness: The extent to which the truth value of a state could have
been predicted from causal interpretation.
• Causal Attribution: The agent who deserves the credit/blame.
• Controllability: Whether the outcome can be altered by the agent whose
perspective is taken (this variable is related to the coping process).
• Changeability: Whether the outcome can be altered by some other causal
agent (this variable is related to coping process).
Coping Process
Another key process involved in appraisal is coping. This process determines whether
and how the agent should respond with respect to the outcome of appraising the
events. There are several coping strategies that computational models such as EMA
[92] use as control signals. These control signals enable or suppress the cognitive pro-
cesses that operate on the causal interpretation of the appraisal patterns. The coping
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process controls the congruency of the actions according to these patterns. As it is
shown below, coping strategies are organized into two categories: problem-focused
and emotion-focused. Problem-focused coping strategies can be applied when the
agent must do something with respect to the problem, whereas emotion-focused
coping works by changing one’s interpretation of circumstances. The following is a
short list of a broad range of coping strategies [92]:
Problem-focused coping
• Active coping: Taking steps to remove or circumvent the stressor,
• Planning: Coming up with action strategies,
• Seeking social support for instrumental reasons: Seeking advice,
assistance, or information.
Emotion-focused coping
• Seeking social support for instrumental reasons: Getting sympa-
thy, moral support or understanding,
• Acceptance: Accepting the stressor and learning to live with it,
• Restraint coping: Waiting till the appropriate opportunity (holding
back).
OCC, a Structural Appraisal Model of Emotion
OCC (Ortony, Clore and Collins) model, similar to Lazarus’ [141] and Scherer’s [216]
cognitive views, considers emotions to arise from affective or valenced reactions
subsequent to the appraisal of a stimulus as being beneficial or harmful to one’s
concern [178]. OCC model categorizes emotions based on their underlying appraisal
patterns. These patterns are fundamental criteria a person employs for evaluating
a situation. They involve the person’s focus of attention, her concern, and her
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Figure 2.4: A simple visualization of OCC model [178].
appraisal preceding an affective reaction. Figure 2.4 shows the main building blocks
of OCC model.
As shown in Figure 2.4, a person could alternatively have three types of focus.
These types of focus are the consequence of events, actions of agents, and aspects of
objects. A person evaluates the significance of the causes behind these three types
of focus based on her personal concerns. As a result, an affective reaction will be
elicited, resulting in an emotion. Various combinations of the elements depicted in
Figure 2.4 create specific patterns resulting in six main groups of emotions in which
all emotion types in a group share the same cognitive pattern (see Figure 2.5).
Emotion groups are fortune-of-others, prospect-based, well-being, attribution, well-
being/attribution- compound, and attraction. The OCC model introduces 22 emotion
types. Each of these emotions is introduced as a representative of a family of similar
emotions with various intensities (since relying on a list of discrete emotions that is
understood by everyone equally is impossible due to people’s language barriers and
various interpretations of the actual words)1. For instance, while they all share the
same eliciting conditions, happiness can be referred to by many other emotion terms
such as joy, cheerfulness, gladness and delighted. Thus the emotion types used in
1In stark contrast to basic emotion theories discussed in Section 2.4.2.
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the model (e.g., relief, love, pride, and shame) are meant to represent an emotional
experience rather than a lexical taxonomy.
For instance, as shown in Figure 2.4, the appraisal criterion for consequences
of events is their desirability for achieving one’s goals. This generates the affective
reaction of being pleased in positive cases, or displeased in negative ones. Figure
2.5 shows the resulting emotion groups in OCC model such as fortune-of-others
(e.g., gloating, pity), prospect-based (e.g., satisfaction, relief), and well-being (e.g.,
joy, distress) [178]. The appraisal of the praiseworthiness of the actions of an agent
against one’s personal standards, as well as the appealing aspects of objects happens
in the same way as shown in Figure 2.4.
Finally, the OCC model introduces some global variables of an emotion’s in-
tensity to distinguish all types of emotions that a person could experience when
encountering events, agents or objects. These variables are as follows
1. Sense of reality (representing the degree to which the event, agent or object
in focus appear real to the person),
2. Proximity variable (representing the psychological closeness of an event, agent
or object),
3. Unexpectedness (representing how surprising an event is for one, either positive
or negative),
4. Arousal (representing how stimulating an event, agent or object is).
2.4.2 Other (Non-Appraisal) Computational Models
Constructivist (Dimensional) Emotion Theories
The components and dimensions of emotions have been the subject of much specula-
tion since the 19th century. Dimensional models of emotion attempt to conceptualize
human emotions by defining where they lie in two or three dimensions. Dimensional
48
Figure 2.5: OCC taxonomy of emotion triggers and emotions [178].
theories of emotion argue that emotions should be conceptualized as points in a
continuous dimensional space, rather than looking at them as discrete entities [43]
[168] [209] [261].
Two dimensions that are commonly proposed to describe emotions are valence
and physiological arousal [9] [141] [208]. Models based on dimensional theories in-
troduce the emotion concept as a non-relational construct summarizing a unique
overall state of the individual. The models based on dimensional theories contrast
theories of basic emotion (see Section 2.4.2), which propose that different emotions
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Figure 2.6: Russell’s suggested affective states based on core affect [209].
arise from separate neural systems [192]. Also, models based on dimensional the-
ories contrast appraisal theories, which propose that appraisals are the relational
constructs characterizing the relationship between one’s mental state and a specific
stimulus. Many dimensional theories argue that discrete emotion categories (e.g.,
sadness, fear and anger) have no “reality” in that there are no specific brain re-
gions or functions that correspond to specific emotions [18]. Therefore, dimensional
theories do not emphasize the term emotion.
One of the most prominent two-dimensional models is Russell’s circumplex model
[208]. Russell suggested that affective states are all related to each other systemati-
cally through what is called core affect [208, 209] (see Figure 2.6) and emotions are
best described as a change in core affect which, in turn, is describable as a point in a
space of two dimensions. One dimension is valence or how good or bad objects and
events are for a being (ranging from pleasant to unpleasant). The other dimension
is arousal, ranging from calm to excited. Russell put a number of affective states
around a circular space between those two dimensions (see Figure 2.6) which is also
known as circumplex, representing the variety of core affects [208, 209]. Since some-
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Figure 2.7: Three dimensional model of pleasure, arousal and dominance as tripar-
tite view of experience [17].
times two-dimensional space cannot easily differentiate among emotions that share
the same values of arousal and valence, e.g., anger and fear (both characterized
by high arousal and negative valence), some of the dimensional models incorporate
valence and arousal as well as intensity, or dominance or stance dimensions. Many
computational dimensional models build on the three dimensional PAD model of
Mehrabian and Russell [168] where these dimensions correspond to pleasure (a mea-
sure of valence), arousal (indicating the level of affective activation) and dominance
(a measure of power or control). Figure 2.7 shows these three dimensions.
Basic (Discrete) Emotion Theories
Basic emotion theories are inspired by Tomkins’ [255] rediscovery of Darwin’s work
[62, 110] which were later developed further by Ekman [70] and Izard [120]. These
theories emphasize a small set of discrete and fundamental emotions. The under-
lying assumption of this approach is that these emotions are mediated by asso-
ciated neural circuitry, with a hardwired component [70]. Different emotions are
then characterized by stable patterns of triggers, behavioral expression, and associ-
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ated distinct subjective experiences. The emotions addressed by these theories are
typically called the basic emotions. Emotions including happiness, sadness, fear,
anger, surprise, and disgust are often considered to comprise the most prototypi-
cal basic emotions [70]. The theory of basic emotions holds that there is a set of
emotions shared by all humans that evolved to deal with ancestral life challenges
[70]. For instance, disgust evolved to address the challenge of avoiding noxious stim-
uli, and fear evolved to address the challenge of avoiding dangers. Because of the
emphasis on discrete categories of states, this approach is also termed the categor-
ical approach [182]. Much of the supporting evidence offered for the theory comes
from experiments that show how certain facial expressions are universally associ-
ated with specific basic emotions, regardless of the observer’s cultural background.
This universality has a production side and a recognition side. On the produc-
tion side, a particular emotional state is said to elicit a facial expression comprised
of a specific set of facial muscles. On the recognition side, observers are able to
infer the emotional state of the person who expresses an emotion, due to the di-
rect correspondence between emotional states and the facial expressions they cause.
Computational models inspired by the basic emotions or discrete approach often
focus on low-level perceptual-motor tasks and encode a two-process view of emotion
that argues for a fast, automatic, undifferentiated emotional response and a slower,
more differentiated response that relies on higher level reasoning processes (e.g., [8]).
There are other approaches that different researchers take based on their em-
phasis on the applicability of emotions in their systems.
Rational Approaches
Rational approaches start from the question of what adaptive functions emotions
serve and then attempt to incorporate these functions into a model of intelligence.
Emotion, within this approach, is simply another set of processes and constraints
that have adaptive value. Models of this sort are most naturally directed towards
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the goal of improving theories of artificial intelligence [4] [227] [238].
Communicative Approaches
Communicative theories of emotion argue that emotion processes function as a com-
municative system. They can function first, as a mechanism for informing other
individuals of one’s mental state (thereby facilitating social coordination), and sec-
ond, as a mechanism for requesting/demanding changes in the behavior of others.
Communicative theories emphasize the social-communicative function of expressions
[89]. Computational models inspired by communicative theories focus on machinery
that decides when an emotional expression can have a desired effect on a human
counterpart.
2.4.3 Similarities and Differences
Different theoretical perspectives should not be viewed as competing for a single
truth. Instead, they should be seen as perspectives arising from particular research
areas (e.g., biological vs. social psychology), focusing on different sets of affective
phenomena, considering different levels of resolution and fundamental components
(e.g., emotions vs. appraisal variables). These different perspectives provide differ-
ent degrees of support for the various processes of emotion, e.g., the componential
theories provide extensive details about cognitive appraisals [118]. Therefore, this
section provides a pairwise comparison between these fundamental theories. Note
that a separate pairwise comparison will not be provided for appraisal vs. discrete
(basic) emotion theories as the important points are adequately covered in the com-
parisons presented below.
Dimensional Vs. Discrete (Basic) Emotion Theories
The fundamental assumption of the basic emotion theory is that a specific type of
event triggers a specific affect program corresponding to one of the basic emotions
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and producing characteristic expression patterns and physiological response configu-
rations [221]. Dimensional theories’ main criticism of basic emotions theory is based
on the observation that affective phenomena appear to be both qualitatively and
quantitatively diverse.
Russell in [209] argues the labels such as “fear”, “anger”, “happiness” do not
capture this diversity. For instance, one might say: a) a person being chased by an
assailant brandishing a knife, b) a person who retreats from an insect moving across
the floor, and c) a person who is concerned they will never find a fulfilling career, are
all in a state of fear. On the basic emotions account, an emotional episode involves
fixed patterns of neurophysiological and facial expression changes in response to
an eliciting stimulus that are distinct between emotions, but are the same within
the same emotional category [70]. If this were the case, one would expect that the
three individuals described above would respond to their eliciting stimuli in the
same way, yet a similarity of behavioral responses between these three cases seems
unlikely. Dimensional theorists, in contrast, would argue that the individuals in the
above three cases are applying the concept of fear to experience, despite the fact that
each individual has a unique core affect. While basic emotion theorists would hold
that since all three individuals are experiencing fear, they would perform the same
behavioral responses to the stimuli, dimensional theorists would argue this is not
the case, as each individual bears a core affective state that is distinguished from the
other two. For instance, the individual’s arousal in response to an armed assailant
should be higher than the individual in response to an insect, as the former case
poses a threat to their life. As a result, the individual in the first case would likely
make every effort to escape from the assailant, including trying to negotiate and
plead with the assailant, while the individual in the second case would be relatively
less dedicated to escaping the insect.
In sum, a dimensional theory is compatible with the differences in the behavioral
responses to eliciting stimuli, while basic emotions theory only allows for a single
fixed behavior of responses to a given emotion. Furthermore, dimensional theories
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Figure 2.8: Representing basic emotions within a dimensional framework [105].
can represent instances of basic emotions (see Figure 2.8), for example, fear elicited
by a snake (green rectangle), in terms of variation along affective dimensions, i.e.,
arousal and valence.
Also, basic emotion theory fails to account for affect that lacks object-directedness
[209]. In the basic emotions approach, an emotion is supposed to have an intentional
object it is directed towards (e.g., being angry at someone, or being sad for some-
one). The dimensional theory argues that emotion may not necessarily be aimed
at a particular object. For instance, an individual can experience a certain type of
emotion (e.g., anger) without knowing of anything in particular that has offended
her. Dimensional models of emotion are therefore capable of accounting for a wider
range of affective phenomena than basic emotions theory.
Another difference between dimensional and basic emotion theories is that the
basic emotion categorization of emotions captures facets of the experience of an
emotion not conveyed by the dimensional description, such as elicitation of a facial
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expression of the emotion. In fact, this attribute of the basic emotions theory is one
of the major differences with all other emotion theories. It is argued in basic emotion
theory that basic emotions are hard-wired to their corresponding facial expressions.
Ekman, who elaborated the concept of basic emotions, developed the Facial Action
Coding System (FACS) which encodes movements of individual facial muscles and
it is a common standard to systematically categorize the physical expression of
emotions [71].
Appraisal Vs. Dimensional Emotions Theories
Dimensional theories struggle to adequately distinguish emotions because of the
existence of limited dimensions.
To compare the appraisal and dimensional theories of emotion, we argue that
there is a relationship between the dimensions in the dimensional theories of emotion
and the appraisal dimensions. For instance, the pleasure dimension roughly maps
onto appraisal dimensions that characterize the valence of an appraisal-eliciting
event, (e.g., intrinsic pleasantness –desirability–, or goal congruence), dominance
roughly maps onto the appraisal dimension of coping potential, and arousal can be
considered as a measure of intensity. However, these dimensions and corresponding
appraisal variables have quite different meanings. Appraisal (as mentioned ear-
lier) is a relational construct characterizing the relationship between some specific
object/event in the environment and the individual’s mental constructs including
beliefs, motives and intentions. Also, several appraisals may be simultaneously ac-
tive, whereas emotions in dimensional emotion theory are non-relational constructs,
each summarizing a unique overall state of the individual.
Furthermore, dimensional emotion theories emphasize different components of
emotion than appraisal theories and link these components quite differently. In
contrast to appraisal theories, dimensional emotion theories do not address affect’s
antecedents in detail. Dimensional theorists question the tight causal linkage be-
tween appraisal and emotion that is central to appraisal accounts. As mentioned
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earlier, dimensional theorists believe that the emotion is not necessarily about some
object (as in “I am angry at him”). In such theories, many factors may contribute
to a change in emotion including intentional judgments (e.g., appraisal). However,
in dimensional emotion theories, the link between any preceding intentional mean-
ing and emotion is broken and most of the time cannot be recovered correctly. For
example, Russell argues for the following sequence: some event occurs (e.g., a bear
walks out of the forest), it is perceived in terms of its affective quality; this per-
ception results in a crucial change in core affect; this change is attributed to some
“object” (e.g., the bear); and only then is the object cognitively appraised in terms
of its goal relevance, causal antecedents and future prospects [161].
We can also compare dimensional emotion theories to the OCC model as a cog-
nitive appraisal model. The major similarity between these two models is that they
both consider emotions to descend from valenced reactions to the stimuli. Further-
more, they acknowledge the role of arousal in determining emotional reactions. As
mentioned in Section 2.4.2, Russell considered arousal as one of the two key dimen-
sions of emotions which could be used to partially discriminate emotional states
[208]. In a different manner, the OCC model recognizes arousal as a necessary
condition for eliciting emotions, and regards arousal as a major determinant of the
elicited emotion’s intensity which distinguishes among various emotions of a partic-
ular type (e.g., fearful versus scared). In [219] Scherer speculates that the arousal
dimension in dimensional models gives little information about the underlying ap-
praisal of the elicited emotion and proposes to replace it with coping potential,
which is an appraisal dimension referring to the individual’s perceived control in a
given situation.
Models based on dimensional emotion theories pursue the idea of eliciting an
emotion according to the joint features in circumplex space (2D or 3D – see Sec-
tion 2.4.2), while OCC or other models of appraisal theory are based on patterns of
antecedents of emotions. This is the fundamental difference between OCC, or ap-
praisal theories in general, and the circumplex approach of Russell [208] or Mehra-
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Figure 2.9: A rough projection of emotion groups of OCC on the circumplex of
affect [3].
bian’s PAD model [17, 168]. Also, models based on appraisal theory of emotions
employ causation, attribution and eliciting conditions in order to distinguish emo-
tions, while the eliciting conditions are not directly accessible from a dimensional
approach. A dimensional model may fall short in establishing why certain emotions
are elicited. However, when the objective is to identify the generated emotions and
their level of pleasantness and intensity, a circumplex model presents an excellent
opportunity [3].
Finally, we consider how a model based on dimensional emotions (i.e., Russell’s
2D circumplex) relates to a cognitive model based on appraisal theory (i.e., OCC).
Figure 2.9 shows the relationship between Russell’s circumplex and the OCC model
in terms of the categorization of actual emotions. The number of emotions in a
section of Russell’s circumplex that fall into an emotion group of OCC is shown
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in parentheses. For instance, all three emotions in the top section (highly excited,
neutrally valenced emotions) fall into prospect-based emotion group. Or, as an-
other example, emotions in the left section (neutral arousal value, negative valenced
emotions) make a one to one relationship between disappointment and the prospect
based emotion group, contempt and attribution emotion group, and jealousy and
fortune of others emotion group (hence number (1) is indicated in front of each).
2.4.4 Applications in Autonomous Agents and Robots
There are many research areas, including robotics and autonomous agents, that
employ the structure and/or functions of emotions in their work with a variety of
reasons for modeling emotions [262]. Some of this work is inspired by specific psy-
chological theories, while some are freely using the concept of emotion without a
theoretical grounding in social sciences; some are using a combination of concepts
from different psychological theories. For instance, in PECS [257], which is designed
for modeling human behaviors, the agent architecture is not based on any specific
social or psychological emotion theory. In fact, it is intentionally designed and de-
scribed in a way which enables the integration of a variety of theories. The PECS’
design enables an integrative modeling of physical, emotional, cognitive and social
influences within a component-oriented agent architecture. Also, in [165] the com-
putational architecture, which is designed to provide information about the possible
overall behavior of a work team, is not based any specific theory. As mentioned
earlier, some researchers apply combinations of emotion theories in their work [133].
For instance, in [41] Can˜amero shows how an agent can use emotions for activity
selection while taking into account both dimensional and discrete approaches in an
action selection mechanism.
We can also see the application of emotion theories in designing companion
robots capable of expressing emotions and social behaviors, as well as robots which
can convey certain types of emotion products, e.g., empathy [33] [142] [181] [232].
Robots also use emotion theories for automatic affect recognition using different
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modalities [109] [270]. Moreover, in some work, researchers have explored the user’s
affective state as a mechanism to adapt the robot’s behaviors during the interaction
[32] [151].
Applications of Appraisal Theory – The emphasis of models derived from
appraisal theories of emotion is on making appraisal the central process. Compu-
tational appraisal models often exploit elaborate mechanisms for deriving appraisal
variables such as decision-theoretic plans [92] [162], reactive plans [196] [201] [245],
Markov-decision processes [72] [234], or detailed cognitive models [158]. However,
emotion itself is sometimes treated less elaborately, simply as a label to which be-
havior can be attached [74]. Appraisal is usually modeled as the cause of emotion
being derived via simple rules applied to a set of appraisal variables.
Computational appraisal models have been applied to a variety of uses includ-
ing contributions to psychology, robotics, AI, and HCI. For instance, Marsella and
Gratch have used EMA [162] to generate specific predictions about how human sub-
jects will appraise and cope with emotional situations and argue that empirical tests
of these predictions have implications for psychological appraisal theory [91] [160].
There are other examples in artificial intelligence and robotics of applying appraisal
theory [2] [130] [162]. In robotics, appraisal theory has been used to establish and
maintain a better interaction between a robot and a human. For instance in [130]
researchers use a computational model of emotion generation based on appraisal
theory to have a positive human-robot interaction experience. In [212] the authors
describe a system approach to appraisal processes based on Scherer’s work on ap-
praisal and the CPM [216]. They show how the temporal unfolding of emotions can
be experimentally tested. They also lay out a general domain-independent compu-
tational model of appraisal and coping. In [260] researchers consider their robot,
INDIGO’s, emotion, speech and facial expressions as key features to establish effec-
tive communication between the robot and a human during their interaction. They
apply concepts of appraisal theory in INDIGO’s emotion modeling. MAGGIE, a
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sociable robot, also applies an appraisal theory of emotions to consider fear in its
decision making system [86]. Velasquez developed Cathexis, which is a distributed
computational model for generation of emotions and their influence in the behavior
of the autonomous agents [259]. The emotion model in this work is based on Rose-
man’s work on appraisal theory. Marinier and Laird in [157] focus on the functional
benefits of emotion in a cognitive system. In this work, they integrate their emotion
theory (which is based on appraisal theory) with the Soar cognitive architecture,
and use emotional feedback to drive reinforcement learning. In [116] Hudlicka pro-
vides a generic mechanism mediating the affective influences on cognition based
on cognitive appraisal. This model is implemented within a domain-independent
cognitive-affective architecture (MAMAID).
In the virtual agents community, empathy is a research topic that has received
much attention in the last decade [30] [167] [179] [193] [250]. In [191] researchers
developed an agent with the capability of affective decision-making based on ap-
praisal theory to establish a relationship with its users. Then, they compared the
performance of their agent with a human (based on a WoZ study) in a speed-dating
experiment. In HCI, appraisal theory has been primarily used for the creation
of interactive characters that exhibit emotions in order to make characters more
believable [200], more realistic [155] [256], more capable of understanding human
motivational states [58] or more able to induce desirable social effects in human
users [180].
Applications of Dimensional Theory – The emphasis of models influenced
by dimensional theories is on processes associated with core affect which is usually
represented as a continuous time-varying process, and can be represented at a given
time by a point in a 2D or 3D-space as a response to the eliciting events. Gen-
erally, there are detailed mechanisms in computational dimensional models which
determine how this point changes over time, e.g., decay to some resting state, and
incorporating the impact of dispositional tendencies such as personality or temper-
ament [83] [161]. Models based on dimensional theories have also been used in
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robotics. For instance, researchers in [147] apply PAD’s three-dimensional space to
rate the pleasure, arousal and dominance of their Multimodal Emotional Intelligence
robot (MEI) in each interaction with human subjects by understanding and express-
ing emotions in voice, gesture and gait. In [271] researchers want to understand the
effect of different interface features for a service robot. They use valence and arousal
dimensions in their questionnaires to assess the perceived anthropomorphism of their
service robot by subjects. In [136] researchers introduce the implementation of a
dynamic personality for a robot based on a dimensional emotion model. They use
WASABI’s architecture [22, 23] as their emotional model. In [149] Lisetti describes
an affective knowledge representation scheme to be used in the design of a socially
intelligent artificial agent. Lisetti uses the valence-arousal two dimensional model of
emotion in this work. This model has been applied in an emotion-based architecture
of Lisetti’s autonomous robots as well as a multimodal affective user interface agent.
ROMAN, an expressive robotic head, uses a behavior-based emotional control ar-
chitecture. The approach to the emotional component of the architecture is based
on the dimensional emotion theory [113].
Comparison of Applications of Emotion Theories – Researchers often use
computational dimensional models for behavior generation of animated characters.
The reason might be because it is easier to translate emotions to a limited num-
ber of dimensions that can be readily mapped to continuous features of behavior
such as the spatial extent of a facial expression. For example, PAD models describe
all behavior in terms of only three dimensions of pleasure, arousal and dominance,
whereas researchers using appraisal models would need to either associate each be-
havior with a large number of appraisal variables [222] [243], or try to map appraisal
variables into a limited and small number of discrete expressions [74]. For a similar
reason, dimensional models are also frequently used as a representational framework
for systems that attempt to recognize human emotional behavior. There is some
evidence that they may better discriminate user affective states than approaches
that rely on discrete labels [18].
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There is also a relationship between dimensional and appraisal theories. Some
of the computational models of emotion that incorporate dimensional theories have
viewed appraisal as the mechanism that initiates changes to core affect. For instance,
ALMA [83] includes OCC inspired appraisal rules [178], and WASABI [22] includes
appraisal processes inspired by Scherer’s sequential-checking theory into a PAD-
based emotion model. Moreover, some computational models explore how core affect
in dimensional models can influence cognitive processes. For example, HOTCO 2
[251] allows explanations to be biased by dimensional affect [161].
2.5 Affect and Motives
Motives are essential mental components in decision-making procedures and apply-
ing them in an affect-driven collaborative agent is part of this thesis’ contribution.
In this section, we review related work on computational models of motivation and
discuss the nature of motives. We also explain three of the important social motives
which will be used in our work. Finally, we discuss how humans’ beliefs, emotions
and motives are related and influence each other.
Motivation principles and mechanisms, as the reasons behind one’s intentions and
actions, and the influences of motives on cognition have been discussed in philosophy,
neuroscience, psychology and artificial intelligence [15, 24, 37, 238, 240]. There are
several examples in AI of computational models for different psychological theories of
motivation. Bach’s MicroPsi agent architecture describes the interaction of emotion,
motivation and cognition of agents based on Dietrich Do¨rner’s Psi theory [13, 14,
15, 16]. Merrick and Shafi provide a computational model for motivation based
on Henry Murray’s theory [174] describing the three important social motivations
of achievement, affiliation and power. They focus on the role of motivation in a
goal-selection mechanism [169]. There are other examples focusing on the impact
of motives on different cognitive processes in robots and artificial agents [31, 46, 65,
231, 259, 265]. The motivation mechanism in our work is also inspired by Murray’s
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theory and Bach’s approach on Do¨rner’s theory. It is focused on the role of motives in
cognitive processes, e.g., intention formation in coping, during collaboration, which
will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Motives play an important role in maintaining
the congruency of intentions due to the fact that they are regulated by emotions
(which are the outcome of one’s internal states, e.g., beliefs), and oriented by goals
(which are the desired outcome one wants to achieve).
2.5.1 Motives
A motive consists of an urge (that is, a need indicating a demand) and a goal
that is related to this urge [14]. Motives shape cognition and behavior [229]. To
be motivated means to be moved to do something [210]. Motives direct behaviors
towards particular goals, which makes the agent more persistent in actions it takes.
They also affect cognitive processes by increasing the level of attention. Motive, as
the outcome of the motivation process, initiates, directs and maintains goal-oriented
behaviors.
Motives are goal-driven and they move the agent towards the attainment of
corresponding sets of intentions. In other words, motives as an essential part of
affect can lead the agent to empower an intention. They are essentially mechanisms
that in light of beliefs tend to produce, modify or select between actions and their
reciprocal intentions. Some of motives are transient, like helping the Astronaut
to hold the panel, while some are long term, like reaching to the shared goal of
the collaboration in our ongoing example, installing solar panels and satisfying the
Astronaut’s needs in the field constitutes the shared goal (see Section 3.2).
2.5.2 Motivation Theory
There are several prominent motivation theories in psychology [21, 87, 138], some
of which have received attention as the basis for computational models. In [174],
Murray described and studied 20 different human motives, of which three have
64
received attention in psychology and artificial intelligence as social motives [169,
273]. Our work on motives has been inspired by some of these works in the literature.
However, we have developed our own motive types and their computational models
(see Section 4.6). The following is a brief description of these three social motives,
achievement, affiliation and power [11, 273] which will be used in this thesis:
• Achievement motivation: Achievement motivation drives humans to strive
for excellence by improving on personal and societal standards of performance.
It involves a concern for excellence, for doing one’s best. In artificial agents,
achievement motivation has potential roles in focusing agent behavior and
driving the acquisition of competence.
• Affiliation motivation: Affiliation refers to a class of social interactions that
seek contact with formerly unknown or little known individuals and maintain
contact with those individuals in a manner that both parties experience as
satisfying, stimulating, and enriching. It involves a concern with developing
friendly connections with others through the two contrasting emotional com-
ponents of hope of affiliation and fear of rejection. These two components
become more crucial in the collaboration domain due to the importance of
social emotions and their impact on beliefs and intentions.
• Power motivation: Power can be described as a domain specific relation-
ship between two individuals, characterized by the asymmetric distribution of
social competence, access to resources, or social status. It involves concern
with having an impact on other people or on the world at large. There are
different aspects of fear or avoidance of power which channel and moderate the
expression of power into socially acceptable behavior, working as inhibitions
to unseemly tendencies. Power motivation can be considered with respect to
the probability of success which makes it relevant to the cognitive appraisal
of emotions during collaboration.
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In [273] it is shown that failure of a power goal is associated with anger, confusion
and disgust; success at an affiliation goal is associated with interest, happiness
and feeling loved; and success at an achievement goal is associated with interest,
surprise, happiness, excitement and a sense of focus. In other words, succeeding at
a particular motive is associated with experiencing particular emotions.
2.6 Theory of Mind
Theory of Mind (ToM), as a crucial component in human’s social interaction, plays
an important role in our computational model. It concerns one’s beliefs about
others as intentional agents. Beside the immediate effect, an individual’s action
also depends on her beliefs about other’s perception of that action as well as the
reaction they take. In this thesis, we use the ToM concept whenever the agent needs
to anticipate a human’s mental state. We will also use the term user model as a
standard collection of properties to describe others.
The concept of theory of mind has received much attention in social psychology
and artificial intelligence. Eligio et al. explore what collaborators understand about
each other’s emotions and conclude that being aware of each other’s emotions helps
collaborators to improve their performance [73]. Fussell and Kraus discuss the im-
portance of perspective taking in a successful communication in a social setting [80].
Scassellati discusses the importance of attribution of beliefs, goals and desires to oth-
ers. He presents two psychological theories on the development of theory of mind in
humans and their potential application in building robots with similar capabilities
[213]. Hiatt and Trafton present a cognitive model which borrows mechanisms from
three different postulates of theory of mind and show that their model produces
behaviors in accordance with various theories of experiences [111]. Si, Marsella and
Pynadath discuss PsychSim, an implemented multi-agent-based simulation tool for
modeling social interaction, which has its own beliefs about its environment and
a recursive model of other agents [194]. They also investigate the computational
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modeling of appraisal in a multi-agent decision-theoretic framework using POMDP
based agents [235, 234]. Since applying the concept of theory of mind is crucial in
social interaction and collaboration, this thesis includes a simple ToM mechanism
inspired by this previous work.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we started by defining the concept of collaboration based on Grosz
and Sidner’s work [103], and listed a number of collaboration properties. Then, we
provided the background of two prominent computational theories of collaboration
which helped develop a better understanding of the theories and how they relate to
each other. Next, we presented the SharedPlans theory and its main properties, e.g.,
partial shared plan, recipe, and two notions of intention. Afterwards, we discussed
the key concepts of the Joint Intentions theory including joint commitment and joint
intention. Then, we continued with the hybrid approach of modeling collaboration
and discussed one of the most well-established models, STEAM. We also briefly
mentioned some other approaches. Later, we presented two different lists to compare
similarities and differences between SharedPlans and Joint Intentions collaboration
theories. We ended this document with different categories of applications of these
theories in agent/robot and human collaboration areas.
We believe the SharedPlans and Joint Intentions collaboration theories are the
most well-defined and well-established theories in computer science. We found
SharedPlans theory more convincing than the other major and subordinate ap-
proaches, with respect to its inclusive explanation of the collaboration structure
and its association to discourse analysis which directly improves the communicative
aspects of a collaboration theory. We also understand the value of Joint Inten-
tions theory due to its clarity and closeness to the foundations of collaboration
concepts. These specifications of the Joint Intentions theory can make it applica-
ble in multi-agent system designs and human-robot collaboration. We also consider
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hybrid approaches valuable, such as STEAM, because they clearly understand draw-
backs with existing theories and successfully achieve better collaborative agents by
infusing different concepts from different theories. Although all these theories are
well-defined and properly introduce collaboration concepts, they mostly explain the
structure of a collaboration and they lack the underlying domain-independent pro-
cesses with which collaborative procedures could be defined more systematically and
effectively in different applications.
We have also discussed the description of affective computing and the impor-
tance of the concept of emotion in general and in social context. We reviewed
the importance of communicating emotions as well as emotions’ social functions.
Then, we provided some examples of agents and robots using artificial emotions in
their decision making process. We also briefly provided a few examples of cognitive
architectures producing different aspects of behaviors in robotics.
There are major theories of emotions explaining the concept of emotion. We
discussed these major theories in detail separately, providing their psychological
background and underlying concepts. Following the explanation of these theories,
we were able to discuss the similarities and differences between these major theories.
Finally, we provided applications of these theories in robotics and AI.
In general, we believe the key components provided by prominent computational
collaboration theories could help us in better understanding of collaboration con-
cepts and ultimately developing our computational models to be compatible with
the collaboration structure. However, we believe these theories need to be expanded
by a better understanding of a) the underlying processes leading to these structures,
and b) the involvement of cognitive constructs that could be involved in these pro-
cesses. Furthermore, we believe theories explaining the affect-driven processes could
successfully model nebulous concepts in psychology, to some degree. We have de-
veloped our work based on computational models of emotions, because it is good to
follow well-established (in comparison with others) theoretical foundations. These
theories can be a guideline for our computational models, and they can explain more
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details of the structure or the processes involved in affective situations. However,
we do not necessarily think that the computational models must exactly follow only
one theory and its descriptions. Meaning, different aspects of models can represent
different theories. For instance, appraisal theory is a good representation of the in-
terpretive aspect of emotions and basic emotion theories provide detailed systematic
methods for expressive application. More importantly, we believe the interpersonal
functions of emotions should be our first concern and we should try to relate them
to the structure of our domain, i.e., collaboration. In conclusion, we can see the im-
portance of interpretive, communicative and regulatory aspects of emotion functions
in this proposed work.
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CHAPTER 3
AFFECTIVE MOTIVATIONAL
COLLABORATION THEORY
Current computational collaboration theories specify the structure of collaborative
activities, but are weak on the underlying processes that generate and maintain
these structures. In addition, current computational models of affect (specifically
appraisal models) provide antecedents (e.g., beliefs and goals) of appraisal processes
and clearly distinguish between different appraisals, but do not describe the dif-
ferences of appraisal in a collaboration context. We argue that affective states
are crucial to these underlying processes and we have developed a new compu-
tational theory, called Affective Motivational Collaboration theory, that combines
affect-based processes, such as appraisal and coping, with collaboration processes,
such as planning, in a single unified framework. In this chapter, we provide a general
argument about our AMC theory, major functions of emotions that can be applied in
a collaboration context, as well as the components in our architecture and how each
component (mechanism) deals with the events in a collaborative environment. We
also provide the definition of elements of mental state and their attributes. Later in
Chapter 4, we use all of this information in the new algorithms we have developed,
e.g., appraisal processes, as part of a new overall computational model.
This work is implemented to build robots capable of generating and recognizing
emotions in order to be better collaborators. We have investigated the mutual
influences of affective and collaborative processes in a cognitive theory to support
interaction between humans and robots or virtual agents. We build primarily on the
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cognitive appraisal theory of emotions and the SharedPlans theory of collaboration
to investigate the structure, fundamental processes and functions of emotions in a
collaboration.
Although existing collaboration theories specify the important elements of a col-
laboration structure, the underlying processes required to dynamically create, use,
and maintain the elements of this structure are largely unexplained. For instance,
a general mechanism has yet to be developed that allows an agent to effectively
integrate the influence of its collaborator’s perceived or anticipated emotions into
its own cognitive mechanisms to prevent shared task failures while maintaining col-
laborative behavior. Therefore, a process view of collaboration must include certain
key elements. It should inherently involve social interactions since all collaborations
occur between social agents, and it should contain a means of modifying the content
of the social interaction as the collaboration unfolds. The underlying processes of
emotions possess these two properties, and social functions of emotions explain some
aspects of the underlying processes in collaboration.
There is also a communicative aspect of emotions. For instance, emotions are
often intended to convey information to others [85]. Emotions are also involved in
verbal behaviors. For instance, an utterance can include both content and relational
meaning. An affect might appear to be elicited by the content of the utterance, but
in fact be an individual’s response to the relational meaning [188]. The interpreta-
tion of these relational meanings are handled by the appraisal of events. Appraisal
processes give us a way to view affect as social [258]. Meaning is created by an in-
dividual’s social experiences in the social world, and individuals communicate these
meanings through utterances. Consequently, the meaning of these utterances and
the emotional communication change the dynamic of social interactions. A success-
ful and effective emotional communication necessitates ongoing reciprocal adjust-
ments between interactants that can happen based on interpretation of each other’s
behaviors [156]. This adjustment procedure requires a baseline and an assessment
procedure. While the components of the collaboration structure, e.g., shared plan,
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provide the baseline, affect-related processes (e.g., appraisal) provide the assessment
procedure.
Affective Motivational Collaboration theory is about the interpretation and pre-
diction of the observable behaviors in a dyadic collaborative interaction. The theory
focuses on the processes regulated by emotional states. These observable behaviors
represent the outcome of processes related to the interpretation of the self’s rela-
tionship to the collaborative environment. The processes are triggered by the events
occurring in the collaborative environment. Thus, Affective Motivational Collabo-
ration theory explains how emotions regulate the underlying processes when the
events occur during collaboration.
Emotion-regulated processes operate based on the self’s mental state including,
the anticipated Mental State of the other. These elements of mental state include
beliefs, intentions, goals, motives and emotion instances. Each of these mental state
possesses multiple attributes impacting the underlying processes of collaboration and
ultimately the relation between cognition and behavior of the agent. The nature of
these attributes will be discussed in Section 3.7.
There are several theories discussed in Chapter 2, which describe the underlying
structure of a collaboration based on mental state of the collaborators. The col-
laboration structure of Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory is based on the
SharedPlans theory [96]. Affective Motivational Collaboration theory focuses on the
processes that generate, maintain and update this structure based on mental state.
The collaboration structure is important because social agents/robots ultimately
need to co-exist with humans, and therefore need to consider humans’ mental state
as well as their own internal states and operational goals.
3.1 Overview of Mechanisms
In this section, we introduce all mechanisms and the connections between them in
our architecture. The Perception and the Action mechanisms are only the source (to
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Figure 3.1: Primary influence of mechanisms in Affective Motivational Collaboration
Theory.
produce sensory information) and the sink (to show proper behavior) of data in our
architecture. These two mechanisms function based on the same events introduced
in Section 3.4.
The Appraisal and Coping mechanisms are two major mechanisms in our com-
putational framework that are tightly coupled. The Appraisal mechanism is respon-
sible for evaluating changes in the self’s Mental State, the anticipated Mental State
of the other, and the state of the collaboration environment. Consequently, the
Appraisal mechanism is connected to a) the Theory of Mind mechanism, to serve as
an evaluator whenever the self applies the Appraisal mechanism to the Mental State
attributed to the human collaborator, b) the Collaboration mechanism, to interpret
the progress and changes in the collaboration plan and associated Mental State,
and to make changes to the shared plan if required, c) the Motivation mechanism,
to generate and assess the self’s new goal-driven motives whenever a new motive
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or intention is required, e.g., following the failure of a task, and d) the Perception
mechanism, to interpret the events from the collaboration environment. In general,
our appraisal algorithms are developed based on the data available in a collabora-
tion structure. This feature makes our algorithms unique and different than other
computational appraisal models. The details about our appraisal algorithms are
provided in Section 4.3. The Coping mechanism provides the self with different
coping strategies associated with changes in the self’s Mental State with respect
to the state of the collaboration. In other words, the Coping mechanism produces
cognitive responses by forming new intentions based on the appraisal patterns. The
Coping mechanism is also inspired by other work; however, it is developed to enable
an agent to cope with the events in a collaborative environment which also distin-
guishes our work from other computational models of coping. Details about our
coping mechanism can be found in Section 4.5.
The Motivation mechanism provides motives to influence the coping process in
terms of the collaborative agent’s or the human collaborator’s needs. The Motivation
mechanism uses the Appraisal mechanism to compute attributes (see Section 3.7)
of competing motives. Also, the Motivation mechanism can serve the Theory of
Mind mechanism by helping the self to infer the motive behind the other’s current
action. Moreover, the Motivation mechanism applies the beliefs associated with the
Appraisal mechanism to generate and compare a new set of motives related to the
status of the collaboration. The outcome of the Motivation mechanism is involved
in forming a new intention to cope with the current event. As a result, the self can
take an action based on the new intention to sustain the collaboration progress.
The Theory of Mind mechanism is responsible for inferring a model of the other’s
anticipated Mental State. The self will progressively update this model during the
collaboration. The refinement of this model helps the self to anticipate the other’s
mental state more accurately, which ultimately impacts the quality of the collab-
oration and the achievement of the shared goal. Furthermore, the self can make
inferences about the motive (or intention) behind the other’s actions using the Mo-
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tivation mechanism. This inference helps the self to update its own beliefs about the
other’s mental state. In the reverse appraisal process (see Sections 2.4.1 and 4.7),
the self also applies the Appraisal mechanism together with updated beliefs about
the other’s Mental State to make inferences about the other’s current mental state
based on the other’s emotional expression. Finally, the Collaboration mechanism
provides the collaboration structure, including status of the shared plan with respect
to the shared goal and the mutual beliefs to the Theory of Mind mechanism. Con-
sequently, any change to the self’s model of the other will update the self’s mental
state.
The Collaboration mechanism maintains constraints on actions. These con-
straints include constraints on task states and on the ordering of tasks. The Collab-
oration mechanism also provides processes to update and monitor the shared plan.
These processes depend on the Appraisal mechanism to evaluate the current Mental
State with respect to the current status of the collaboration. The self also shifts its
focus of attention according to the outcome of the Appraisal mechanism. Moreover,
the Collaboration mechanism can help the self to identify the failure of a task. The
Appraisal and Motivation mechanisms provide interpretation of task failure and the
formation of new elements of Mental State (e.g. intentions) respectively. Ultimately,
the Coping mechanism allows the self to perform behavior appropriate to the current
state of the collaboration.
3.2 Example Scenario
We now provide the following scenario in a robotic domain to illustrate a collabora-
tive interaction. In the scenario, there is an astronaut, who has had a high success
rate in accomplishing space missions. She is capable of operating the manipulator
system and supporting equipment. She works as a commander in the field during
the operation. She is trained to collaborate with general-purpose field operation
robots.
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There is also a robot which is assigned to the mission to provide services to the
astronaut. It has been tested in extreme environmental conditions and has a low
failure rate. It is capable of communicating with the astronaut and understanding
the astronaut’s nonverbal behavior. It has the ability to identify and assess its own
emotions and those of the astronaut.
The robot and the astronaut will collaborate with each other to achieve their
shared goal, which is to install two solar panels. They will face various difficulties,
ranging from the task being unpleasant and challenging to conflicts of their private
and/or shared goals occurring because of a blocked or a protracted sub-task. The
robot and the astronaut will go through a series of assessment processes to figure
out a) how did the current blocking happen? b) why is the current task blocked?
and c) what is the next action they are going to take? The robot uses its cognitive
and affective abilities and its communication skills to overcome these problems and
to motivate the astronaut to propose alternative tasks. The following is part of
an interaction between the astronaut and the robot during their collaboration on
installing solar panels.
1. Astronaut : Please hold the panel on this structure.
[Robot holds the panel and Astronaut begins to work on the panel.]
[Both the Robot and the Astronaut continue their collaboration to achieve their
shared goal.]
2. Astronaut : At this point you should be careful how you hold the panel. Turn
the right side 45 degrees towards me.
3. Robot : Is this what you want?
4. Astronaut : Yes, do not move it.
[Astronaut finishes attaching the panel onto the structure and checks the con-
nectors to make sure they are working.]
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5. Astronaut : The connectors on this panel have problems and we might not
be able to finish this task.
6. Robot : Don’t worry! I can replace the connectors in about 4 minutes. We
definitely can finish this task after that.
7. Astronaut : Okay, go ahead and fix the connectors.
[Robot fixes the issue with the connectors and passes them to the Astronaut.
Astronaut connects the wires to the connectors.]
8. Astronaut : I need you to begin welding this panel and also prepare the
measurement tool for me.
9. Robot : Do you want me to prepare the measurement tool first? Then, I can
begin welding afterwards.
10. Astronaut : Yes, that’s fine!
[Astronaut waits for the Robot to weld the panel and prepare the measurement
tool for him. Robot finishes the welding task after a long time, then prepares
and passes the measurement tool to the Astronaut. But, the measurement tool
has an accuracy problem.]
11. Astronaut : Oh no! Finishing the quality check of our installation with this
measurement problem is so frustrating. I think we should stop now!
12. Robot : I see. But, I can help you with the measurement and we can finish
the task as originally planned.
13. Astronaut : That would be great!
[Robot helps the Astronaut to finish the measurement task with its own mea-
surement tool.]
[Then, the Robot goes back to its own goal, which is to fetch the second panel
to finish the overall task.]
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3.3 General Argument
Affective Motivational Collaboration theory focuses on affect-regulated processes
involved in collaboration and builds on two well-established theories in this context.
The first is Grosz and Sidner’s SharedPlans collaboration theory, which is based
on the concepts of mutual belief and shared plans [96, 103]. Secondly, we build
on the computational model of the appraisal theory of emotions by Marsella and
Gratch [92, 90, 162, 163] which explains how emotions arise from an individual’s
interpretation of its relationship with the environment, and specifies the dimensions
of appraisal and the appraisal patterns characteristic of different emotions [223];
although our algorithms are inspired by their work, our focus is to employ other
concepts that are involved in appraisal of an event due to the collaboration context.
For instance, as discussed in Section 4.3.1, we believe not only is the relevance of
an event is influenced by the utility of the event, but it is also influenced by the
perceived affective state of the other collaborator. The details of these differences
are described in Section 4.3.
Existing collaboration theories (including SharedPlans) consider the nature of
a collaboration to be more than a set of individual acts. These theories argue for
an essential distinction between a collaboration and a simple interaction or even a
coordination in terms of commitments [96, 152]. We believe there is also a need
for a computational theory to specify and characterize the underlying cognitive
processes of collaborative activities. The study of these cognitive processes helps
explain why and how humans collaborate with each other. For instance, SharedPlans
theory can describe our scenario in Section 3.2 in terms of fundamental Mental
State, such as mutual beliefs, intentions, and shared plans. However, it does not
explain the underlying processes leading to these elements of Mental State. Affective
Motivational Collaboration theory extends the SharedPlans theory by describing
these processes. As another example, all of the prominent computational models
of appraisal are able to clearly define the antecedents of appraisals, and how each
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appraisal process can evaluate a particular aspect of an event. However, no appraisal
model provides the required factors for each appraisal process in the context of
collaboration. Furthermore, emotions, due to their evaluative and regulatory nature,
provide fundamental functions (see Section 3.5) each of which plays an essential role
in maintaining a collaboration’s structure and status. In other words, these functions
explain the dynamics of a collaboration structure.
Affective Motivational Collaboration theory specifies the processes involved in
the progress of a collaboration and how they impact the collaboration’s underlying
structure. For example in the exchange below, the Robot needs to respond appro-
priately to the Astronaut’s new request, to maintain progress during collaboration.
The emotion function, i.e., goal management, is involved in such situations. Our
computational model starts with high-level semantic representation of events (in-
cluding utterances), i.e., natural language processing is out of the scope of this work:
8. Astronaut : I need you to begin welding this panel and also prepare the
measurement tool for me.
9. Robot : Do you want me to prepare the measurement tool first? Then, I can
begin welding afterwards.
What is the nature of the processes involved in a collaboration? For example, in
the exchange below, the Robot changes its focus of attention to something important
to the Astronaut because of its perception of the Astronaut’s negative affective state:
5. Astronaut : The connectors on this panel have problems and we might not
be able to finish this task.
6. Robot : Don’t worry! I can replace the connectors in 4 minutes. We definitely
can finish this task after that.
And, how do these processes impact the social characteristics of a collaboration?
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For instance, in the exchange below, emotions and the Appraisal mechanism can
influence the self’s awareness during collaboration:
11. Astronaut : Oh no! Finishing the quality check of our installation with this
measurement problem is so frustrating. I think we should stop now!
12. Robot : I see. But, I can help you with the measurement and we can finish
the task as originally planned.
Finally, Affective Motivational Collaboration theory incorporates motivation as
an affect-regulated and goal-driven mechanism, by which the self can form a new
intention based on its own beliefs about self and the other, as well as the result of
an Appraisal mechanism. In general, a new motive can be involved in formation of
a new intention and the self can take a new action based on the new intention. The
Motivation mechanism also connects the outcome of the Appraisal mechanism and
the Collaboration mechanism by applying the self’s belief structure and appraisal
patterns. The result of this process generates a set of competing motives, each of
which can influence the formation of self’s intention. The self can store its own mo-
tives as well as the other’s motives along with their corresponding attributes which
can impact the Appraisal mechanism. In the following example extracted from the
scenario, the Astronaut informs the Robot of a new problem, and the Robot forms
a new intention to solve the problem:
5. Astronaut : The connectors on this panel have problems and we might not
be able to finish this task.
6. Robot : Don’t worry! I can replace the connectors in 4 minutes. We definitely
can finish this task after that.
In the same example that we saw earlier, the Astronaut faces a problem in his
own task and informs the Robot of his decision. The Robot forms a new intention
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to help the Astronaut to overcome his problem and ultimately, make progress in
their collaboration:
11. Astronaut : Oh no! Finishing the quality check of our installation with this
measurement problem is so frustrating. I think we should stop now!
12. Robot : I see. But, I can help you with the measurement and we can finish
the task as originally planned.
3.4 Events
The events occurring in a collaborative environment include a) utterances spoken
by the collaborators, b) primitive actions executed, deferred, or aborted, and c) ob-
servable affective states. These events are the events that our affective collaborative
agent perceives. We will discuss below the operation of individual processes in our
theory based on these events. Each of the following five sub-sections describe how
an individual mechanism in Figure 3.1 handles these events.
3.4.1 Collaboration Mechanism and Events
The Collaboration mechanism is responsible for maintaining the internal structure
of a collaboration, including the focus of attention, constraints on actions, updating
the shared plan and, in general, monitoring the collaboration. All of these structures
require updating each time the self perceives an event. For instance, an utterance
by the other can impact the self’s focus of attention during the collaboration, or the
effect of a primitive action can influence the self’s view of an impasse on a task. As
another example, the perception of the other’s affective state can cause significant
changes in the self’s collaboration monitoring.
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3.4.2 Appraising Events
The other’s utterances, the effect(s) of the collaborators’ primitive actions, and
the other’s affective states (expressed verbally or nonverbally) are the three types
of events perceived by the self during collaboration. The Appraisal mechanism
receives the output of the Perception and Collaboration mechanisms as well as the
requisite Mental States related to the current event. It appraises the event, in
terms of appraisal variables using the collaboration structure and the history of the
self’s related Mental State. The collaboration structure contains information about
the collaboration’s shared plan and the collaborators’ shared goal, the temporal
and the hierarchical constraints of the tasks, and the current focus of attention.
Moreover, the self progressively generates and updates various elements of Mental
State (discussed in Section 3.7) during collaboration. The occurrence of a new event
causes a change in the self’s Mental State. The construct of the new mental state,
e.g., beliefs, are semantically connected to the older ones. The Appraisal mechanism
uses the history of the Mental State to consistently evaluate a new event.
3.4.3 Coping with Events
Events do not directly cause the self’s Coping mechanism to operate. Instead, it
is the formation of Mental State that cause the Coping mechanism to choose an
appropriate cognitive response to these events. The cognitive responses (also known
as “coping strategies”) are considered to act upon the self’s relationship to the world
and its own Mental State. Events also trigger other processes, which impact the self’s
Mental State. The changes in Mental State cause the Coping mechanism to provide
consistent and appropriate cognitive responses to the world. For instance, suppose
the self perceives an utterance and evaluates it in terms of the appraisal variables.
The values of these variables and the corresponding affective states will cause new
beliefs and intentions to be formed, which then cause the Coping mechanism to
appropriately choose the self’s behavior.
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3.4.4 Motivation and Events
The Motivation mechanism acts to regulate the self’s Mental State and goal-directed
behaviors for internal and social purposes. The Appraisal mechanism evaluates the
state of self, the environment, or the anticipated mental state of the other. In each
of these cases, the outcome of the Appraisal mechanism might indicate the need for
internal or behavioral regulation. In such cases, the Motivation mechanism uses the
elements of Mental State associated with the state of self, the environment or the
other’s anticipated Mental State as well as the pattern provided by the Appraisal
mechanism to generate motives aligned with private or shared goals. Thus, via the
Appraisal mechanism the Motivation mechanism implicitly responds to the events.
The attributes of the generated motives (see Section 3.7) will be updated every
time a new event occurs. For instance, the Appraisal mechanism may evaluate the
outcome of the current task as unexpected, undesirable, uncontrollable and urgent
which is indicative of the failure of a task. Then, the Motivation mechanism provides
goal-directed motives, each of which can influence the formation of an intention.
3.4.5 Theory of Mind and Events
Theory of Mind operates when an event occurs and the self wants to infer and
interpret the other’s mental state. Thus, Theory of Mind helps the self to choose
the behavior best matched to the other’s anticipated Mental State. The Theory of
Mind mechanism infers the mental state of the other, which helps the self to update
the user model of the other. The Motivation and the Appraisal mechanisms are also
involved in this procedure. For instance, the self can infer the other’s mental state
through a reverse appraisal procedure (see Sections 2.4.1 and 4.7). The Motivation
mechanism includes another inverse procedure to infer the other’s active motives,
which can lead to inferring the other’s goal, beliefs, motives and intentions.
83
3.5 Functions of Emotions
We have talked about the crucial role of emotions in communicating Mental States,
motivating actions, and evaluating and interpreting internal states and the envi-
ronment. Emotions, generally speaking, provide a set of intra- and interpersonal
functions which regulate internal processes and the self’s relationship to the other
during the collaboration. Emotions have meanings in a social context which can
be interpreted by an observer. The self uses the meanings of affective states to
trigger appropriate emotion functions with respect to the current social context.
Ultimately, the elicited affective state’s functions impact the self’s Mental State and
consequently behaviors. In the rest of this section, we briefly describe how ten dif-
ferent emotion functions are related to the collaboration context. There are other
emotion functions, such as learning and memory control, which are outside of the
scope of this thesis. We have implemented some of the emotion functions in this sec-
tion such as social regulation, motivation, focus of attention, and goal management
in our computational framework (see Chapter 4). Other functions are described
here with their relationship to the collaboration context, but they are beyond the
implementation of this thesis.
3.5.1 Action Selection
Action selection is the function in which affective states influence choosing the most
appropriate action out of a repertoire of possible actions at a point in time. This
function influences the Coping mechanism and results in consistency of the self’s
actions based on anticipated emotional responses of the other and the satisfaction
of the shared goal.
3.5.2 Adaptation
Adaptation is the raison d’eˆtre of emotions. It helps the self to properly respond to
changing challenges in a dyadic social context by adjusting its behavior. Adaptation
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is a specialized problem-solving technique implicating the necessity of the self’s
emotional states for short and long term behavior changes during collaboration.
3.5.3 Social Regulation
Social regulation by emotions is the process which enables the self to communicate
internal Mental State through the expression of emotions in a social context. It
can assist the self to regulate various social interactions required in the course of
a collaboration, such as conflict resolution and negotiation. Emotional expressions
influence the other’s behavior by triggering the other’s inferential processes and
emotional reactions [135].
3.5.4 Sensory Integration
Sensory integration can guide the self through the course of a collaboration by
sustaining rich-sensory tasks to demonstrate more effective collaborative behaviors.
It benefits the self by anticipating a certain type of inferential process to the other’s
mental and emotional states. For instance, perceiving fear in the other can lead to
an increased focus of attention on the ongoing task, or discerning anger can raise
the probability of avoiding current events (generated by the self) by the other.
3.5.5 Alarm
The alarm function is a purely reactive and pattern-driven process [241]. It accounts
for persuading the self that an undesired or unsatisfactory condition happened in
the past, and since then, has persisted in the self’s Mental State. The alarm function
also provides the self with a rapid reaction to the events. The self will be able to
interrupt deliberative processes and show quick behavioral reactions. For instance,
the self can consider corrective actions when a high probability of anticipated failure
occurs during the collaboration.
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3.5.6 Motivation
Motivation is a goal-driven emotion function associated with the self’s behaviors.
There is a motive behind every intentional action created by the Motivation mecha-
nism. This motive is computed based on underlying beliefs relying on the evaluative
role of emotions. Therefore, the motive behind any behavior carries an anticipated
value of the future consequence for that behavior. It also reveals the belief founda-
tion of a behavior. Consequently, the self can apply this function of emotions to a)
cope with certain types of problems, and b) infer the other’s mental state based on
each action.
3.5.7 Goal Management
The goal management function identifies the existence or the need for a high priority
goal for the self. These goals include both private goals and shared goals. Emotions
provide an evaluation mechanism for the self to choose or reprioritize goals at each
point in time. This function of emotions can impact the self’s behavior with respect
to the dynamics of interaction during the course of a collaboration.
3.5.8 Focus of Attention
Emotion instances and the patterns generated by the Appraisal mechanism are
directly linked to the focus of attention of the self. Both positive and negative
results of a cognitive evaluation of events can change, maintain, or intensify the
self’s focus of attention. For instance, negative emotions, e.g., fear or anger, can
influence the self’s focus of attention by orienting the self towards the events [76].
Positive emotions, e.g., happiness, can broaden or expand the self’s focus of attention
from details of the events to their general features [78].
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3.5.9 Strategic Processing
The occurrence of new events can lead the self to rapid and/or strategic responses.
The Coping mechanism contains various strategies associated with different ele-
ments of the Mental State, e.g., belief or intention-related strategies. The content
of the self’s Mental State changes as time passes, which causes the Coping mecha-
nism to choose an appropriate action. The Appraisal mechanism allows the self to
demonstrate a rapid response or strategically prioritize the current events generated
based on the changes in the Mental State. For instance, is a mild, reactive facial
expression an adequate response to the other’s current utterance or does the self
need to show a stronger behavior? Is it the new belief about the current state of the
collaboration, or is it the new intention pursuing the self’s private goal that the self
needs to cope with? Thus, appraisal patterns and affective states impact the self’s
strategic processing.
3.5.10 Self Model
Emotions can be a representation of how the self interprets the collaboration environ-
ment. The self can generate or update beliefs about its self-model when faced with
unambiguous events and apply the same self-model when confronted with events
possessing more ambiguity and uncertainty. Creating a self-model can also help the
self to demonstrate more consistent and coherent behaviors when similar situations
occur during the collaboration. This reliability in the self’s behavior can help the
other to predict the self’s responses during collaboration.
3.6 Components of the Architecture
Affective Motivational Collaboration theory consists of seven mechanisms (see Figure
3.1) most of which directly store and fetch the data in the Mental State. The Mental
State will keep all the required data about the self (agent), other (human) and the
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environment (including events). In this section we explain each of the mechanisms
and the elements of Mental State in more detail.
3.6.1 Collaboration
• Input: The input to the Collaboration mechanism includes all the data that
affects the execution of individual tasks in the collaboration plan. This data
will be provided via the different elements of Mental State including beliefs,
intentions and goals. These elements of Mental State will establish the agent’s
initial plan and will be updated throughout the collaboration process by the
Perception mechanism and other processes.
• Output: The output of Collaboration includes all the data that is modified
or created during execution of a plan in the form of elements of Mental State.
These elements of Mental State will be used by the internal processes in the
Theory of Mind mechanism. Additionally, the Appraisal mechanism will use
these elements of Mental State to evaluate the events during collaboration.
These elements of Mental State also will be used by other processes, e.g. goal
management, for the purpose of maintaining the collaboration.
• Function: The Collaboration mechanism will construct a hierarchy of tasks
and also manage and maintain the constraints and other required details of the
collaboration specified by the plan. These details include the inputs and out-
puts of individual tasks, the preconditions specifying whether it is appropriate
to perform a task, and the postconditions specifying whether a just-completed
task was successful (which can be used as an indication of an impasse or fail-
ure). Collaboration also keeps track of the focus of attention, which determines
the salient objects, properties and relations at each point of the collaboration.
Moreover, Collaboration has the ability to shift the focus of attention during
the collaboration. All the other mechanisms in the overall Affective Moti-
vational Collaboration theory are influenced by changes in the collaboration
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plan. The Collaboration mechanism in general performs various logical deduc-
tions required by other processes in our computational model. It is designed to
ameliorate the shortcomings of the existing Collaboration theories by provid-
ing required inferences such as dynamic planning based on the recent changes
in the collaboration environment and the internal changes in the agent’s Men-
tal State. For instance, in our scenario (see Section 3.2), when the Astronaut
interrupts the Robot asking for a new and urgent task, the Robot needs to
alter the collaboration plan to continue. Collaboration also supports essential
monitoring processes during the collaboration such as event monitoring.
3.6.2 Appraisal
• Input: The most significant part of Appraisal’s input data is based on the
activity of the Collaboration mechanism. This data includes all the required
elements of Mental State associated with the Collaboration mechanism. For
instance, the beliefs and their strengths will be used by algorithms inside of
Appraisal to compute the value of the appraisal variables. Appraisal also
receives data from the Theory of Mind mechanism. This data helps the agent
use Appraisal for inferring the human’s intentions and motives based on a
reverse appraisal procedure. The input data from the Perception mechanism
is generally needed to support the evaluation of the events. Appraisal also
uses the information about the motives in the underlying processes.
• Output: The output of Appraisal can directly and indirectly impact other
mechanisms. The Motivation mechanism uses this data to generate and main-
tain motives based on the current appraisal of the environment.
• Function: Appraisal is a subjective evaluation process based on individual
processes each of which computes the value of the appraisal variables used in
our computational model. The Collaboration mechanism needs the evaluative
assistance of Appraisal for various reasons. The course of a collaboration is
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based on a full or a partial plan which needs to be updated as time passes and
collaborators achieve, fail at or abandon a goal assigned to them. The failure
to achieve a goal should not destroy the entire collaboration. Appraising the
environment and the current events helps the agent to update the collabora-
tion plan and avoid further critical failures during collaboration. Appraisal
also helps the agent to have a better understanding of the human’s behavior
by making inferences based on appraisal variables. Furthermore, in order to
collaborate successfully, a collaborator cannot simply use the plan and reach
to the shared goal; there should be an adaptation process not only for up-
dating the plan but also the underlying Mental State. For instance, there are
beliefs about the appraisal of the self and the other that augment the model of
what collaborators have done, and what and how they are planning to achieve
the current shared goal based on their emotional states. This process will be
discussed in more detail under the Motivation mechanism (see Section 3.6.4).
Additionally, the beliefs formed based on the appraisals can impact other
mechanisms such as the Theory of Mind, Motivation and Coping, essentially
including the whole computational model.
3.6.3 Coping
• Input: The Coping mechanism operates based on the data stored in different
aspects of the Mental State. This data includes changes in the agent’s beliefs
as well as the agent’s intentions (whether they are created or altered during
the collaboration), and the private or shared goals.
• Output: The output of the Coping mechanism is the data specifying the
intention for a behavior which the agent needs to perform based on the current
state of the collaboration.
• Function: The Coping mechanism is responsible for interpreting ongoing
changes in the Mental State and adopting the appropriate behavior with re-
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spect to these changes. This component includes rules categorized into four
coping strategies which are Belief-related, Intention-related, Attention-related
and Desires-related strategies [162]. These rules will apply to the attributes
and structures of the elements of Mental State to cope with the internal
changes as well as the demands of the environment. For example, the Coping
mechanism will utilize certain beliefs about the self to regulate the agent’s
internal states, while using mutual beliefs to maintain progress in the existing
collaboration. As another example, motives’ attributes can guide the Coping
mechanism by voting for a particular behavior.
3.6.4 Motivation
• Input: The most essential part of the input to Motivation is the Mental
State, and more specifically the private and shared goals associated with the
collaboration. Motivation also uses data from two other mechanisms, namely,
Theory of Mind and Appraisal. Input from Theory of Mind is used by Moti-
vation whenever new motives need to be generated or compared according to
the shared goal. Input from Appraisal is used whenever the motive attributes
are involved in the internal processes of the Motivation.
• Output: The output of Motivation includes the data required to form new
intentions to reach the private or the shared goals. The motives which are the
output of the Motivation mechanism are also used by the Coping mechanism
to choose appropriate behavior according to the goals of the collaboration
plan.
• Function: The Motivation mechanism works closely with the Appraisal mech-
anism. The purpose of this component is to generate new motives which will
be added to the Mental State. These motives are generated based on what the
agent believes about the environment including self and the other collaborator
and the corresponding appraisals. The agent uses these motives to achieve a
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private or shared goal according to new conditions, to interact better with a
human who needs social interactions, or to evaluate the success of task per-
formances. The Motivation mechanism consists of several processes. These
processes generate several motives with respect to the agent’s current Men-
tal State. Then, these motives will be used to make a decision to form an
intention in the Coping mechanism.
3.6.5 Theory of Mind
• Input: Theory of Mind receives its input from the Mental State as well as the
Collaboration and Perception mechanisms. This mechanism uses the current
Mental State to infer the other’s Mental State (which is simpler than the
Mental State associated with self). The Collaboration mechanism provides
the structure of the collaboration plan, including the constraints which can
be used in the internal inference processes of Theory of Mind, such as reverse
appraisal. The Perception mechanism also helps Theory of Mind with the
input data from the sensory system.
• Output: The output of Theory of Mind will be stored in the Mental State.
The Motivation mechanism can use this output to generate new motives ac-
cording to the current state of the collaboration.
• Function: The agent uses the Theory of Mind mechanism to infer and at-
tribute beliefs, intentions, motives and goals to its collaborator. The agent
can also infer the Mental State of the other based on the reverse appraisal of
the other’s behavior. Another internal process of the Theory of Mind is to
infer the other’s motives on the basis of his behavior.
3.6.6 Perception
We consider the Perception mechanism only as a source of data to our computa-
tional model (see Figure 3.1). Thus, our computational model starts with high-level
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semantic representation of events (including utterances), i.e., natural language pro-
cessing is out of the scope of this work.
• Output: Predefined utterances will be used for verbal communication with
the agent. These utterances will be a part of the output data of the Perception
mechanism. The output of the Perception mechanism will be given to the
Collaboration, Theory of Mind and Appraisal mechanisms. We will provide a
unified perception representation across all of these mechanisms.
• Function: The Perception mechanism is responsible for producing the sensory
information used by other processes in our model.
3.6.7 Action
We consider the Action mechanism only as a sink of data in our computational
model (see Figure 3.1).
• Input: The input to the Action mechanism is provided by the Coping mech-
anism. This data will cause the Action mechanism to execute an appropriate
behavior of the agent. This data has the same level of abstraction as the out-
put of the Perception mechanism, i.e., it includes agent’s utterances, primitive
actions and emotional expressions.
• Function: The Action mechanism functions whenever the agent needs to
show a proper behavior according to the result of the internal processes of the
collaboration procedure.
3.6.8 Mental State and Emotion Instances
The Mental State shown in Figure 3.1 comprises the knowledge base required for all
the mechanisms in the overall model. This Mental State includes: beliefs, intentions,
motives, goals, and emotion instances for both self and the other.
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Beliefs are a crucial part of the Mental State. We have two different perspec-
tives on categorization of beliefs. In one perspective, we categorize beliefs based on
whether they are shared between the collaborators. The SharedPlans [103] theory is
the foundation of this categorization, in which, for any given proposition the agent
may have: a) private beliefs (the agent believes the human does not know these),
b) the inferred beliefs of the human (the agent believes the human collaborator has
these beliefs), and c) mutual beliefs (the agent believes both the self and the human
have these same beliefs and both of them believe that). From another perspective,
we categorize beliefs based on who or what they are about. In this categorization,
beliefs can be about the self, the other, or they can be about the environment. Be-
liefs about the environment can be about the outcomes of a new appraisal, or even
the human’s offer, question or request, and general beliefs about the environment
in which the agent is situated. Beliefs can be created and updated by different
processes. They also influence how these processes function as time passes.
Intentions are mental constructs directed at future actions. They play an essen-
tial role in: a) taking actions according to the collaboration plan, b) coordination
of actions with the human collaborator, c) formation of beliefs about self and antic-
ipated beliefs about the other, and d) behavior selection in the Coping mechanism.
First, taking actions means that the agent will intend to take an action for primitive
tasks that have gained the focus of attention, possess active motives, have satisfied
preconditions, and for which required temporal predecessors have been successfully
achieved. Second, intentions are involved in action coordinations in which the hu-
man’s behavior guides the agent to infer an anticipated behavior of the human.
Third, intentions play a role in belief formation mainly as a result of the perma-
nence and commitment inherent to intentions in subsequent processes, e.g., appraisal
of the human’s reaction to the current action and self regulation. And lastly, in-
tentions are involved in selecting intention-related strategies, e.g., planning, seeking
instrumental support and procrastination; these strategies are an essential category
of the strategies in the Coping mechanism. Intentions possess a set of attributes,
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e.g. Involvement, Certainty, Ambivalence (see Section 3.7.4), which moderate the
consistency between intention and behavior. The issue of consistency between the
intentions (in collaboration) and the behaviors (as a result of the Coping mechanism
in the appraisal cycle) is important because neither of these two mechanisms alone
provides a solution for consistency.
Motives are mental constructs which can initiate, direct and maintain goal-
directed behaviors. They are created by the affect-regulated Motivation mechanism.
Motives can cause the formation of a new intention for the agent according to: a) its
own emotional states (how the agent feels about something), b) its own private goal
(how an action helps the agent to make progress), c) the collaboration goal (how an
action helps to achieve the shared goal), and d) the other’s anticipated beliefs (how
an action helps the other). Motives also possess a set of attributes, e.g., Insistence
or Failure Disruptiveness (see Section 3.7.3). These attributes are involved in the
comparison of newly generated motives based on the current state of the collabora-
tion. Ultimately, the agent forms or updates a belief about the winning motive in
the Mental State.
Goals help the agent to create and update its collaboration plan according to the
current private and shared goal content and structure, i.e., the Specificity, Proximity
and Difficulty of the goal. Goals direct the formation of intentions to take appro-
priate corresponding actions during collaboration. Goals also drive the Motivation
mechanism to generate required motive(s) in uncertain or ambiguous situations, e.g.,
to minimize the risk of impasse or to reprioritize goals.
Emotions instances that are elicited by the Appraisal mechanism (see Section
3.7.5 for list of emotion types used in this model). These emotion instances include
the agent’s own emotions as well as the anticipated emotions of the other which are
created with the help of the processes in the Theory of Mind mechanism.
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3.7 Attributes of Mental State Elements
Mental states are conscious states of the mind providing the content for cognitive
processes. As we discussed Affective Motivational Collaboration theory operates
with the following Mental State: beliefs, intentions, motives, goals and emotion in-
stances. This Mental State possesses attributes, each of which provides a unique
interpretation of the related cognitive entities. These Mental State’s attributes are
used in different cognitive processes such as the Appraisal mechanism and the Mo-
tivation mechanism. We provide more details about these attributes in this section.
Attributes that are implemented in our computational framework in Chapter 4 are
marked with an asterisk throughout this section. All of the attribute values have a
scale, e.g., [0, 1], in our computational framework.
3.7.1 Attributes of Beliefs
The attributes of a belief are involved different processes in Affective Motivational
Collaboration theory. They impact the evaluation of an event by the Appraisal
mechanism, generation of new motives, updates on the collaboration plan, activation
of coping strategies and ultimately the self’s behavior. The following six attributes
of beliefs are related to Affective Motivational Collaboration theory.
• Strength*: Belief strength is about how rigorously the self holds salient
beliefs about an object, an entity, or an anticipated behavior. It can be mea-
sured through scales, for instance, how probable or likely that belief is, or
just whether it is true or false. The strength of a belief can impact the self’s
appraisal processes, e.g. relevance (see Relevance algorithm in Chapter 4). A
belief may be strong, but not necessarily accurate, and vice versa.
• Saliency*: The saliency of a belief is a cognitive attribute that pertains to
how easily the self becomes aware of a belief. This property of a belief has a
prominent influence on the self’s attention during collaboration. It directs the
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self’s focus of attention to the most pertinent spatio-temporal salient event
(see Relevance algorithm in Chapter 4).
• Persistence*: It is argued that beliefs form and change due to cognitive and
social considerations [42]. Persistent beliefs are very resistant to these changes.
However, even persistent beliefs can change. Persistence of goal-related be-
lief(s) influences the appraisal of the relevancy of an event (see Relevance
algorithm in Chapter 4).
• Recency: The recency of a belief refers to how temporally close a particular
belief is to the current state of collaboration. The recency attribute of the
self’s belief can bias (recency effect) the evaluation processes of the cognitive
mechanism during collaboration. It can create a tendency to weight recent
events more than earlier ones whenever it is required according to self’s Men-
tal State (see satisfaction drive in Chapter 4). The recency of a belief can
ultimately impact adopting an appropriate Coping mechanism.
• Accuracy: Accuracy of a belief is the relation between that belief and the
fact which that belief is about. The accuracy of a belief can be measured by
looking at how closely that belief can relate to the truth. The accuracy of a
belief as a gradational property can be used in evaluative processes of the self,
i.e., Appraisal. It can also impact the self’s other goal-driven processes and
triggering of an emotion function.
• Frequency: The frequency of a belief is related to how regularly it appears as
the result of the occurrence of an event. The frequency of beliefs can impact
attributes of the self’s other Mental State. For instance, beliefs forming or
maintaining intentions with direct experiences (see Section 3.7.4) are more
likely to occur frequently.
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3.7.2 Attributes of Goals
The attributes of a goal impact the processes in Affective Motivational Collaboration
Theory, especially the processes involved in Motivation and Appraisal mechanisms.
The attributes of a goal are important because the Motivation and the Appraisal
mechanisms in this theory are goal-driven and attribution of the goals according to
the self’s standards provides coherency of the processes and their outcomes. We
discuss three relevant goal attributes used in our computational framework in this
section.
• Proximity*: Goals can be distinguished by how far they project into the
future during the collaboration. Proximal (short-term) goals result in more
related motives and subsequently better self and social-regulation than tem-
porally distant goals. Proximal goals can impact the self’s behaviors by in-
fluencing the goal management process (see Section 4.4 in Chapter 4). As a
result, the self can determine and maintain the collaboration progress towards
the shared goal more accurately while operating based on proximal goals.
• Specificity*: Goals incorporating specific performance standards are more
likely to enhance the self’s self-evaluation than general goals. Specific goals
raise the self-evaluation performance, because they provide a more accurate
baseline for the mechanisms, e.g., Appraisal or Collaboration (see Section 4.4
in Chapter 4), or any arbitration process that the self needs for self-evaluation
during collaboration. Consequently, by increasing the self-evaluation perfor-
mance, the self can improve the level of satisfaction within the collaboration.
As an example, holding an object A in a particular position with respect to
an object B for a certain amount of time and welding them with a material C
is a more specific goal than a general goal of installing an object on another
one.
• Difficulty*: Goals that are moderately difficult have the most impact on
the self and social regulation processes of the self. Conversely, overly easy
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or impossible goals usually do not motivate an individual to achieve the goal.
Difficult goals increase the probability of a motive’s failure disruptiveness, and
overly easy goals decrease the importance of the related motive; in both cases
the goals have less chance to be pursued. The existence of a partial shared
plan, dependency on the other to perform a task, the failure of the same or
similar task in the past all increase the difficulty level of a goal. See Section 4.4
in Chapter 4 for the influence of difficulty of a goal on the goal management
process.
3.7.3 Attributes of Motives
According to Sloman, motives can be compared on various dimensions [240]. This
comparison is based on motive attributes. In Affective Motivational Collaboration
theory motives are formed based on the self’s existing Mental State under the in-
fluence of the Appraisal mechanism. Different elements of Mental State, and the
results of self appraisal as well as the reverse appraisal of the other can cause a va-
riety of motives to be formed. The Motivation mechanism needs a set of attributes
to compare newly generated motives and choose the one which is most related to
the current state of the collaboration. We have chosen the following five motive
attributes as most related to the collaboration context.
• Importance*: The importance of a motive is determined by the correspond-
ing beliefs about the effects of achieving or not achieving the associated goal
(see Section 4.3.1 in Chapter 4). It is a function of belief attributes (e.g.,
saliency) and the current goal. For instance, if a motive is supported by a
belief about the current goal with relatively high attribute values, that motive
will become important for the self.
• Urgency*: The urgency of a motive defines how much time the self has to
acknowledge and address that motive before it is too late. The urgency of a
motive is a function of beliefs about the other’s mental and emotional state
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(see Section 4.3.1 in Chapter 4). For instance, the self responds to an urgent
motive due to the existence of an important anticipated outcome for the other,
and limited time to accomplish the corresponding tasks, even if those tasks
are not important for the self.
• Insistence: The insistence of a motive defines the “interrupt priority level” of
the motive, and how much that motive can attract the self’s focus of attention.
This dimension of motive is associated with what the Appraisal mechanism
considers as relevance and desirability when evaluating an event. Beliefs about
successive subgoals and the other’s anticipated Mental State influence the
insistence attribute of a motive. Insistent motives have higher priority and are
able to interrupt the self’s ongoing tasks.
• Intensity: The intensity of a motive determines how actively and vigorously
that motive can help the self to pursue the goal if adopted. Motives with higher
intensity will motivate the self to apply certain types of coping processes for
an obstructed goal to avoid termination of the collaboration. Motives with
higher intensity cause the self to find alternative solutions for the problem
rather than abandoning the goal and ultimately the collaboration.
• Failure Disruptiveness: The failure disruptiveness attribute of a motive
determines how significant an interruption failure is to achieving the corre-
sponding goal. In other words, it gives the self a measure of the pleasantness
of achieving a related goal. This attribute directs the self’s behavior toward
positive and negative outcomes during collaboration.
3.7.4 Attributes of Intentions
The attributes of an intention influence several processes in Affective Motivational
Collaboration Theory. They can be involved in mechanisms such as Appraisal and
Coping. One of the most important uses of intention attributes is to moderate
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the intention-behavior relations [59]. Ultimately, the self can show more consistent
behavior with respect to its own preceding behaviors and current state of the col-
laboration. We decided to include the following five intention attributes extracted
from the psychology literature in Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory.
• Temporal Status: The temporal status of an intention can be defined as
the extent to which an intention remains consistent over time. The self needs
to maintain the stability of its intentions as time passes until the task is per-
formed. Temporally stable intentions helps the other to accurately predict the
self’s behavior. The anticipated cognitive load of perceiving the self’s task
by the other impacts the temporal stability of the self’s intention. In other
words, the temporal stability of an intention moderates the intention-behavior
relation of the self during collaboration.
• Direct Experience: The direct experience of an intention refers to whether
the self previously has performed a task based on a similar intention. The self
can refer to the corresponding intention directly experienced in the past before
taking a new action. The Mental State associated with the prior experience
of an intention can influence the appraisal of a new event requiring the self to
perform the same task. For instance, the existence of a direct experience of an
intention can impact the degree of the expectedness and controllability of an
event during the collaboration which ultimately guides the Coping mechanism
to produce an appropriate behavior.
• Certainty: The certainty of an intention is determined by the quality of
the underlying motive and the beliefs associated with that motive. The more
strong, accurate, frequent, recent, salient and persistent a set of pertinent be-
liefs of the self are, the more chance the related motive has to be selected. Since
the certainty of an intention depends on the associated motive, the nature of
the pursued goal also implicitly impacts the certainty of that intention. A goal
with a higher specificity (see Section 3.7.2) value influences the certainty of the
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affiliated intention. The certainty of an intention is an important moderator
of the self’s intention-behavior consistency.
• Ambivalence: The Mental State of the self might contain contradictory in-
tentions towards the pursuit of the same goal, which makes those intentions
ambivalent. For instance, the self might already have an intention to perform
a task according to the shared plan, while the Appraisal and the Motivation
mechanisms dynamically cause formation of a new opposing intention. Fur-
thermore, ambivalent intentions can occur because of the contrast between the
self’s private goal and the shared goal during the collaboration. The ambiva-
lence attribute of an intention is inversely related to the intention-behavior
consistency of the self.
• Affective-Deliberative Consistency: The self’s intentions possess an af-
fective and a deliberative component. The affective component refers to the
affective state and in general the affective evaluation of the self’s intention to-
wards its own behavior. However, the deliberate component refers to the self’s
actual intention which is formed either based on the existing shared plan or
under the influence of a new motive generated by the Motivation mechanism.
For instance, as an example of affective-deliberative inconsistency, the self can
appraise an event as an urgent and uncontrollable one (which leads the self’s
emotion towards anger), despite the fact that pursuing the goal related to this
intention is required for the satisfaction of the shared plan. In general, mutu-
ally consistent affective and deliberate components of an intention positively
impacts the consistency of the self’s intention and behavior.
3.7.5 Emotion Instances
Each emotion has its own functionality at either the intrapersonal or interpersonal
level. Emotions not only regulate the self’s internal processes, but also assist the self
to anticipate the other’s Mental State. In this section, we provide the description
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of the emotions that can be elicited during collaboration, and are involved in our
scenario (see Section 3.2). Some of these emotions are modeled in Chapter 4 (see
Table 4.3). In this theory, to avoid the controversial issue of whether virtual agents
or robots can feel emotions, we are going to use the convention of having emotions
by the agent or the robot. The agent can also possess beliefs about an emotion
instance which is similar to having beliefs about any other proposition.
• Joy: Joy is the state of an individual’s well-being and is associated with the
sense of successful achievement of a goal. Joy reveals one’s sense of pleasure
which implies an impending gain for the individual.
• Anger: Anger can be elicited by an unfair obstacle, hindering the individual’s
goal attainment and it is usually triggered by some event (e.g., threat) which
provokes a behavioral reaction. Anger functions to set boundaries or escape
from dangerous situations, and implies an urgent desire for justice.
• Hope: Hope is the result of an optimistic evaluation of an event by an indi-
vidual having expectations of positive and desirable future outcomes related
to that event. It is usually a poignant assimilation of the present discontent
and the future content implying an imagined or anticipated successful future
goal state.
• Guilt: Guilt is based on self-condemnation in response to a negative outcome
of one’s self performance evaluation. It is caused by the violation of others’
beliefs about the self, and others’ standards and bearing significant responsi-
bility for that violation. The occurrence of guilt usually implies the desire to
atone in social context.
• Pride: Pride is a product of the satisfied sense of one’s own actions or decision
outcomes. It implies the self-approval of the evaluation outcomes of one’s own
actions. Pride is associated with the achievement motivation (see Section
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2.5.2) wherein succeeding at a particular goal motivates the corresponding
action.
• Shame: Shame is produced when one evaluates one’s own actions or behaviors
and attributes failure to oneself. The individual focuses on specific features of
the self which led to failure. Shame implies the existence of remorse.
• Worry: Worry is one’s emotional attempt to avoid anticipated potential
threats or unidentified undesirable events. The individual’s concern can be
about a real or an imagined issue. Worry implies a fear of a future failure
about which one should make a decision or take an action at present.
3.8 Summary
The purpose of Affective Motivational Collaboration theory is to explain how to
integrate affect-driven processes into collaboration context. Affective Motivational
Collaboration theory reveals the reciprocal influence of collaboration structure and
the appraisal processes. In other words, the appraisal processes can evaluate a
collaboration environment based on the information in collaboration structure. Re-
ciprocally, the outcome of appraisals can be used by other processes to maintain
progress during collaboration. We believe functions of emotions can be used as these
processes to maintain the collaboration structure. Therefore, the required computa-
tional framework should include at least Collaboration and Appraisal mechanisms
to implement this concept. However, a collaborative agent also needs to be able
anticipate and interpret the human collaborator’s internal states, e.g., beliefs, emo-
tions. The Theory of Mind mechanism’s role in our architecture is to fulfill this
concept. Furthermore, a collaborative agent should not only act based on a) emo-
tional state, and b) capability of doing an action at a particular time. We believe the
Motivation mechanism is required to reflect the collaborators’ need into the forma-
tion of the agent’s intentions. Motives are crucial mental constructs since they are
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affect-regulated (hence, they are influenced by emotions’ antecedents, e.g., beliefs),
and they are goal-oriented (hence, they can impact the congruency of intentions and
actions). Finally, the Coping mechanism works conjointly with Motivation and Ap-
praisal mechanisms to form appropriate intentions with respect to the collaboration
status. All of these mechanisms operate based on a knowledge base which includes
different elements of mental state as we discussed in this chapter. However, all the
processes involved in the different mechanisms can process or update certain aspects
of an element of the mental state. Thus, Affective Motivational Collaboration theory
includes definition of the attributes for all of these elements. In this chapter, we
also discussed how different mechanisms can handle events during the collaboration.
We believe, verbal and nonverbal behaviors are loaded with information that can
impact collaborators’ decisions when they occur. Thus, we consider both types of
behaviors to be interpreted by our architecture as events during the collaboration.
In Chapter 4, we use these theoretical concepts to discuss the implementation of
our computational framework.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK
4.1 Introduction
Our computational framework includes all of the mechanisms discussed in Chapter
3. The emphasis of our implementation is on the Appraisal, Coping, Collaboration,
and Motivation mechanisms, and in general the reciprocal influence of the Appraisal
and Collaboration mechanisms (see Section 4.4). In this chapter, we provide concrete
algorithms for the theoretical concepts discussed in Chapter 3. These algorithms
have been implemented as part of the AMC framework. We also evaluated these
algorithms and the overall system in an end-to-end system evaluation user study
(see Chapter 5).
There are several appraisal models (e.g., EMA [162]) contributing in different
applications such as social sciences, virtual agents, and robotics. However, none
of these models have focused on the appraisal processes during collaboration. We
believe appraisal plays a key role in collaboration due to its regulatory and evalu-
ative nature. Also, collaboration induces some changes to appraisal processes due
to its unique nature. For instance, although the appraisal models mostly use utility
to compute the relevance of an event, we have found new cognitive components
involved in determining utility because of the influence of the collaboration. These
components, such as the recurrence of a belief by the human collaborator or the in-
fluence of the human collaborator’s perceived affective state on the robot’s decisions
emphasize the fact that collaboration requires additional procedures in appraisal
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Figure 4.1: Example of collaboration structure.
processes. One of our contributions is to ground general appraisal concepts in the
specific context and structure of collaboration.
Furthermore, we believe collaboration and appraisal have reciprocal influences
on each other (see Figure 4.3). In this chapter, we also talk about the influence of
appraisal on collaboration through the goal management process. Also, we discuss
our coping mechanism and strategies within the collaboration context. Then, we
provide our computational model of three different motives used in our framework.
Finally, we briefly discuss other mechanisms in our framework.
4.2 Collaboration Mechanism
The Collaboration and Appraisal mechanisms (see Figure 3.1) have reciprocal in-
fluences on each other. In this section, we focus on information about the collab-
oration structure which will be incorporated in appraisal processes in Section 4.3.
We describe some of the methods in our Collaboration mechanism which are used
to retrieve information about the collaboration structure.
The Collaboration mechanism constructs a hierarchy of goals associated with
tasks in the form of a hierarchical task network (see Figure 4.1), and also manages the
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constraints and other required details of the collaboration including the inputs and
outputs of individual tasks, the preconditions (specifying whether it is appropriate
to perform a task), and the postconditions (specifying whether a just-completed
task was successful). Collaboration also keeps track of the focus of attention, which
determines the salient objects, properties and relations at each point, and shifts
the focus of attention during the interaction. For example in Figure 4.1, “Check
Connector” is the current (focused) goal1.
Here, we describe the methods which retrieve information about the collabora-
tion structure, and are used in our algorithms to compute the values of appraisal
variables. Some of these methods use the focus stack which includes a stack of goals
and the top goal on the focus stack represents the current pursuing goal. In these
methods, εt is the event corresponding to time t, and gt is a given goal at time t.
• getPrimitiveGoal(εt) returns the unique primitive goal to which the given event
(action, utterance, or emotional expression) directly contributes; it is only
one goal since the robot can only do one primitive action at a time in our
collaboration model, i.e, in the goal tree, a given primitive action can only
directly contribute to one parent goal. The method returns ambiguous if it
does not find a goal in the plan2.
• getGoalStatus(gt) returns whether gt’s status is achieved, failed, blocked,
inapplicable, pending, or inprogress.
• getTopLevelGoal(gt) returns gt’s top level goal.
• precondStatus(gt) returns the status of the precondition for the given goal;
whether it is satisfied, unsatisfied or unknown. For instance, the pre-
condition for attaching a panel is whether the panel is appropriately located
on its frame.
1The focused goal is the goal that the robot currently pursues.
2Ambiguity introduces some extra complexities which are beyond scope of this thesis.
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• isLive(gt) returns true iff all the predecessors of gt are achieved and all the
preconditions are satisfied
def
= pending
∨
inprogress
• isFocusShift(gt) returns true iff the given goal was not the previous focus (at
time t-1).
• isNecessaryFocusShift(gt) returns true iff the status of the previous focus was
achieved [143].
• isPath(g1, g2) returns true iff there is a path between g1 and g2 in a plan tree
structure.
• getContributingGoals(gt) returns gt’s children in plan tree.
• getPredecessors(gt) returns gt’s predecessors in plan tree.
• getInputs(gt) returns all required inputs for gt. For example, the goal “Attach
Panels” requires the inputs welding tool and panel.
• isInputAvailable(gt) returns whether the given input is available. For instance,
whether the welding tool is available for the goal “Attach Panels”.
• isFocused(gt) returns whether gt is the current focus.
• getResponsible(gt) returns responsible agent(s) for gt. In a dyadic collabora-
tion, both of the agents jointly can be responsible for a nonprimitive goal, while
only one agent (self or other) is responsible for each primitive goal. For in-
stance, both the Robot and the Astronaut are responsible for the nonprimitive
goal of “Install Solar Panels”, whereas it is only the Robot who is responsible
for the primitive goal of “Prepare Measurement Tool”.
4.3 Appraisal Mechanism and Underlying Processes
In this section, we focus on the specific problem of appraising the Relevance (since
other appraisals are only computed for relevant events), Desirability (since it dis-
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Figure 4.2: Using Collaboration structure in Appraisal (mechanisms in our frame-
work).
criminates facilitating and inhibitory events towards the collaboration progress), Ex-
pectedness (since it underlies a collaborative robot’s attention), and Controllability
(since it is associated with the agent’s coping ability) of events within a collabo-
rative interaction. There are other appraisal variables introduced in psychological
[223] and computational literature [92]. We believe most of these variables can be
straightforwardly added to our appraisal mechanism whenever they are required.
All of the algorithms in this section use the mental state of the robot (discussed in
Section 3.6.8) which is formed based on the collaboration structure (see Figure 4.2).
These algorithms use the corresponding primitive goal to the most recent event at
each turn.
4.3.1 Relevance
Relevance is a key appraisal variable since the other appraisal variables are mean-
ingful only for relevant events. Relevance as an appraisal variable measures the
significance of an event for the self. An event can be evaluated to be relevant if it
has a non-zero utility [162]. However, the utility of an event is also influenced by
the other collaborator’s emotional expressions as the reflection of the other collab-
orator’s mental state with respect to the status of the collaborative environment.
Other appraisal models only consider the utility of an event based on the self’s goal
and plan.
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Algorithm 1 determines the relevance of the given event with respect to the cur-
rent mental state. The relevance of the event depends on the significance of the
event with respect to the collaboration status, which is determined based on the
utility of the event as presented in [92, 162]. Our algorithm for computing the rel-
evance of an event during collaboration involves other factors that other appraisal
models do not consider. For instance, the human’s perceived affective state, recur-
rence of a belief, or occurrence of a belief about an unrelated goal by the human
play important roles by influencing the utility of an event during collaboration. As
a result, evaluating the relevance of events can cause a collaborative robot to re-
spond effectively which can positively impact the status of the shared goal, without
dedicating all its resources to every event.
After perceiving an event, the belief about that event represents the event in the
robot’s mental state. getPrimitiveGoal returns the goal to which the current event
contributes, unless it is ambiguous; gt represents the shared goal at time (turn) t
within the shared plan.
Utility of an Event
We compute the utility (−1 ≤ U ≤ 1) of the event using the values of the attributes
associated with the existing beliefs, and the attributes of the motive associated with
the recognized goal (see details below). We use three belief attributes (i.e., Strength,
Saliency, and Persistence – see Section 3.6.8) to compute the belief-related part of
the utility:
We provide the utility function (U) in Equation 4.1. This function uses: saliency
(S ) and persistence (P) of the belief related to the recognized goal, the recognized
goal’s status (υ), and the aggregation of belief and motive attributes (Ψ) according
to Equation 4.1.
U(gt) =
υP · S
Ψ Ψ>0
0 Ψ = 0
(4.1)
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Algorithm 1 Relevance Appraisal Process
1: function IsEventRelevant(Event εt)
2: gt ← getPrimitiveGoal(εt)
3: U ← getEventUtility(gt)
4: τt ← getEmotionalThreshold(gt)
5: if (τt ≤ |U|) then
6: return RELEVANT
7: else
8: return IRRELEVANT
Intuitively, we use υ to generate positive and negative utility values. The υ’s
value becomes +1 if the status of the corresponding goal is achieved, pending,
or in progress, and υ’s value becomes -1 if the status of the corresponding goal is
failed, blocked, or inapplicable. The P influences the value of utility only as a
coefficient since recurrent beliefs are not formed frequently during collaboration. The
Ψ value indicates the magnitude of the influence of beliefs and motives using their
attributes. Hence, the Ψ value impacts the saliency value of beliefs exponentially,
helping to differentiate between beliefs.
• Strength: The extent to which the preconditions (α), postconditions (β), pre-
decessors (λ), and contributing goals (µ) of a goal are known (satisfied or
unsatisfied) makes beliefs about the goal stronger. An unknown pre and
postcondition status of a goal and its predecessors and contributing goals forms
weaker beliefs. For instance, if one knows all predecessors of a pursued goal
(e.g., “Check Panels”) are satisfied (i.e., “Fix Panels” and “Prepare Pan-
els”), failure of the pursued goal will elicit one’s negative affective state (due
to the strong beliefs related to the goal); whereas not knowing the status of
the goal-related factors (e.g., whether the Astronaut could find the tool to fix
a panel) causes one to form weaker beliefs about the goal.
In equation 4.2, the subscript k refers to the known goal-related factors (satisfied
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or unsatisfied); whereas the subscript all includes both known and unknown goal-
related factors. In this equation, both urgency (γ) and importance (η) attributes
of motives can impact the outcome of the goal-related belief attributes’ ratio, and
ultimately the Ψ value.
Ψ =
α
k
+ β
k
+ λ
k
+ µ
k
α
all
+ β
all
+ λ
all
+ µ
all
+ η + γ (4.2)
η, γ ∈ N, η, γ ≥ 0
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• Saliency (S): Beliefs related to the focused goal are more salient than beliefs
related to any other goal in the plan; according to Figure 4.1, if one of the
collaborators is preparing a solar panel, beliefs related to all of the other live
(pending or in progress) goals (e.g. “Connect Adaptor”) will be less salient
than beliefs related to the focused goal, i.e., “Check Connector”. Beliefs’
saliency decreases according to their corresponding live goal’s distance from
the focused goal in the shared plan. Non-live goals will not be salient.
• Persistence (P): The recurrence of a belief over time (turns) increases the
persistence of the belief. Beliefs occurring only once have the lowest value of
persistence. For instance, if the Astronaut repeatedly says that she can not
find the measurement tool to check the connector, the Robot could pursue a
new goal outside of the shared plan to acknowledge Astronaut’s concern.
We also use two motive attributes discussed in Section 3.6.8 to compute the motive
related part of the utility (U):
• Urgency (γ): There are two factors impacting the urgency of a motive: a)
whether the goal directing the given motive is the predecessor of another goal
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for which the other collaborator is responsible, and b) whether achieving the
goal directing the given motive can mitigate the other collaborator’s negative
valenced affective state. For instance, if the Robot has a private goal to fetch
another panel while the Astronaut is waiting for the Robot to connect the
adaptor, connecting the adaptor will be more urgent than Robot’s private
goal.
• Importance (η): A motive is important if failure of the directing goal causes
an impasse in the shared plan (i.e., no further goal is available to achieve), or
achievement of the directing goal removes an existing impasse. For example, if
the Robot cannot find the adaptor (an impasse to connect the adaptor), and
the Astronaut provides another adaptor (external motive), the new motive
becomes important to remove the impasse in the shared plan.
The significance of an event in a collaborative environment is based on the utility
of the event and the human’s perceived affective state. The human’s perceived
affective state influences the relevance of the event in the form of a threshold value
τt in Algorithm 1. In Equation 4.3, we use the valence of the perceived affective
state (Veh) to compute τt.
τt = −0.5Veh + 0.5 (4.3)
Veh ∈ R, −1 ≤ Veh ≤ 1
Hence, perceiving human’s positive affective state (e.g., happiness) reduces the
threshold value which makes the robot find an event relevant with even a slightly
positive utility. Similarly, an event can be considered irrelevant even though the
utility has a relatively positive value, because of perceiving the human’s negative
affective state.
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4.3.2 Desirability
Desirability characterizes the value of an event to the robot in terms of whether the
event facilitates or thwarts the collaboration goal. Desirability captures the valence
of an event with respect to the robot’s preferences [92]. In a collaborative robot,
preferences are biased towards those events facilitating progress in the collabora-
tion. Desirability plays an important role in the overall architecture; it makes the
processes involved in the other mechanisms (e.g., Motivation and Theory of Mind)
and consequently the robot’s mental state, congruent with the collaboration status
which is a collaborative robot’s desire. Therefore, it causes the robot to dismiss
events causing inconsistencies in the robot’s collaborative behavior. Moreover, de-
sirability is also crucial from the collaboration’s point of view.
Algorithm 2 defines a process in which the desirability of an event is computed
with regard to the status of the shared goal; i.e., it operates based on whether and
how the event changes the status of the current shared goal. It distinguishes between
the top level goal and the current goal because the top level goal’s change of status
attains a higher positive or negative value of desirability. For instance, failure of
the top level goal (e.g., installing solar panel) is more undesirable than failure of a
primitive goal (e.g., measuring the quality of the installed panel).
A top level goal’s status must be achieved (i.e., satisfied postcondition) to
consider the event most-desirable. When the goal’s status is failed (i.e., unsat-
isfied postcondition) or blocked, the associated event has themost-undesirable
or undesirable values respectively. A goal is blocked if any of the required goals
or goals recursively through the parent goal are not achieved. An inapplica-
ble goal is also considered as undesirable. A goal is inapplicable if any of its
predecessors are not achieved, and/or its preconditions are not satisfied. For
pending and inprogress top level goals, the status of the current goal associated
with the top level goal determines the status of the event εt. Only a non-primitive
goal can have inprogress status, if it has been started but is not yet completed.
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Algorithm 2 Desirability Appraisal Process
1: function IsEventDesirable(Event εt)
2: gt ← getPrimitiveGoal(εt)
3: gtop ← getTopLevelGoal(gt)
4: if (getGoalStatus(gtop) = ACHIEVED) then
5: return MOST-DESIRABLE
6: else if (getGoalStatus(gtop) = FAILED) then
7: return MOST-UNDESIRABLE
8: else if (getGoalStatus(gtop) = BLOCKED) or
9: (getGoalStatus(gtop) = INAPPLICABLE) then
10: return UNDESIRABLE
11: else if (getGoalStatus(gtop) = PENDING) or
12: (getGoalStatus(gtop) = INPROGRESS) then
13: if (getGoalStatus(gt) = ACHIEVED) then
14: return DESIRABLE
15: else if (getGoalStatus(gt) = FAILED) then
16: return MOST-UNDESIRABLE
17: else if (getGoalStatus(gt) = BLOCKED) or
18: (getGoalStatus(gt) = INAPPLICABLE) then
19: return UNDESIRABLE
20: else if (getGoalStatus(gt) = PENDING) or
21: (getGoalStatus(gt) = INPROGRESS) then
22: return NEUTRAL
A goal can be pending if it is live, or if it is a non-primitive goal that has not
been started yet. Achieved current goals mark an event (εt) as desirable, while
failed or blocked current goals render the event associated with them as most-
undesirable and undesirable respectively. Pending or inprogress current
goals mark their associated events as neutral.
4.3.3 Expectedness
Expectedness is the extent to which the truth value of a state could have been
predicted from a causal interpretation of an event. In the collaboration context,
the expectedness of an event evaluates the congruency of the event with respect
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Algorithm 3 Expectedness Appraisal Process
1: function IsEventExpected(Event εt)
2: gt ← getPrimitiveGoal(εt)
3: gtop ← getTopLevelGoal(gt)
4: if (isLive(gt)) then
5: if (¬isFocusShift(gt) or isNeccessaryFocusShift(gt)) then
6: return MOST-EXPECTED
7: else
8: return EXPECTED
9: else
10: if (isPath(gt, gtop)) then
11: return UNEXPECTED
12: else
13: return MOST-UNEXPECTED
to the existing knowledge about the shared goal. Thus, expectedness underlies a
collaborative robot’s attention. The collaboration mechanism uses expectedness to
maintain the robot’s attention and subsequently its mental state with respect to the
shared goal. Reciprocally, the appraisal mechanism uses the underlying information
of the collaboration structure to evaluate the expectedness of an event [247].
In Algorithm 3 we define the process of computing the expectedness based on
the shared plan and status of the shared goal. The key point in this algorithm is the
status of the current shared primitive goal (gt), which is associated with the event
εt and its relationship with the top level goal (gtop).
The intuition captured here is that one expects the current goal to be finished
before undertaking another activity, but the goals that can be the next focus of
attention are also to be expected. Therefore, if the goal is live, the algorithm checks
whether the goal has not changed, or whether the interpretation of the last event
results in a necessary focus shift. Shifting the focus to a new goal is necessary when
the former goal is achieved and a new goal is required. Consequently the new event
is the most-expected one. However, even if the focus shift is not necessary, the
new event can be considered as expected, since the corresponding goal is already
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Algorithm 4 Controllability Appraisal Process
1: function IsEventControllable(Event εt)
2: gt ← getPrimitiveGoal(εt)
3: M← GetAgencyRatio(gt)
4: R ← GetAutonomyRatio(gt)
5: P ← GetSuccPredecessorsRatio(gt)
6: I ← GetAvailableInputs(gt)
7: Veh ← getEmotionValence(gt)
8: ω ← getWeights(gt)
9: X ← ω0·M+ω1·R+ω2·P+ω3·I
ω0+ω1+ω2+ω3
+ Veh
10: if (X > 0) then
11: return CONTROLLABLE
12: else
13: return UNCONTROLLABLE
live. For goals that have not yet been started (that is, are not live), the algorithm
must determine how unexpected it would be to pursue one now; if the goal is at
least in the plan, i.e., on the path to the top level goal, it is just unexpected while
any others are most-unexpected.
4.3.4 Controllability
Controllability is the extent to which an event can be influenced; it is associated with
a robot’s ability to cope with an event [92]. Thus, a robot can determine whether an
event’s outcome can be altered by actions under either of the collaborators’ control.
In other words, controllability is a measure of a robot’s ability to maintain or change
a particular state as a consequence of an event.
Controllability is important for the overall architecture. For instance, the robot
can choose to ask or negotiate about a collaborative task which is not controllable,
or form a new motive to establish an alternative goal for the current uncontrollable
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event. In general, other mechanisms in the architecture use the controllability output
in their decision-making processes; while controllability uses information from the
collaboration structure, e.g., predecessors of a goal.
An important determinant of one’s emotional response is the sense of control
over occurring events. This sense of subjective control is based on one’s reasoning
about the self’s power. For instance, the robustness of one’s plan for executing
actions can increase one’s sense of power and subsequently the sense of control. In
the collaboration context, we have translated the sense of control into a combination
of four different factors including a) agency and b) autonomy of the robot, as well
as the ratios of c) successful predecessors, and d) the available inputs of a given goal
(i.e., gt) in the shared plan.
In Algorithm 4, we partially compute the controllability of an event based on the
above four factors. We use weighted averaging of these factors to determine their
impact on the controllability of an event (line 9). The value of all these weights
are set to 1.0 for the purpose of simplicity (getWeights). These weights can be
adjusted after further investigating the influence of these factors, and implementing
other mechanisms in the overall architecture. We believe that the human’s perceived
affective state also impacts the controllability of an event (getEmotionValence).
The (−1.0 ≤ Veh ≤ 1.0) is the valence value of the human’s perceived affective state.
Positive emotions, e.g., happiness, possess positive values, and negative emotions,
e.g., anger, have negative values. The magnitude of this value can change with re-
spect to the intensity of the perceived affective state. Thus, a positive controllability
value indicates that an event is controllable; otherwise uncontrollable.
GetAgencyRatio: Agency is the capacity of an individual to act independently
in a given environment. In a collaborative environment collaborators are sometimes
required to act independently of each other. Hence, they need to have some internal
motives that are formed based on their own Mental State rather than motives that
are reinforced by the other. These internal motives will lead the collaborators to
acquire new intentions when required. If the robot’s mental state possesses only
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an internal motive supporting the recognized goal, we consider a maximum agency
value denoted as M in Algorithm 4 (i.e., M = 1.0); otherwise we consider the
minimum agency value (i.e., M = 0.0).
GetAutonomyRatio: Autonomy is the ability to make decisions without the
influence of others, and implies acting on one’s own and being responsible for that.
In a collaborative environment, tasks are delegated to the collaborators based on
their capabilities. Therefore, each collaborator is responsible for the delegated task
and the corresponding goal. In Algorithm 4, R denotes the value of autonomy with
regard to the goal gt. This value (0.0 ≤ R ≤ 1.0) is the ratio of the number of
goals contributing to gt for which the robot is responsible over the total number of
contributing goals, if the goal associated with the current event is a nonprimitive
goal. However, if the associated goal of the current event corresponds to a prim-
itive goal the value of R would be 0.0 (if the human is responsible) or 1.0 (if the
robot is responsible). In general, higher autonomy leads to a more positive value of
controllability.
GetSuccPredecessorsRatio: The structure of a shared plan contains the order
of the required predecessors of a goal. Predecessors of a goal, gt, are goals that the
collaborators should achieve before trying to achieve goal gt. We use the ratio of
successfully achieved predecessors of the associated primitive goal over the total
number of predecessors of the same goal. If all of the predecessors of the given goal
are achieved, then P = 1.0 which is the maximum value for P . On the contrary,
failure of all of the predecessors will lead to P = 0.0. Therefore, a higher P value
positively impacts the value of controllability for the current event.
GetAvailableInputs: Finally, inputs of a task are the required elements that
the collaborators use to achieve the specified goal of the task. These inputs are
also part of the structure of a shared plan. We compute the ratio of the available
required inputs over the total required inputs of the goal associated with the current
event. This value (denoted as I in Algorithm 4) will be set between 0.0 and 1.0.
Similar to the other factors in the controllability process, the closer the value of I
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gets to 1.0, the more positive impact it has on the overall controllability value of
the event.
In summary, the output of these four appraisal processes serves as critical input
for the other mechanisms of the Affective Motivational Collaboration framework,
shown in Chapter 3. By providing adequate interpretation of events in the collabo-
rative environment, the appraisal mechanism enables the robot to carry out proper
collaborative behaviors.
4.4 Goal Management
A collaborative robot needs to be able to regulate and manage shared goals during
collaboration. Emotion has a crucial influence on this goal management process. In
this section, we provide a cost function that we use to choose the goal in the shared
plan with the lowest cost value out of a set of alternative goals. This cost function is
a) based on the goal attributes, b) with respect to the reverse appraisal of the per-
ceived affective state, and c) the appraisal of the collaborative environment. Adding
goal management process to Collaboration mechanism is one of our contributions.
Goals represent a key part of the context during collaboration. However, not
all goals are appropriate to pursue at the moment, depending on conditions. In
fact, it can be destructive for a collaboration to pursue a plausible goal in a poor
context. Therefore, a collaborative robot must be able to manage shared goals
during collaboration. The goal management process has a critical influence on a
collaborative robot’s behavior by maintaining or shifting the focus of attention to
an appropriate goal based on the collaboration status.
Changes in a collaboration environment alter the relative importance of alter-
native goals. These changes can reflect the collaborators’ internal changes and the
influence of their actions. In a collaboration environment, emotions represent the
outcome of underlying mental processes of the collaborators. Emotions have many
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Figure 4.3: Using Appraisals’ outcome to influence Collaboration structure (mech-
anisms in our framework).
different functions [226] including goal management. Goal-oriented emotions such
as anger, frustration and worry regulate the mental processes influenced by one’s
internal goals. In our ongoing example, a robot and an astronaut are collaborating
to install solar panels. When one of the astronaut’s goals is blocked, the robot must
manage the shared goals in order to prevent failure of the collaboration. By using
reverse appraisal [64] of the astronaut’s affective state and its own appraisal of in-
dividual goals, the robot is able to successfully shift the focus of attention from the
blocked goal (eliciting worry in the astronaut) to an appropriate one to maintain
the collaboration. A similar example is provided in Chapter 5.
Here, we describe the goal management process in our framework using an
astronaut-robot collaboration example. We introduce the goal management process
based on a cost function including the influence of affective appraisal and reverse
appraisal processes. Goal management is a crucial part of our investigation of the
reciprocal influence of appraisal on a collaboration structure (see Figure 4.3).
As we mentioned earlier, we use four appraisal variables including: relevance,
desirability, expectedness and controllability. The outcome of each appraisal process
is a specific value for the corresponding appraisal variable. The vector containing
these appraisal variables can be mapped to a particular affective state at each point
in time when required (see Algorithms in Section 4.3). Moreover, the functions
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(0.26, 0.82) (0.37, 0.08) (0.37, 0.10)
Robot's Primitive Goal
Figure 4.4: Cost values indicated by tuples with (second number) and without (first
number) the influence of emotions.
of emotions, such as goal management, in a social setting and the meaning of the
collaborator’s perceived affective state in collaboration context are also important.
A collaboration structure provides a hierarchy and constraints of the shared
goals in the form of a shared plan which contains both the robot and the human
collaborator’s goals. The robot pursues the goals for which the robot is responsible
in the shared plan. However, there can be several live goals available for the robot
to pursue at each point in time during collaboration. A goal is live iff all of its
predecessors are achieved and all of its preconditions are satisfied. Therefore, a
collaborative robot requires a mechanism to choose between a set of live goals. We
believe appraisal processes are crucial to choose between the available live goals,
since the appraisals are the immediate outcome of the robot’s assessment of the
collaboration environment.
For instance, Figure 4.4 shows a non-primitive “Prepare Panels” goal decom-
posed into three unordered primitive goals. Therefore, if “Prepare Panels” is live,
its primitive goals can be pursued by the responsible agent. In our example, the
astronaut is responsible for the “Check Connector” goal; the robot is responsible
for the remaining two primitive goals. According to the collaboration mechanism in
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our overall framework, “Check Connector” is in focus, with the astronaut pursuing
this goal. Suddenly, however the astronaut tells the robot that she can not find the
connector and she is worried about failure of this goal. The robot’s response to this
situation will be explored below as we discuss details of our cost function.
Equation 4.4 shows the function to calculate the cost of each live goal. Goal
management algorithm chooses the minimum cost goal. The base in the equation
calculates the cost of pursuing any given goal. The three functions used to calculate
the cost are: proximity P (g), difficulty D(g), and specificity S(g) (see equations 4.6
to 4.8).
Cost(g) =
(
ω0.P (g) + ω1.D(g) + ω2.
1
S(g) + 1
)Γ
(4.4)
For simplicity in this example, we assume equal values for the weights: ωi=1.
Γ = −C[(Rr + 1)Dr + α(Rh + 1)Dh] (4.5)
The exponent part of our cost function (Equation 4.5) captures a) the influence
of the human’s perceived emotional instance, and b) the influence of self appraisal of
the given goal. Rh ∈ [0, 1] and Dh ∈ [−1, 1] are the relevance and desirability values
respectively, which are based on the reverse appraisal of the human’s perceived
affective state. For instance, if the astronaut is worried, Dh is negative, e.g., -0.8
(depending on how undesirable the event is according to reverse appraisal), and Rh
will be 1 for the active goal and its value descends to 0 for other live goals depending
on their distance to the active goal in the shared plan (e.g., 0.1).
Rr ∈ [0, 1] and Dr ∈ [−1, 1] are relevance and desirability values, provided by
the self appraisal functions for all of the live goals. For instance, for the active
goal for which the astronaut was worried, Dr can be positive, e.g., 0.8 (depending
on the self’s desirability appraisal function); Rr can be 1, since the active goal is
relevant for the robot. These values will change for the other live goals depending
on how relevant they are with respect to the collaboration status (e.g., 0.9 and 0.8).
124
Finally, C ∈ [1,∞) is a constant (e.g., 2) used to control the influence of affect on
cost value. It is negative since undesirability (negative values) should increase the
cost. α ∈ [1,∞) is another constant (e.g., 3) used to control the importance of
reverse appraisal relative to self appraisal.
The proximity of a goal indicates how far the goal is from the current active goal
in the shared plan. It is calculated by the distance function (Equation 4.6) which
returns the number of edges between the current active goal gact , and the given goal
g in the shared plan. In our example, P (g) is 2 for both “Check Impedance” and
“Connect Adaptor” goals.
P (g) = max
{
1, distance(gact , g)
}
(4.6)
The difficulty of a goal is a function of three parameters (Equation 4.7) which
consider the difficulty based on a) topology of the shared plan tree (domain in-
dependent), and b) the amount of effort required to pursue a given goal (domain
dependent). The
∑
prede(g) is the sum of efforts that all the predecessors of a given
goal g require. The
∑
desce(g) is the sum of efforts that all the descendants of a
given goal g require. The effort values represent the amount of effort for the goals
with respect to the domain. In our example, we assume the values of all the goal
efforts are 1 for simplicity. The H(g) is the height of the given goal g. The heights
of all primitives under “Prepare Panel” goal are 0 in our example.
D(g) =
(
H(g) + 1
)
×
[
M∑
m=0
prede(g) +
N∑
n=0
desce(g)
]
(4.7)
The specificity of a goal is the function of depth (distance from the root) and
degree (number of children in the graph) of a given goal g. The first non-primitive
goal (root) is the least specific goal, and the primitives (leaves) are the most specific
goals. As calculated based on Figure 4.4, the values of S(g) for the three primitives
under the “Prepare Panels” are 2.
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S(g) =
depth(g)
degree(g) + 1
(4.8)
The tuples below the three leftmost primitive goals in Figure 4.4 indicate cost
values of each goal: the first number in each tuple is the normalized cost value
without the influence of the affective part of the cost function, i.e., the exponent is
equal to 1 in Equation 4.4; the second number of each tuple indicates the normalized
value of the cost including the influence of affective appraisal and the astronaut’s
perceived affective state.
Based on our cost function, the cost of completing the primitive goal “Check
Connector” is 0.82 (see Figure 4.4). As shown, when affect is not considered the cost
is 0.26; the negative affective state of the astronaut (worry) significantly increases
the cost of the current goal, and also impacts the other two primitive live goals under
the same parent. Therefore, instead of insisting on pursuing the same blocked goal
which has caused the astronaut’s negative affective state, the robot can mitigate
the astronaut’s emotions by adapting to her worry. The robot shifts the focus
of attention to “Check Impedance” to maintain progress and prevent failure of the
collaboration. We use our proposed cost function in our goal management algorithm
to integrate affective appraisal into the collaboration mechanism in our framework.
4.5 Coping Mechanism and Strategies
We have developed an algorithm for the Coping mechanism to determine how the
agent would respond to events using our framework. Coping operates based on
the antecedents of the appraisals and includes strategies that the agent chooses to
make changes, directly or indirectly, that would have a desired impact on the ap-
praisal. In our computational framework, the output of Coping is one or multiple
intentions. Our Coping mechanism includes a set of coping strategies that can be
triggered based on different conditions (see Table 4.1). All of these coping strategies
are known in the literature, however, none of these strategies are applied in col-
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laboration context. Some of our coping strategies, i.e., planning, active coping and
seeking social support for instrumental reasons, are categorized as problem-focused
and others, i.e., acceptance, mental disengagement, and shifting responsibility, are
categorized as emotion-focused strategies as described in [92]. We implemented
these six coping strategies because they let our agent demonstrate distinct behav-
iors with respect to the output of the appraisal mechanism and the agent’s mental
state in our framework.
4.5.1 Planning
The planning coping strategy works based on the shared plan and the task structure
introduced as an input to our framework. The task structure includes the hierarchy
and ordering of the tasks, the required inputs of each task as well as the preconditions
and postconditions of individual tasks. We use this task structure to create our
shared plan which includes the primitive and non-primitive goals that our agent
and its collaborator want to achieve throughout their collaboration. Therefore, our
agent executes actions related to its own goals based on this shared plan, and uses the
same shared plan to associate goals and their status with the human collaborator.
To achieve a goal the agent is required to execute an action, and to execute an
action the agent needs to have the right intention. In our framework, whenever this
coping strategy is activated the Coping mechanism provides the selected intention
to the Action mechanism. The Action mechanism executes an action based on the
given intention to achieve the corresponding goal in the shared plan.
4.5.2 Active Coping
The active coping strategy can provide one or all of the following three different
intentions with respect to whether this coping strategy is activated and the required
conditions are provided. Firstly, this coping strategy can provide an intention to
acknowledge the human’s emotions. For instance, if the human expresses an affective
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state with negative valence, the agent can acknowledge human’s negative affective
state accordingly. Secondly, the active coping strategy can provide an intention to
respond to the human if the human asks a question. Currently, in our framework,
the agent can respond to the human if the human asks the agent: a) what input
is required to achieve a goal, b) how to do a task to achieve a goal, c) to achieve
a goal, d) who is responsible to achieve a given goal. For instance, if the human
asks the agent to achieve a goal, the active coping strategy forms an intention to
either accept the human’s proposal (if achieving the given goal is controllable for
the agent), or reject the human’s proposal (if it is not controllable for the agent).
Thirdly, the active coping strategy can form an intention to delegate a task to
the human collaborator. The intention for task delegation can be formed if the
agent fails to achieve its own goal, and the human’s perceived affective state is not
negative. As mentioned earlier, any or all of these intentions can be formed if active
coping is selected. The agent acts accordingly by passing these intentions to the
Action mechanism. For instance, if the human is frustrated about a failure that
occurred when using a tool to perform its own task and asks the agent whether the
agent can provide its own tool, the active coping strategy forms a new intention to
acknowledge the human’s frustration and responds to the human by providing the
right tool (input) to use and fulfill the task. In this example, there will be no new
intention to delegate a new goal to the human since the agent perceives the human’s
negative affective state.
4.5.3 Seeking Social Support for Instrumental Reasons
The seeking social support for instrumental reasons strategy forms new intentions
for the agent whenever the agent needs the human’s help and needs to ask questions
from the human collaborator to make progress in collaboration. The questions that
our agent can ask are the reciprocal of those questions that the human can ask and
the human can respond as we mentioned in Section 4.5.2. Therefore, our agent can
ask a) what input is required to achieve a goal, b) how to do a task to achieve a
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goal, c) the human to achieve a goal, d) who is responsible to achieve a given goal.
Reciprocally, again, the agent expects the human collaborator to accept or reject the
agent’s proposals. In our framework, whenever this strategy is activated the agent
considers human’s perceived affective state. For instance, if the human is worried
about the outcome of a task failure, the agent does not form an intention to ask
questions about any of the above cases and consequently prevents asking for more
help.
4.5.4 Acceptance
The acceptance coping strategy forms an intention to drop the intention of pursuing
a goal. In our framework, if this strategy becomes activated, the intention to pursue
the current goal will be dropped; see Table 4.1. For instance, if the human has
failed to achieve a goal due to the lack of a required input, and the agent is not
able to pursue another goal and the agent is not able to provide the required input,
this strategy becomes activated. The acceptance strategy also forms an intention
to inform the human collaborator about the agent’s decision on not pursuing the
current goal.
4.5.5 Mental Disengagement
The mental disengagement coping strategy forms new intention to lower the negative
emotional intensity associated with a goal in the event of a failure or an impasse.
We use our goal management algorithm (see section 4.4) as the result of selecting
this strategy to dissociate from the current goal in the collaboration process and
subsequently disengage the collaborator from a negative event (e.g., failure to achieve
a goal). This disengagement helps the agent to lower the utility of an unsuccessful
goal achievement attempt and focus on other achievable goals with respect to their
costs to facilitate progress of collaboration. In our framework, this coping strategy
forms an intention to run the goal management process. As the result of mental
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disengagement activation, the Coping mechanism also forms another intention to
inform the human about the outcome of the goal management process, i.e., whether
the agent proposes switching to pursue another goal with lower cost, or if there is
not much the agent can do since there is no other goal with a lower cost to pursue.
The process and example of choosing another goal with a lower cost are shown in
Section 4.4.
4.5.6 Shifting Responsibility
The shifting responsibility strategy forms a new intention to shift the blame from
the agent to another entity. In our framework, we use this strategy to mitigate the
influence of negative events causing negative emotions in the agent or the human
collaborator. For instance, if this strategy becomes activated as a result of a failure,
a new intention will be formed to blame the other collaborator, or the third person
who provided the input (if the task needed a tool as an input). It can also form an
intention to give the credit to the human collaborator to mitigate human’s negative
emotions.
4.5.7 Activation of Coping Strategies
In our Coping mechanism, there are three activation criteria for each coping strategy.
The first criterion is the conjunction of emotion valences of the self and the other
collaborator (see Emotion Valence column in Table 4.1). For instance, if the valence
of the human collaborator’s affective state is negative and the valence of the agent’s
affective state is also negative, the active coping (2nd row), the acceptance (4th row),
and the mental disengagement (5th row) coping strategies are the coping strategy
candidates that have potential to become activated if the other activation criteria
also exist for any of them. For example, if the human collaborator is frustrated and
the agent’s elicited emotion is guilt, the three above mentioned coping strategies
become potential candidates to be selected as the agent’s active coping strategy.
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The second criterion is the need for the agent to cope with an event. The values of
our three different motives (i.e., satisfaction, achievement, and external) are involved
in the decision of whether there is a need for a particular coping strategy to become
activated. We use conjunction of satisfaction motive’s value with the disjunction of
achievement and external motives. For instance, if we have highly negative values
for all three motives for the potential candidates of coping strategies based on the
example we mentioned above, the acceptance coping strategy will be selected as the
strategy with the highest need for the agent. For example, this kind of condition can
occur when the agent fails doing its own task and pursuing the current goal (negative
satisfaction motive), and can not find another goal to overcome the impasse (negative
achievement motive). The details about how the motive values are computed is
presented in Section 4.6. Finally, the ability to cope with an event is the third
criterion that impacts the decision of whether the selected coping strategy can be
activated. The controllability of an event represents whether the agent is able to
control the situation occurring with the given event. In our example, if the agent
finds the event uncontrollable, the acceptance coping strategy becomes activated
(see Table 4.1).
4.6 Motivation Mechanism
As we discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, motives are goal-driven affect-regulated con-
structs indicating an urge related to their goal. There are several motives in psy-
chological and computational literatures as we reviewed in Chapter 2. However,
none of these computational models have particularly focused on the application of
motives in the collaboration context. We believe motives have a key role to fill the
gap between the Appraisal and Coping mechanisms in a collaborative environment.
In fact, motives can improve the intention formation process with respect to the
urge of pursuing a goal by considering the emotional states of the collaborators. As
shown in Table 4.1, it is not enough to choose a particular coping strategy only by
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knowing how controllable it is to pursue the given goal. For instance, motive values
can help the agent to choose between Acceptance and Mental Disengagement when
pursuing a goal is not controllable.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, we provided three types of prominent motives in
the literatue; i.e., achievement, affiliation and power. However, due to the fact that
not all of these motives fit in to the dyadic collaboration context, we developed
our own computational models of motives in our framework, including: satisfaction,
achievement, and external motives. Our approach in general is inspired by Merrick
and Shafi’s work in [169] modeling motives using curves generated by sigmoid func-
tions. In our work, curves are influenced by the valence of the human collaborator’s
perceived affective state. This section provides more details about how different
curves model different motives in our computational framework. We use the values
of these three motives in other mechanisms including the Coping mechanism as we
described in Section 4.5 and show in Table 4.1.
4.6.1 Satisfaction Motive
The satisfaction motive indicates the satisfaction level with the collaboration for
the agent and its human collaborator. The satisfaction motive process maintains
the value of satisfaction drive throughout the collaboration. The satisfaction drive
is the quantitative weighted accumulation of desirability values between -1 and +1
over time. For instance, if the desirability values of the agent’s appraisal over three
consecutive turns are {0.75, 0, -0.25}, and their corresponding weights are {0.25, 0.5,
1.0}, the satisfaction drive value will be (0.25)(0.75) + (0.5)(0) + (1.0)(-0.25) which
is -0.0625. Notice that the latest desirability values get higher weights. Intuitively,
it is because older desirable events have less influence on overall desirability and
consequently the satisfaction level of the collaboration. The same process computes
the satisfaction drive values for the agent and the human collaborator. Only the
sources of desirability values are different, i.e., appraisal for the agent and reverse
appraisal for the human collaborator. Then, the satisfaction motive process com-
133
Figure 4.5: Three functions of satisfaction motive for different values of valence.
The x-axis indicates the satisfaction drive’s delta value in [-1, +1], and the y-axis
indicates the magnitude of satisfaction motive in [-1, +1].
putes the difference between the current and the previous (t-1) satisfaction drives,
called the delta of satisfaction drive value, δsat. As shown in equation 4.9, we use
the δsat value in all three functions to compute the overall satisfaction motive’s value
Msat. We also use three different functions with respect to the valence value of the
the human collaborator’s perceived affective state. Our satisfaction motive’s model
has three domain dependent parameters Ssat ∈ [0, 1.5], i.e. strength of motive, BL
where B is the base parameter of the function in (1,∞) and L is the exponential
parameter of the same function in (0,∞); together B and L define unsatisfiability
value. Currently we set Ssat value to 1.5, B to 3.0, and L to 2.0.
Msat(εt) =

arctan(Ssat × δsat) valence = 0
BL×(δsat−1) valence > 0
−B−L×(δsat+1) valence < 0
(4.9)
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The curves, shown in Figure 4.5, suitably represent the change in magnitude
of satisfaction motive based on different valence values of the human collaborators
affective state. Intuitively, if the human collaborator does not express any affective
state, the satisfaction motive’s value can vary between -1 and +1 (blue curve in
Figure 4.5). However, if the agent perceives positive affective state, there will be no
negative satisfaction value since the other collaborator is in positive state of mind
(red curve in Figure 4.5), and in contrast, if the agent perceives negative affective
state, the satisfaction motive value only changes between -1 and 0 (green curve in
Figure 4.5) with respect to how satisfied the agent is according to the status of its
own goals during collaboration.
4.6.2 Achievement Motive
The achievement motive drives the agent’s need to achieve a goal during the col-
laboration. According to the literature, e.g. [169], the achievement motive is based
on the estimation of success probability and the difficulty of achieving a goal. In
our framework, we compute the probability of success as the product of the con-
trollability and expectedness appraisal values. Intuitively, the more controllable and
expected the events are, the probability of successful achievement of their related
goal is higher.
In our framework we use two sigmoid-based functions to compute the achieve-
ment motive’s value. These functions values change based on the probability of
success and valence of the human collaborator’s affective state. We use Equation
4.10 when the perceived affective state of the human has positive or zero valence
value, and we use Equation 4.11 when the perceived affective state of the human
has a negative valence value. As shown in Figure 4.6, when the value of the valence
changes between 0 and +1, the output of M+ach function changes between the red
and the blue lines respectively. Conversely, when the value of the valence changes
between -1 and a small negative number (close to zero), the output ofM−ach func-
tion changes between the green and the orange lines.
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Figure 4.6: Two functions of the achievement motive for different values of valence.
The x-axis indicates the success probability value of achieving a goal which is in [0,
+1], and the y-axis indicates the magnitude of achievement motive in [-1, +1].
M+ach(εt) = 2.0
1 + e(2.0−valence)×(1.05−p(success))
− 1.0
1 + e(12.0−valence)×(1.2−p(success))
(4.10)
M−ach(εt) = 1.0
1 + e(0.5+valence)×(1.05)−p(success)
− 1.0
1 + e(12.0+valence)×(p(success)−1.02)
(4.11)
By intuition, as the probability of success increases the agent is more motivated
to achieve a goal and this motive gets higher when the human’s affective state is
positive or at least neutral. The human’s negative emotions cause lower values of
achievement motive since taking care of and acknowledging the human’s negative
affective state should have higher priority for a collaborative agent than achieving
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a goal.
4.6.3 External Motive
The external motive drives the agent’s need to achieve a proposed goal by the human
collaborator during the collaboration. In our framework, the external motive is also
based on the estimation of success probability and the difficulty of achieving a goal,
but this goal is proposed by the human collaborator. The probability of success
for the external motive is computed the same way as the achievement motive’s
probability of success, i.e. the product of controllability and expectedness appraisal
values.
The only difference from the achievement motive is that we use Equations 4.10
and 4.11 in reverse order for the external motive; i.e., we use Equation 4.11 when
the valence of human’s perceived affective state is positive, and Equation 4.10 when
the valence of the human’s perceived affective state is negative or zero.
Intuitively, when the human proposes a new goal while expressing a negative
affective state the agent should be more motivated to acknowledge human’s pro-
posal and pursue the proposed goal to mitigate human’s negative affective state and
maintain the collaboration. For example, when the human collaborator is worried
about the failure of attaching a solar panel due to a malfunctioning tool, and pro-
poses that the robot attach the panel, the high value of the external motive causes
the robot to accept the human’s proposal.
4.7 Theory of Mind
The Theory of Mind mechanism uses the collaboration structure and functions de-
scribed in Section 4.2 as well as appraisal processes to form anticipated beliefs about
the human’s mental and emotional states. In other words, since our agent knows
about the human’s goals (as part of the shared plan), it can apply the human goals
to the same algorithms during the human’s turn of the collaboration. The agent
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Figure 4.7: Two functions of external motive for different values of valence. The
x-axis indicates the success probability value of achieving a proposed goal which is
in [0, +1], and the y-axis indicates the magnitude of the achievement motive in [-1,
+1].
uses the collaboration structure during the human’s turn to compute appraisal val-
ues with respect to the human’s current emotional state and the current goal in the
shared goal structure. The outcome of the reverse appraisal forms beliefs about the
anticipated mental and emotional state of the human collaborator.
Reverse Appraisal
We use the same relevance, expectedness and controllability algorithms for reverse
appraisal as those algorithms we described in Section 4.3. In these three algorithms
the Theory of Mind mechanism substitutes the agent’s required goal and its corre-
sponding constraints and information with the human’s goal and its corresponding
information which is provided to the agent within the shared plan structure. How-
ever, only for the reverse appraisal of desirability we chose to simply use the valence
138
value of the human’s perceived affective state and interpret negative, neutral and
positive valence values as undesirable, neutral and desirable values respectively. In
this way, our agent could directly infer whether the occurrence of the current event
and its corresponding goal is desirable for the human. The outcome of all of these
processes is a vector of reverse appraisal values that could be used by other mecha-
nisms in our framework.
4.8 Elicitation of Emotion Instances
We have modeled 10 different emotion instances that can be elicited by the agent
or anticipated from the human during collaboration in our framework (see Table
4.3). We chose these 10 emotions because we believe they are good examples of
social emotions that can occur during a collaboration. These emotion instances
have meanings in social context and more specifically in collaboration. There are
two components involved in selecting a particular emotion: appraisal variables and
collaboration context.
We use the outcome of the four appraisal processes discussed in section 4.3 to
determine the potential emotion instance to be elicited (if the agent wants to express
an emotion), or to anticipate a potential emotion from the human collaborator (if
the human response is anticipated). The outcome of appraisal processes can be
one of the values presented in Table 4.2 with respect to the corresponding process.
For instance, relevance can only obtain either of two values, i.e., relevant or
irrelevant., or the controllability can obtain one of the three values in Table 4.2;
i.e., high controllable, low controllable or uncontrollable.
We also use the collaboration context as our second determinant to select a
particular emotion. We define the collaboration context based on: goal achieve-
ment (human achieved and agent achieved), goal failure (human failed and
agent failed), proposal of a goal (human proposed and agent proposed),
acceptance of the proposed goal (human accepted and agent accepted), and
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Table 4.2: Appraisal values for relevance, desirability, expectedness and controlla-
bility.
Appraisal Variable Relevance Desirability Expectedness Controllability
Values
RELEVANT
HIGH_DESIRABLE MOST_EXPECTED HIGH_CONTROLLABLE
DESIRABLE EXPECTED
LOW_CONTROLLABLE
IRRELEVANT
NEUTRAL UNEXPECTED
UNDESIRABLE
MOST_UNEXPECTED UNCONTROLLABLE
HIGH_UNDESIRABLE
rejection of the proposed goal (human rejected and agent rejected). All of
these situations can occur by either of the collaborators, i.e., agent or human (see
Table 4.3). There is only one exception and it is when the desirability value is
neutral the associated emotion to the event is always neutral without considering
the collaboration context and the values of other appraisal variables (see first row
in Table 4.3)1. In summary, the outcome of four appraisal processes and the in-
ferred context of a collaboration can lead the agent to elicit its own affective state
or anticipate the human collaborator’s affective state.
The following interaction is based on our example scenario in Section 3.2:
5. Astronaut : The connectors on this panel have problems and we might not
be able to finish this task.
6. Robot : Don’t worry! I can replace the connectors in 4 minutes. We definitely
can finish this task after that.
The agent finds the Astronaut’s goal uncontrollable, unexpected, unde-
sirable and relevant (see all possible values of appraisal variables in Table 4.2).
Also, the agent finds the current context of collaboration as human proposed;
therefore, the agent infers that Astronaut’s perceived negative emotion instance can
be worry. Thus, since the agent has access to working connectors (required inputs
to the Astronaut’s task), first, the agent acknowledges the Astronaut’s negative
1Empty cell in Table 4.3 indicate that the value of the cell does not influence the selection of
the emotion in the corresponding row.
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affective state, then informs the Astronaut with a proper solution to mitigate the
Astronaut’s negative affective state.
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CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION
In this chapter, we provide the explanation and results of two different user studies.
The first user study (see Section 5.2) was conducted online to evaluate our appraisal
algorithms. Specifically, the goal of this study was to validate the effectiveness of the
factors involved in our appraisal algorithms. We prepared online questionnaires and
asked participants to tell us what their decision would be in the simple situations
provided. The participants’ answers to our questionnaires were compared with the
results of our algorithms for the given situations. The results are provided in Section
5.2. The second user study (see Section 5.3) was conducted in the laboratory The
goal of this user study was to provide an end-to-end system evaluation using our
overall framework. We provided pre- and post-study questionnaires as well as an
open-ended questionnaire to study the humans’ evaluation of a robot collaborating
using our framework. The results are provided in Section 5.3.
5.1 Implementation
As described in Chapter 3, the Perception and Action mechanisms are not part
of our theoretical work. Therefore, we only implemented these mechanisms to the
extent to which they could help us to run and test our framework. The Perception
mechanism only redirects the input values from the system’s users to the framework.
For instance, in our user study described in Section 5.3, the Perception mechanism
only receives the valence of human’s affective state from the input and provides it to
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the framework. On the other hand, the Action mechanism executes some functions
based on the intentions formed and provided by the Coping mechanism described in
this section. We group all of these functions into three categories in our framework.
The first group of functions includes all of the functions capable of executing some
actions with respect to the domain. The second category includes all of the functions
involved in revealing the agent’s utterances by writing on the screen or conveying
through the agent’s voice and text to speech systems. The last category includes all
of the functions to express the agent’s affective state. The emotions can be expressed
through colors, emoticons, voice and text. For example, in the user study described
in Chapter 5, we expressed the agent’s emotions by using emoticons and utterances
through the text on the screen as well as the agent’s voice.
We use Disco as the basis of the Collaboration mechanism. Disco is the open-
source successor to COLLAGEN [203, 204] which incorporates algorithms based on
SharedPlans theory for discourse generation and interpretation. Disco is able to
maintain a segmented interaction history, which facilitates the collaborative dis-
course between a human and a robot.
5.2 Evaluating Appraisal Algorithms (Crowd Sourcing)
In this section, we present a crowd-sourced user study and the results, which we
conducted to validate the components of our appraisal processes.
5.2.1 Experimental Scenario
We developed an experimental scenario in which participants were asked to envision
a sequence of hypothetical collaborative tasks between themselves and an imaginary
friend, Mary, in order to accomplish their shared goal. To minimize the background
knowledge necessary for our test subjects, we used a simple domestic example of
preparing a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, and a hard boiled egg sandwich for
a hiking trip. The tasks did not require the participants to do any deep problem
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Prepare Two Sandwiches
Prepare Peanut 
Butter Sandwich
Prepare Boiled
Egg Sandwich
Spread
Strawberry Jam
Spread
Peanut Butter
Press
Bread Slices
Boil Water Boil Two Eggs
Cut Sandwiches
In Half
Put Sandwich 
in Bag
Slice Eggs Add Salt Add Pickles
Press
Bread Slices
Put Sandwich 
in Bag
Subject's Primitive Tasks
Mary's Primitive Tasks
Subject & Mary's Non-Primitive Tasks
Figure 5.1: Collaboration task model for the evaluation.
solving; rather, the tasks were part of simple daily activities that should be familiar
to all participants.
5.2.2 Hypothesis and Methodology
Hypothesis
We conducted this user study to test our hypothesis that humans and our algorithms
will provide similar answers to questions related to different factors used to compute
four appraisal variables: relevance, desirability, expectedness, and controllability.
Procedure
We conducted a between-subject user study using an online crowdsourcing website
– CrowdFlower1. We had a questionnaire for each appraisal variable. There were 12
questions (including 2 test questions) in the controllability and expectedness ques-
tionnaires, 14 questions (including 2 test questions) in the desirability questionnaire,
and 22 questions (including 3 test questions) in the relevance questionnaire.
We provided textual and graphical instructions for all questionnaires; Figure 5.1
shows the corresponding task model2. The instructions, provided in the Appendix
A, presented a sequence of hypothetical collaborative tasks to be carried out by the
1http://www.crowdflower.com
2Figure 5.1 was not given to the participants.
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Table 5.1: Number of participants
appraisal variables # of participants
Relevance 29
Desirability 35
Expectedness 33
Controllability 33
test subject and an imaginary friend, Mary, in order to accomplish their goal of
preparing two sandwiches. We also provided a simple definition and an example
of each appraisal variable. The collaboration structure and the instructions were
the same for all questionnaires. The questions introduced specific situations related
to the shared plan, which included blocked tasks and failure or achievement of a
shared goal. Each question provided three answers which were counterbalanced
in the questionnaire. We provided an option like C in all questions (see Figure
5.2), because we did not want to force participants to choose between two options
when they did not have a good reason. We derived two questions for different factors
involved in each algorithm (see Section 4.3). For instance, we prepared two questions
about the influence of the strength of a belief as a key factor involved in relevance
algorithm. The questions were randomly placed in the questionnaire. Figure 5.2
shows an example question from the relevance questionnaire which was designed to
test whether participants perceive saliency as a factor in relevance. The input for
our algorithms was the task model depicted in Figure 5.1.
Participants
Each participant group originally had 40 participants. We limited the participant
pools to those with the highest confidence level on the crowdsourcing website in the
United States, Britain, and Australia. Test questions were included to check the
sanity of the answers. We eliminated participants providing wrong answers to our
sanity questions, and participants with answering times less than 2 minutes. The
final number of accepted participants in each group is provided in Table 5.1.
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5.2.3 Results
Each question in our questionnaires was designed based on different factors that
we use in our algorithms (see Section 4.3). For each of the four questionnaires we
provide an example question, and describe how each question relates to a specific
factor within the corresponding algorithm. The input for our algorithms was the
task model depicted in Figure 5.1. The complete list of questions is provided in
the Appendix A. Additionally, we provide the p-value for each question, using a
binomial distribution, with a probability of success of 0.33, which is the probability
of selecting the right answer if the participant is simply guessing.
Expectedness
Figure 5.2 shows an example question from the expectedness questionnaire. In this
example, with respect to Algorithm 3 (line 6), option A is more expected because
the task related to this option provides the next available task in the focus stack
(see the task model in Figure 5.1). Although the task in option B is part of the
existing task model, it is considered as unexpected by our algorithm, since it is
not live in the plan. We provided option C to determine whether the participants
will differentiate between these two options. This question was presented to the
participants to determine whether their decision for the expectedness of this event
is similar to the output of the expectedness algorithm. For this question, the human
decision was 97% similar to the algorithm’s output.
Results for the expectedness questionnaire are presented in Table 5.2. As shown
in this table, the results are statistically significant; in fact, for questions 1-6 and
9-10, human participants showed between 67 and 100 % agreement with our algo-
rithms, with p-values of 0.001. Questions 7 and 8 were the only two questions
that did not show a statistically significant p-value. It should be noted that these
questions are comparing equally expected or equally unexpected situations, none of
which our algorithms would consider most-expected or most-unexpected.
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Table 5.2: Expectedness results (the Equally Expected column indicates for which
questions our algorithm provides option C as the response)
.
Question Factor EquallyExpected
Percentage of
Matching Answers p-Value
1 Live goal vs. Necessary focus 
shift
No 94% « 0.001
2 Live goal vs. Not part of 
shared plan
No 97% «  0.001
3 Live goal vs. Not part of 
current branch
No 82% «  0.001
4 Necessary focus shift vs. Not part of shared plan No 100% « 0.001
5 Necessary focus shift vs. Not 
part of current branch
No 97% « 0.001
6 Not part of shared plan vs. Not part of current branch No 73% « 0.001
7 Live goal Yes 42% 0.093
8 Not part of current branch Yes 42% 0.093
9 Necessary focus shift Yes 67% « 0.001
10 Not part of shared plan Yes 88% « 0.001
Controllability
Figure 5.3 shows an example question from the controllability questionnaire. The
algorithm’s output is option B, and is determined by Algorithm 4 (line 3), similarly
to the expectedness example above. In this example, option B is more controllable
than option A, because the self over total ratio of the responsibility of the prede-
cessors of the given task (see Autonomy in Section 4.3.4) is higher than the ratio in
Imagine you have pressed the two slices of bread (one covered with 
strawberry jam and one covered with peanut butter) together and passed 
it to Mary. Which of the following two actions is more expected?
A. Mary puts the given sandwich into a zip lock bag after cutting it in half.
B. Mary puts some pickles on another slice of bread.
C. Equally expected.
Figure 5.2: Example expectedness question.
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Table 5.3: Controllability results (the Equally Controllable column indicates for
which questions our algorithm provides option C as the response)
.
Question Factor EquallyControllable
Percentage of Matching
Answers p-Value
1 Agency No 85% « 0.001
2 Autonomy (contributors) No 52% 0.009
3 Autonomy (predecessors) No 91% « 0.001
4 Succeeded predecessors ratio No 58% 0.001
5 Available inputs No 91% « 0.001
6 Agency Yes 91% « 0.001
7 Autonomy (contributors) Yes 73% « 0.001
8 Autonomy (predecessors) Yes 55% 0.003
9 Succeeded predecessors ratio Yes 70% « 0.001
10 Available inputs Yes 76% « 0.001
option A, i.e., self is responsible to spread peanut butter on one slice of bread and
strawberry jam on another slice of bread. In this question, the humans decision was
90% in agreement with the algorithm’s output.
Results for the controllability questionnaire are presented in Table 5.3. As shown
in the table, the p-value is <0.01 for each of the ten questions. The two questions
with the lowest human agreement with the algorithms both relate to autonomy
(Questions #2 and #8) of the participants with 52% and 55%.
Imagine you want to make a peanut butter sandwich. Which of the following 
two actions is more controllable?
A. You can spread the peanut butter on one slice of bread and you need 
Mary to spread strawberry jam on the second slice of bread.
B. You can spread the peanut butter on one slice of bread and strawberry 
jam on the second slice of bread.
C. Equally controllable.
Figure 5.3: Example controllability question.
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Table 5.4: Desirability results (the Equally Desirable column indicates for which
questions our algorithm provides option C as the response)
.
Question Factor EquallyDesirable
Percentage of Matching
Answers p-Value
1 Top level goal is failed No 100% « 0.001
2 Top level goal is achieved No 83% « 0.001
3 Predecessors or preconditions of the top level goal No 100% « 0.001
4 Focus is achieved No 98% « 0.001
5 Focus is failed No 100% « 0.001
6 Predecessors or preconditions of 
the focus
No 100% « 0.001
7 Pending or in-progress focus Yes 46% 0.040
8 Top level goal is failed Yes 66% « 0.001
9 Predecessors or preconditions of 
the top level goal
Yes 54% 0.003
10 Focus is achieved Yes 57% 0.001
11 Focus is failed Yes 60% « 0.001
12 Predecessors or preconditions of 
the focus
Yes 77% « 0.001
Desirability
Figure 5.4 shows an example question from the desirability questionnaire. The
output based on the Algorithm 2 (line 14) is option C, since in both option A and
option B, the focus goal has been achieved successfully. Therefore, in this example,
both options A and B are desirable. The humans’ decision was 77% in agreement
with the algorithm’s output in this question.
The results of the desirability questionnaire are presented in Table 5.4. As shown
in the results table, the p-value is less than 0.05 for all of the desirability questions.
However, an interesting trend is that human participants had a level of agreement
of 83%-100% when the algorithm’s output selected one alternate as more desirable
than another alternate. When the algorithm’s output chose option C (i.e. rating
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Which of the following two actions is more desirable?
A. Imagine you pressed two slices of bread together with peanut butter 
and strawberry jam on them, and passed them to Mary. Mary cuts the 
peanut butter sandwich in half and puts them in the zip lock bag.
B. Imagine you want to make the egg sandwich. You have sliced the 
eggs, put them on one slice of bread, salted them, and waiting for Mary 
to put some pickles on your eggs. Mary puts some pickles on your eggs.
C. Equally desirable.
Figure 5.4: Example desirability question.
two situations as equally desirable), the human participants only showed 46%-77%
agreement. This may indicate that a higher level of granularity is required in the
algorithm when evaluating options with similar levels of desirability.
Relevance
In the example shown in Figure 5.5, with respect to Algorithm 1, option A is relevant
because of Mary’s perceived negative affective state (see Equation 4.1). Although
option B is relevant (since it achieves the next goal in the shared plan), 83% of partic-
ipants consider it as less relevant than option A; we believe this is due to the effect of
Mary’s perceived negative affective state which also generates a higher utility value
in our relevance algorithm. Another question also tested belief saliency. However,
the options provided only related to the shared plan (i.e., no human emotions in
the options). In this case 87% of participants chose the option that accomplished
the next goal in the shared plan. Interestingly, when confronted with a negative
affective state from their collaborator, human participants deviated from the shared
plan and found their collaborator’s affective state more relevant than the original
plan. It is noteworthy that in both the absence and the presence of emotions the
participants chose the more salient option with respect to our definition of saliency,
which was not referenced or provided in the questionnaire.
The complete summary of results for the relevance questionnaire is provided in
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Table 5.5: Relevance results (the Equally Relevant column indicates for which ques-
tions our algorithm provides option C as the response)
.
Question Factor Equally Relevant Percentage of MatchingAnswers p-Value
1 Belief Saliency No 86% « 0.001
2 Belief Strength No 45% 0.063
3 Belief Recency No 97% « 0.001
4 Motive Insistence No 86% « 0.001
5 Motive Urgency No 66% « 0.001
6 Motive Intensity No 72% « 0.001
7 Goal Proximity No 69% « 0.001
8 Goal Specificity No 79% « 0.001
9 Belief Saliency Yes 90% « 0.001
10 Belief Strength Yes 76% « 0.001
11 Belief Recency Yes 72% « 0.001
12 Motive Insistence No 90% « 0.001
13 Motive Urgency Yes 100% « 0.001
14 Motive Intensity Yes 100% « 0.001
15 Goal Proximity Yes 83% « 0.001
16 Goal Specificity Yes 90% « 0.001
17 Belief Saliency No 59% « 0.001
18 Motive Insistence No 10% 0.995
19 Goal Proximity No 14% 0.982
Table 5.5. As shown in the table, all questions show 59%-100% agreement with our
algorithms and statistically significant p-values except for questions 2, 18 and 19.
Question 2 addresses belief strength. This question presents a situation in which
participants must choose whether a self related goal, or collaborator’s goal is more
relevant. Questions 18 and 19 address motive insistence and goal proximity, respec-
tively; both of these questions present situations in which participants must choose
whether an intense emotional circumstance, or adherence to the collaboration plan
is more relevant (the questionnaire is provided in the Appendix A). Our algorithms
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Imagine you have made the peanut butter sandwich and passed it to 
Mary to cut it in half. Which of the following two actions is more 
relevant?
A. Mary starts crying since she cut her finger with a knife.
B. You begin to boil the water to boil the eggs for your second sandwich.
C. Equally relevant.
Figure 5.5: Example relevance question.
choose that the strong emotional circumstance will be more relevant; however, hu-
man participants generally selected adherence to the collaboration plan to be more
relevant.
5.2.4 Discussion
As shown in the preceding results tables, the human participants agreed 100% on
some questions, while on some other questions there was a much lower level of
agreement. Our results indicate that people largely performed as our hypothesis
predicted. The very small p-values indicate that the data set is not random; in
fact, the high percentage of similarity confirms our hypothesis and shows that the
algorithms can help us to model appraisal in a collaboration. The very low level of
agreement on a handful of questions may indicate algorithm components that require
further refinement before implementation; therefore, we made limited changes to our
algorithms in light of this study.
5.3 End-to-End System Evaluation
As mentioned earlier, collaborative robots need to take into account humans’ internal
states while making decisions during collaboration. Humans express affect to reveal
their internal states in social contexts including collaboration [35]. Due to the exis-
tence of such expressions, robots’ affect-awareness can improve the quality of collab-
oration in terms of humans’ perception of performance and preferences. Hence, col-
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Figure 5.6: Experimental setup for end-to-end system evaluation.
laborative robots need to include affect-driven mechanisms in their decision-making
processes to be able to interpret and generate appropriate responses and behaviors.
Our aim in this experiment was to study the importance of affect awareness and
the underlying affect-driven processes in human-robot collaboration. We examined
how affect-awareness impacts different aspects of humans’ preferences by compar-
ing the results from our participants collaborating with an affect-aware versus an
affect-ignorant robot.
5.3.1 Experimental Setup
The setup of this user study included the four main elements shown in Figure 5.6.
The first element is the implementation of the Affective Motivational Collaboration
framework (see left-side of Figure 5.6) as described in Chapter 4. In this user-study,
the Collaboration mechanism in our framework uses a hierarchy of goals associated
with tasks in the hierarchical task network structure. This goal-hierarchy provides
three levels of goals, including: top-level goals, main subgoals, and primitive goals
(see Figure 5.8). The second element was implemented to receive action commands
from the framework and forward them to the robot to control joints and actuators
(see Robot Controller in Figure 5.6). A wizard was the third element of this setting.
The wizard did nothing except inform the robot/framework whether the current
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Figure 5.7: Experimental setup.
task performed by either the robot or the participant was achieved successfully.
The wizard was completely invisible to the participants, and had no impact on
the robot’s behavior other than providing input regarding tasks’ failure or success.
The last element was the supervisor. The supervisor in affect-aware condition was
providing the right peg to the robot or the human (see Environment and Tasks
in this section) in case of a task failure, only when the human reported a neutral or
positive affective state. The robot did not ask the supervisor to come and help if the
human reported a negative affective state (see Interaction Paradigm in Section
5.3.2). In the affect-ignorant condition the robot always asked the supervisor to
help and provide a correct peg irrespective of the human’s reported affective state.
Environment and Tasks
The environment was set up in a laboratory and included the robot, the collaboration
board on top of a desk, and the participant standing in front of the robot on the
other side of the board (see Figure 5.7). The wizard in Figure 5.6 monitored the
155
Install Solar Panel
Attach PanelPrepare Panel
Prepare
Connector
Prepare
Control Switch
Check
Hardware
Check
Function
Remove 
Left
Cover
Remove
Right
Cover
Place
Panel
Weld
Panel
Check
Panel
Attachment
Check
Wirings
Check
Control
Switch
Check
Cascading
Cells
Check
Output
Current
Human's Primitive Goal Robot's Primitive Goal
Connect
Adaptor
Prepare Cable
Take Out
Cable
Unroll
Cable
Place
Cable
Figure 5.8: Collaboration structure used as the task model.
interactions using a live stream of a camera in a different room. The wizard provided
only the required perception, i.e., decision on success or failure of the tasks for the
robot, through the entire time of the collaboration.
The tasks were defined based on the collaboration structure shown in Figure
5.8 and were executed in a turn-taking fashion by each of the collaborators1. The
collaborators used the task board displayed in Figure 5.9. For each task either the
robot or the participant was responsible for picking up one of the corresponding
pegs from their own inventory and placing it on the right spot which was colored
and tagged the same as the associated peg. Some pegs and corresponding spots
on the board had hidden magnets which prevented the pegs from standing upright.
Any peg that fell over was considered a failed task (see Appendix B).
The Robot
We conducted our experiment with a KUKA Youbot (see Figure 5.7). The robot
was stationary on top of a desk and was able to pick up and place available pegs
corresponding to the robot’s task. The robot was operated based on Robot Oper-
ating System (ROS distribution: indigo) and was receiving commands through the
ROS-bridge from our Affective Motivational Collaboration framework (see Figure
5.6). We provided a simple GUI using a touch-screen monitor (see Figure 5.10) to a)
1Figure 5.8 was not given to the participants.
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express the robot’s positive, negative or neutral affective state through an emoticon
and the word POSITIVE, NEGATIVE, or NEUTRAL, b) display the robot’s utter-
ances, c) control turn-taking process of the collaboration, and d) let the participants
report their positive, negative or neutral affective state for each turn. The GUI was
identical in both affect-aware and affect-ignorant conditions (see Section 5.3.2). The
robot used the MaryTTS1 text-to-speech platform to provide corresponding speech
for its utterances in English.
Robot Controller
The robot controller is comprised of two major components: 1) ROS-bridge and 2)
joint controller (see Figure 5.6). ROS-bridge2 provides an API to ROS function-
ality for non-ROS programs, which enables us to send action commands from our
framework (implemented in JAVA) to the robot’s joint controller. The joint con-
troller receives action commands and translates them into actual joint and actuator
commands and sends them to the robot.
5.3.2 Experimental Design
Our scenario was based on a table top turn-taking game that we designed to simulate
the installation of a solar panel. Participants collaborated one-on-one with our robot
to complete all the given tasks required to install the solar panel. Each participant
worked with the robot in two conditions, in a within-subject study. Each primitive
task consisted of picking up and placing pegs on predefined spots on the board (see
Figure 5.9). Each pick-and-place was associated with the robot’s or the participant’s
task. The robot and the participants had their own unique primitive tasks that
they had to accomplish in their own turns. The final goal of installing a solar panel
required the robot and participants to accomplish all of their own individual tasks.
Failure of any task would create an impasse during the collaboration.
1http://mary.dfki.de/
2http://wiki.ros.org/rosbridge suite
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Figure 5.9: The tabletop layout of the available spots for the human and the robot
to place their pegs during the collaboration.
Interaction Paradigm
At the beginning of each collaboration the robot asked the participant to achieve
the overall shared goal, i.e., “installing the solar panel”. Then the robot informed
the participant about the immediate parent non-primitive goal (e.g. Prepare Panel
– see Figure 5.8) that the primitives are contributing to, before working towards
a new sub goal. After achieving a new primitive goal, the robot either informed
the human that it would pursue the next goal, or it informed and passed the turn
to the human to execute the next task with respect to the human’s goal. In case
of the human’s turn, the robot waited for the human to achieve a primitive goal,
then the wizard let the robot know whether the human’s goal was achieved or not.
Afterwards the robot made a decision about which goal to pursue and informed
the human accordingly. The robot interacted via a) speech, b) the corresponding
utterance on the screen, c) negative, positive and neutral expression of affective
state through an emoticon on the screen.
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Figure 5.10: The Graphical User Interface (GUI) used during interaction.
Two Conditions
There were two conditions of the robot: 1) affect-aware and 2) affect-ignorant. The
same interaction paradigm was used in both conditions. In each condition, the
human had two predetermined task failures, and the robot had one. In the affect-
aware condition we considered the impact of human’s affective state on appraisal
outcome and reciprocally on the processes influencing the collaboration structure,
e.g., goal management. In the affect-ignorant condition we bypassed all of the
mechanisms in the AMC framework except the Collaboration mechanism which was
required to generate collaborative behaviors based on the shared plan.
The robot’s behaviors were the same for both affect-aware and the affect-ignorant
conditions when the human collaborator reported neutral or positive affective state.
In these situations, for the affect-aware condition the Planning strategy was the
only coping strategy that could be activated; the planning strategy used Disco as
the collaboration manager in our Collaboration mechanism. Using the collabora-
tion manager as a result of the activation of the planning strategy in affect-aware
condition caused the robot to generate exact same behavior as the affect-ignorant
condition; since in the latter condition the mechanisms of the whole framework are
bypassed and reduced to only Collaboration mechanism which generates behaviors
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based on Disco. The reasoning about which task should be done and controlling
the robot was entirely autonomous under the above situation for both conditions.
Therefore, in both the affect-ignorant and the affect-aware conditions, the robot
responded by asking the supervisor for help. The interaction was structured based
on the same collaboration structure (see Figure 5.8) for both conditions. Also, the
robot’s utterances were identical in affect-ignorant and affect-aware cases if in the
latter the participant reported a positive or a neutral affective state.
The affect-aware and affect-ignorant conditions only differed in case of a robot’s
task failure or when human reported negative affect in response to failure of a task;
the affect-ignorant condition still used Disco to generate collaborative behaviors,
and the robot used only the neutral expression using the emoticon and text, i.e.,
NEUTRAL. However, in the affect-aware condition all the mechanisms were involved
to activate proper coping strategy in response to robot’s task failure or human’s
perceived negative affective state. All other coping mechanisms (see Section 4.5)
are designed to generate appropriate behavior in case of failure of a task, including
positive, negative or neutral expression using the emoticon. We had three behavioral
changes that could only happen in affect-aware condition and only when the human
reported a negative affective state or when the robot failed. The planning, active
coping, seeking social support for instrumental reasons, and mental disengagement
coping strategies were involved to generate these three behaviors. These three robot
behaviors were:
1. Mitigating the human’s negative affective state and postponing its own task to
help the human. If the human expressed negative affective state after the first
human task failure, the robot responded by mitigating the human’s negative
affective state by saying “It was not your fault. I can help you with this task”
and helping the human by providing a peg to fulfill the human’s task.
2. Goal management to switch to another goal which had lower cost with respect
to the human’s perceived negative affective state. If the human expressed
negative affective state after the second human task failure, the robot informed
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the human that they could proceed with another task to save time while
simultaneously requesting a new peg (i.e., help) from the supervisor.
3. Task delegation to the human to overcome the impasse. If the robot faced a
task failure (robot’s negative affective state), the robot requested help from
the human (who had the correct peg).
In the following section we provide the algorithmic trace to show how goal man-
agement algorithm works in both affect-aware and affect-ignorant conditions.
Algorithmic Trace
In this section we provide an algorithmic trace to clarify the difference between
two conditions. This algorithmic trace is based on one of the three behavioral
changes in our user study when the robot, besides acknowledging human’s perceived
negative affective state, activates a coping strategy called mental disengagement.
This situation occurred when the human collaborator failed to “take out cable”,
which was the second failure in our study. As shown in Table 4.1, the mental
disengagement strategy can be activated when the robot and the human feel neutral
or negative, all three values of motives (see Section 4.6) have obtained low or medium
negative values, and the robot evaluates the controllability of the corresponding
goal of the event as uncontrollable one. As the result of activation of the mental
disengagement strategy, our framework applies the goal management algorithm to
lower the effect of the stressor which is the failure of a goal in the plan.
The following algorithmic trace shows how different mechanisms (see Chapter
4) in our framework are involved to generate proper behavior in response to the
perceived goal-failure of the human in the affect-aware condition:
1. As a result of perceiving failure to achieve a goal by the human collaborator
(i.e., “Take Out Cable” – See Figure 5.8), AMC framework uses the Ap-
praisal mechanism to appraise this event. To be able to appraise the event,
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the Appriasal mechanism needs the current information of the collaboration
structure.
2. Thus, the Collaboration mechanism provides the information required to
appraise the current event. This information includes the status of the precon-
ditions, postconditions, hierarchical and temporal constraints, inputs, outputs,
status of the predecessors and contributing goals in the shared plan. All of
this information appears as elements of Mental State, i.e., beliefs.
3. Then, the Theory of Mind mechanism provides the anticipated beliefs
about the human collaborator’s mental state based on reverse appraisal of the
human’s perceived affective state, i.e., negative affect.
4. As a result, the Appraisal mechanism’s outcome will be relevant, undesir-
able, unexpected and controllable.
5. The Motivation mechanism uses the collaboration structure (Collabora-
tion mechanism), anticipated beliefs of the human collaborator (Theory of
Mind mechanism) and the outcome of the appraisal (Appraisal mechanism) to
compute the intensity of three motives (see Section 4.6), i.e., low or medium
negative values for satisfaction, achievement, and external motives.
6. The Coping mechanism receives the values of the three motives and acti-
vates two coping strategies, Active Coping and Mental Disengagement, with
respect to the conditions shown in Table 4.1. As a result of the activation of
these strategies, first, the active coping strategy forms a new intention to ac-
knowledge human’s negative affective state, and then, mental disengagement
strategy uses the goal management algorithm to lower the effect of current
stressor (goal failure) and overcome an impasse. The goal management al-
gorithm uses the current collaboration structure and the human’s perceived
affective state to form a new intention to switch to another goal which has the
lowest cost (see Section 4.4), i.e., “Place Panel”.
7. At the end, the Action mechanism receives two new intentions of acknowl-
edging human’s negative affective state and pursuing achievement of a new
goal (i.e., Place Panel). As a result, the robot will say: “Don’t worry! To
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manage the time let’s switch to another task. We can come back and finish
this later.”
In affect-ignorant condition, AMC framework bypasses the Appraisal, Theory
of Mind, Motivation, and Coping mechanisms. The AMC framework forms
a new intention based on the goal that the SharedPlans’ collaborator manager,
i.e., Disco, provides. In this condition the agent’s decision is not influenced by the
human’s perceived negative affective state, even if the human reports a negative
affective state. As a result, the robot asks the supervisor to come and provide help
to overcome an impasse in response to the human’s goal failure.
5.3.3 Hypotheses
The non/social functions of emotions impact a collaboration process. Human col-
laborators prefer to collaborate with others whose behaviors are influenced by these
functions of emotions depending on the context. We developed seven specific hy-
potheses regarding the positive influence of affect-awareness and the usefulness of
emotion function during collaboration:
Hypothesis 1. Participants will feel closer to the affect-aware robot rather than
the affect-ignorant robot.
Hypothesis 2. Participants will find the affect-aware robot to be more trust-
worthy than the affect-ignorant robot.
Hypothesis 3. Participants will find the affect-aware robot to have better
performance in collaboration than the affect-ignorant robot.
Hypothesis 4. Participants will find the affect-aware robot to be more under-
standing of their feelings than the affect-ignorant robot.
Hypothesis 5. Participants will find the affect-aware robot to be more under-
standing of their goals than the affect-ignorant robot.
Hypothesis 6. Participants will feel more satisfied about the collaboration
when working with the affect-aware robot rather than affect-ignorant robot.
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Hypothesis 7. Participants will perceive higher level of mutual satisfaction
with the affect-aware robot than affect-ignorant robot.
5.3.4 Procedure
Participants were first given a brief description of the purpose of the experiment.
After the short introduction, they were asked to review and sign a consent form.
Participants were then provided with a written instruction of their task and the
rules for collaborating with the robot, provided in Appendix B. Then, one of the
experimenters lead them into the experiment room and went through all the details
of the instructions with the participants standing in front of the collaboration board
and the robot. The experimenter confirmed participants’ correct understanding of
the tasks and informed them of the types of task failures (i.e., fallen peg) that
might occur during the collaboration. Participants were told that researchers were
developing a collaborative robot and would like their help in evaluating their de-
sign. Participants were provided with identical instructions and randomly assigned
to complete either the affect-aware or the affect ignorant condition first. They were
told that, after their collaboration with the robot, they would be asked to answer
a questionnaire on their experience. After completing the first round of collabo-
ration, participants answered a post-experiment questionnaire that measured their
perceptions of the robot, the task, and the collaboration procedure; the questions
are provided in Table 5.6. After answering the first post-experiment questionnaire,
participants were told that they were going to collaborate with the robot one more
time and the robot might not necessarily have the same collaborative behavior. Af-
ter completing the second round of collaboration, participants were asked to answer
the second post-experiment questionnaire which consisted of the same questions as
the first post-experiment questionnaire. Finally, participants were asked to answer
an open-ended questionnaire which measured their perception of difference between
two runs, their preference of collaborative robot between two runs, and their reasons
of preference; the questions are provided in 5.7.
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Measurements
In our study two basic conditions of the robot were tested: a) the affect-ignorant
condition, b) the affect-aware condition. We measured participants’ recall of the col-
laborative behaviors presented by the robot using an open-ended post-experiment
questionnaire. We also specifically asked the participants what behavior of the
robot they liked during their collaboration. We also evaluated participants’ lev-
els of satisfaction, trust, goal achievement, mutual understanding of goals, mutual
understanding of feelings, mutual agreement, and also participants’ beliefs about
the efficiency of collaboration and their feeling of robot’s collaborative behaviors.
Seven-point Likert scales were used in these questionnaire items.
Participants
A total of 37 participants participated in the experiment in 74 trials. Participants
were recruited from Worcester Polytechnic Institute’s students and staff as well as
other people recruited from outside of the campus. The ages of the participants
varied between 19 and 74 with an average of 34.2 years before our screening of 4
participants based on our sanity check questions. After this screening, the ages of
the participants varied between 19 and 54 with an average of 30.8 years old. Of the
33 participants, 21 were female and 12 were male. Each participant participated
in 2 trials. In one trial the robot was aware of human’s affective state and in the
second trial the robot was ignoring human’s affective state. The order of these two
trials were randomly assigned to each participant. Overall, we used affect-ignorant
robot first in 16 experiments, and affect-aware robot first in 17 experiments.
5.3.5 Results
As discussed in Section 5.3.4, results of the user study were gathered through a 31-
question Likert-scale survey that was given to each participant after each run with
the robot, and through a 5-question open-ended summary questionnaire at the end
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of the experiment.
7-Point Likert Scale Survey Results
As mentioned previously, the 7-point Likert scale survey was administered at the end
of the affect-ignorant run and at the end of the affect-aware run for each participant.
The 31 questions are generally categorized in accordance with the seven hypotheses
listed in Section 5.3.3 to evaluate the humans’ perceptions of the following seven
categories, with 3-7 questions per group: (1) the likability of the robot (2) the level
of trust the human feels in the robot (3) the human’s perception of the robot’s
performance (4) the human’s perception of the robot’s understanding of human’s
emotions (5) the human’s perception of the robot’s understanding of human’s and
collaboration’s goals and objectives (6) the human’s feeling about the collaboration
and (7) the human’s perception of the human’s and robot’s mutual satisfaction with
each other as collaborative partners.
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Table 5.6: The 31 Likert scale questions organized according to their categories
(hypotheses).
Question Category
(Hypothesis) Question
Question
Number p-value
Likability
I felt close to the robot. Q1 « 0.001
I would like to continue working with the robot. Q2 « 0.001
I like the robot. Q3 « 0.001
The robot was interesting. Q4 « 0.001
Trust
I trust the robot. Q5 « 0.001
It was easy to express myself to the robot. Q6 « 0.001
I trust the robot to perform appropriately in our collaboration. Q7 « 0.001
I am confident in the robot's ability to help me. Q8 « 0.001
I trust the robot to assess my feelings appropriately in our collaboration. Q9 « 0.001
Robot’s 
Performance
The robot was repetitive. Q10 0.002
The robot made efficient decisions. Q11 0.040
The robot’s decisions improved my performance during the collaboration. Q12 « 0.001
Robot’s 
Understanding of 
Human's Emotions
The robot understood my emotions. Q13 « 0.001
The robot is sometimes confused about what I feel about our activities. Q14 0.005
I feel that the robot, in its own unique ways, is genuinely concerned about me. Q15 « 0.001
The robot understands some of my feelings and takes them into account in our
collaboration. Q16 « 0.001
The robot does not understand how I feel during our collaboration. Q17 0.001
Robot’s 
Understanding of 
Goals
The robot does not understand what we are trying to accomplish. Q18 0.002
The robot does not understand what I am trying to accomplish. Q19 0.007
The robot perceives accurately what my objectives are. Q20 « 0.001
The robot was committed to the collaboration. Q21 « 0.001
Human Feeling 
about 
Collaboration
I find what the robot and I are doing is unrelated to my goals. Q22 0.001
I find what I am doing with the robot confusing. Q23 0.026
The robot and I are working towards mutually agreed-upon goals. Q24 0.008
The robot and I collaborate on setting goals for us to work on. Q25 « 0.001
The robot and I agree on what is important for us to work on. Q26 « 0.001
I believe that the robot and I achieved the goals we set. Q27 0.001
I am satisfied with the outcome of our collaboration. Q28 « 0.001
Satisfaction of 
Collaborative 
Partner
The robot was satisfied with my collaborative behavior. Q29 « 0.001
I was satisfied with the robot. Q30 « 0.001
I understand the robot, and I think it understands me, at least in the best way it
can. Q31 « 0.001
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Figure 5.11: Results of the Likert scale survey for Likability questions.
The results distributions were often skewed, due to the natural limits imposed
by the Likert scale. Because the study was a within-subject study, and due to
the skewness of the data, the results were analyzed using the Wilcoxon Signed
Rank Test, with the normal approximation for large samples. For all questions, the
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test indicated that participants’ rating of the affect-aware
condition was statistically significantly higher than the affect-ignorant condition
(except in reverse-scored questions, when it was statistically significantly lower).
The questions and their p-values are provided in Table 5.6. Analysis of the results
revealed no statistically significant difference or consistent pattern based on which
condition the participant completed first. In the following presentation of results,
bar charts with sample means are presented for the purpose of illustration.
Likability of the Robot
Questions 1 through 4 addressed the likability of the robot. As shown in Fig-
ure 5.11, participants rated the affect-aware robot 1.5-2.1 points higher than the
affect-ignorant robot. These results indicate that participants felt closer with and
preferred working with the affect-aware robot; these results support Hypothesis 1,
which stated that humans would prefer to work with the affect-aware robot over the
affect-ignorant robot.
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Figure 5.12: Results of the Likert scale survey for questions related to trust.
Human Trust in the Robot
Questions 5-9 were designed to measure the degree of trust that the human partic-
ipants felt in the robot. As shown in Figure 5.12, participants trusted the affect-
aware robot, on average, a minimum of 1.4 points more than the affect-ignorant
robot, both in general and in terms of collaboration performance. In Question 5,
participants rated a general statement of trust 1.5 points higher in the affect-aware
case. Additionally, in Question 7, participants rated their trust in the affect-aware
robot to perform appropriately during collaboration an average of 5.9 on a 7-point
Likert scale, where 7.0 would indicate maximum trust; this indicates an acceptable
level of trust in the robot’s collaborative abilities. These results support Hypothesis
2, that posits that human participants would find the affect-aware robot to be more
trustworthy than the affect-ignorant robot.
Perception of the Robot’s Performance
Question 10 (which is reverse-scored) measures the participant’s perception of repeti-
tiveness in the robot during the collaboration. In both conditions, participants rated
the robot as moderately repetitive, with the affect-ignorant robot’s average response
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Figure 5.13: Results of the Likert scale survey for questions related to the robot’s
performance.
being about 1.1 points higher than the affect-aware. This result correlates with sev-
eral of the open-ended responses which described the affect-aware robot’s behaviors
as “cute” and “interesting”, refer to Section 5.3.5. Question 11, which asks about the
efficiency of the robot’s decisions is the question with the highest p-value of the 31
questions. This correlates with the result of the open-ended question asking which
condition of the robot exhibited behaviors that could prevent human error (refer to
5.3.5); in response to this question, several respondents stated that it may be quicker
or simpler to call the supervisor in the event of a task failure, rather than changing
the order of the tasks. According to the results from Question 12, the participants
felt that the affect-aware robot’s decisions during collaboration improved their own
performance, with an average rating of 5.4, while the affect-ignorant robot only re-
ceived an average rating of 3.3, indicating that participants felt it was not able to
interact in such a way as to increase the human’s performance; refer to results from
Question 6. These results support Hypothesis 3, which posited that humans will
perceive the affect-aware robot as being more capable than the affect-ignorant robot.
Robot’s Understanding of Human Emotions
In Questions 13 through 17, participants evaluate the robot’s understanding of hu-
170
Figure 5.14: Results of the Likert scale survey for the questions related to the robot’s
understanding of human emotions.
mans’ emotions. In questions 13, 15, and 16, participants rated the affect-aware
robot, on average, a minimum of 1.8 points higher than the affect-ignorant robot.
In response to questions 14 and 17, which are reverse-scored, participants ranked the
affect-ignorant robot 1.2 and 2.0 points higher, respectively, than then affect-aware
robot. The results of all five questions in this category support Hypothesis 4.
Robot’s Understanding of Human and Collaboration Goals
Questions 18 and 19 were reverse-scored questions intended to determine whether
the humans felt that the robot understood the shared collaboration goal and the
human’s personal goal, respectively. For both conditions of the robot, the aver-
age scores were lower than 3.5, indicating that the human’s perceived the robot as
having some understanding of the goals. For both questions, the affect-ignorant
robot’s average score was significantly higher than the affect-aware robot’s score.
Similarly, Question 20 was a measure of whether the human perceived that the
robot correctly perceived the human’s goal. On average, participants provided an
average rating for the affect-aware robot that was 1.5 points higher than that for the
affect-ignorant robot. Question 21 measured the human perception of the robot’s
commitment to the collaboration; for this measure, the average participant score
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Figure 5.15: Results of the Likert scale survey for questions related to the robot’s
understanding of goals.
assigned to the affect-aware robot was 6.2 points out of a maximum of 7 points,
indicating that the participants felt that the affect-aware robot was strongly com-
mitted to the collaboration. The affect-ignorant robot received an average rating of
4.4 points, indicating only moderate commitment. These results strongly support
Hypothesis 5, which posits that humans will feel that the affect-aware robot will
better understand their goals than the affect-ignorant robot.
Human’s Feeling about the Collaboration
Questions 22 through 28 were designed to gauge how the human participants felt
about the partnership within the collaboration and the outcome of the collaboration.
For each of the 7 questions, the participants ranked the affect-aware robot as better
than the affect-ignorant robot, by a minimum, on average, of 0.8 points. Questions
24, 27 and 28 addressed whether the robot and the participant were working toward
mutually agreed-upon goals and on the outcome of the collaboration; in the affect-
aware condition, participants rated the robot a minimum of 6.1 points, on average,
while rating the affect-ignorant robot 1-1.6 points lower, indicating that the par-
ticipants felt a very strong sense of collaboration with the affect-aware robot, and
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Figure 5.16: Results of the Likert scale survey for questions related to the human’s
feeling about the collaboration.
only a moderate sense of collaboration with the affect-ignorant robot. Questions 25
and 26 address whether the robot and the participant set the collaboration goals
together; these two questions have lower scores than Questions 24, 27 and 28, for
both the affect-aware and the affect-ignorant case. The lower overall scores are likely
due to the fact that the robot decides the task order or action in the event of failure
in both conditions; however, the higher score in the affect-aware case may indicate
that emotional awareness can increase a feeling of collaboration. These results sup-
port Hypothesis 6 that humans will feel a greater sense of mutual collaboration and
understanding about the collaboration with the affect-aware robot.
Human Perception of Mutual Satisfaction with Collaborative Partner
Questions 29, 30 and 31 were designed to measure the human’s perception of the
robot’s satisfaction with the human, the human’s satisfaction with the robot and
the mutual understanding between the human and the robot, respectively. The
participants provided an average response in the affect-aware condition of 5.8, 5.9
and 5.7 to Questions 29, 30 and 31, respectively, indicating a high level of mutual
satisfaction; all three answers were about 1.4-1.9 points lower, on average, in the
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Figure 5.17: Results of the Likert scale survey for questions related to satisfaction
with collaborative partner.
affect-ignorant condition. These results indicate a higher level of satisfaction working
with the robot in the affect-aware condition, and strongly support Hypothesis 7,
which posited that humans will feel a greater sense of mutual satisfaction with the
affect-aware robot than the affect-ignorant robot.
Results from the Open-Ended Questionnaire
As described in Section 5.3.4, each participant answered an open-ended question-
naire at the end of the study. Table 5.7 summarizes the questionnaire and which
condition users preferred for certain conditions (i.e. affect-ignorant or affect-aware).
Note that some users chose not to state a preference regarding which condition they
preferred for certain conditions; because we were specifically interested in whether
users preferred the affect-aware case, we considered the ambiguous responses to be
failures in the binomial analysis. The binomial analysis is based on a population
size of 33.
As shown in Table 5.7, 100% of users unambiguously preferred the run with the
affect-aware robot. In general, this preference stemmed from a feeling of closeness
and partnership, as seen in these responses: “the robot had emotions and responded
to my emotions. Also, “what it said about my failing was cute and aimed to make
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Table 5.7: Open-ended questionnaire questions and results. (*Note: Because we are
evaluating whether humans prefer an affect-aware robot, these results are taken as
negative test results when calculating the p-value using the binomial distribution.
Only those participants who clearly indicated a preference for the affect-aware robot
are taken as positive test results.)
Question
Number of Participants
Who Did Not Prefer One
Condition Over the Other *
Number of
Participants Favoring
Emotion-Aware Robot
p-value
Which of the two runs with the robot did you prefer? 0 33 0
In which of the two runs did the robot exhibit behavior that could be useful in a 
more complex task? 1 30 « 0.001
In which of two runs did the robot exhibit behavior that could prevent human error? 3 18 > 0.1
In which of the two runs did the robot exhibit behavior that could improve the 
efficiency of collaboration? 2 26 « 0.001
What was the most interesting behavior of the robot and in which run did it happen? 5 24 0.002
me feel better.” Another example is “I liked feeling needed and accounted for; I
felt closer to the robot.” Finally, “I saw the changes in its feeling, which motivated
me to care more about my act...I also liked that he asked me to correct its failure,
although it could ask the supervisor.”
When asked in which of the two runs the robot exhibited behavior that could
be useful in a more complex task, 90.9% chose the affect-aware robot. In general,
respondents thought that the affect-aware robot was better at problem solving,
more adaptable, and more capable of handling the social complexities that occur in
collaboration, as shown in responses such as “The robot explained motives...which
is important to keep a team communicating and on the same pace.” Also, “When
we failed he initially switched to a new task and then came back to the originally
failed task. It kept me from getting irritated and negative.” Finally, “The more
complex, the more necessary it is to understand how humans think and operate...an
empathetic robot can adapt, encourage and help.” It is worth noting that one
respondent preferred the affect-ignorant case, saying “In a more complex task it
might be better for the robot to take control and simply tell me what to do; trying
to be understanding and collaborative wouldn’t be as important as doing the task
correctly.”
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The only question that did not provide statistically significant support in favor
of the affect-aware robot related to which case the robot exhibited behavior that
could prevent human error. About 36.4% of respondents thought that the affect-
ignorant robot was more likely to prevent human error; however, all but one of
these cited calling the supervisor as the main method of preventing human error,
in spite of the fact that the instructions indicated that the robot’s need to call the
supervisor counted against the collaboration. Of the 54.5% who thought that the
affect-aware robot was better at preventing human error, most cited the robot’s
ability to console the human as the main behavior that could prevent human error.
Respondents indicated that this enabled them to move on and feel better about
the collaboration, as with this response: “The robot switched to a different task
and we came back to an error later. This allowed my mind to move away from
being frustrated. I was able to complete a different task which felt like a win - then
come back and finish the error. Making my mind move away from frustration could
definitely prevent more errors.”
When asked in which of the runs the robot exhibited behavior that could improve
the efficiency of the collaboration, 78.8% responded with the affect-aware case; of
these, the vast majority stated that this was because of the robot’s ability to change
the order of tasks in the event of a failure, and to ask the human for help.
Finally, when asked in which run the most interesting behavior occurred, 72.7%
chose the affect-aware condition. Of these respondents, 12 individuals stated that
the robot’s attempt to console the human by saying “It was not your fault” in
response to the human’s negative affective state that occurred as a consequence of
the human’s failed task was the most interesting behavior, and a majority mentioned
that it actually made them feel more positive. Six participants referred to the robot’s
ability to understand and express affective state. Several participants referred to the
robot’s ability to communicate, including the ability to ask questions. Of those who
responded with the affect-ignorant case, most found the ability to call the supervisor,
and mechanical functions, such as gripping, to be most interesting.
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Figure 5.18: Age and gender distribution of the user study participants.
Impact of Demographics
As mentioned in Section 5.3.4, we recorded the age and gender of each participant;
the distribution is provided in Figure 5.18. The distribution presented in this figure
are the results presented in this thesis; however, four participants were removed
from the results, due to the participant breaking study rules. Two of the removed
participants were women over 40 years old and two were men over 50 years old. Al-
though it was not the primary purpose of the study, we investigated the Likert scale
results to determine if there were any relevant trends based on the demographics of
the participants.
To investigate the impact of demographics, we carried out Multiple Linear Re-
gression analysis for each question, under each condition of the robot (i.e. affect-
aware and affect-ignorant). For each question, the dependent variable was the par-
ticipant rating; each question was analyzed with four combinations of dependent
variables: (1) age only, (2) gender only, (3) age and gender, and (4) age, gender and
age*gender (effect modification). The results for the affect-aware case are presented
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Table 5.8: Multiple linear regression analysis results for the affect-aware condition.
Question
Number
Model Significance
(F(dfeffect, dferror) = F-value, p-value)
Adjusted
R2 Value
Age 
(coeff., p-value)
Gender 
(coeff., p-value)
Age*Gender
(coeff., p-value)
Q2 F(3,29)=4.37, p=0.012 0.240 -0.152, p=0.003 -3.600, p=0.024 0.152, p=0.005
Q3 F(3,29)=7.42, p<0.001 0.376 -0.202, p<0.001 -4.725, p=0.003 0.191, p<0.001
Q7 F(3,29)=4.09, p=0.015 0.224 -0.124, p=0.007 -2.747, p=0.058 0.126, p=0.011
Q8 F(3,29)=5.31, p=0.005 0.288 -0.140, p=0.001 -3.513, p=0.010 0.147, p=0.002
Q9
F(1,31)=6.87, p=0.013 0.155 -0.060, p=0.013 - -
F(3,29)=3.88, p=0.019 0.213 -0.164, p=0.006 -3.185, p=0.093 0.122, p=0.056
Q12 F(3,29)=3.79, p=0.021 0.207 -0.160, p=0.008 -3.629, p=0.059 0.164, p=0.013
Q13 F(1,31)=6.55, p=0.016 0.148 -0.064, p=0.016 - -
Q16
F(1,31)=7.40, p=0.011 0.167 -0.076, p=0.011 - -
F(3,29)=4.65, p=0.009 0.255 -0.202, p=0.005 -3.123, p=0.166 0.141, p=0.065
Q17* F(1,31)=6.48, p=0.016 0.146 0.054, p=0.016 - -
Q18* F(1,31)=5.65, p=0.024 0.127 - -0.929, p=0.024 -
Q20 F(3,29)=3.05, p=0.044 0.161 -0.129, p=0.018 -2.935, p=0.091 0.133, p=0.024
Q23* F(3,29)=3.08, p=0.043 0.163 0.064, p=0.021 1.962, p=0.031 -0.079, p=.0.010
Q28
F(1,31)=6.04, p=0.020 0.136 - 0.917, p=0.020 -
F(3,29)=5.42, p=0.004 0.293 -0.106, p=0.006 -2.165, p=0.074 0.110, p=0.009
Q30
F(2,30)=4.46, p=0.020 0.178 -0.040, p=0.029 0.958, p=0.027 -
F(3,29)=6.68, p=0.001 0.348 -0.143, p<0.001 -2.589, p=0.048 0.124, p=0.006
Q31
F(1,31)=5.42, p=0.027 0.121 - 1.102, p=0.027 -
F(2,30)=5.60, p=0.009 0.223 -0.039, p=0.032 1.194, p=0.008 -
F(3,29)=6.15, p=0.002 0.326 -0.126, p=0.004 -1.782, p=0.188 0.104, p=0.025
in Table 5.8 and the results for the affect-ignorant case are presented in Table 5.9.
The tables contain all models that were statistically significant, except those that
revealed a decrease in the R2 when the number of parameters increased; parameters
not included in a specific regression are left blank in the tables. Questions that are
excluded from the table did not have any statistically significant models based on
age and gender.
As shown in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9, for many questions, age and gender only
provided statistically significant regression models when effect modification was in-
cluded; while this may actually indicate effect modification, we suspect that this
may also be related to the demographic distribution. As mentioned previously, the
only two male participants over the age of 50 were removed from the data pool
due to breaking the rules with the robot. The resulting demographic distribution
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Table 5.9: Multiple linear regression analysis results for the affect-ignorant condi-
tion.
Question
Number
Model Significance
(F(dfeffect, dferror) = F-value, p-value)
Adjusted
R2 Value
Age 
(coeff., p-value)
Gender 
(coeff., p-value)
Age*Gender
(coeff., p-value)
Q9 F(2,30)=4.97, p=0.014 0.199 -0.076, p=0.006 0.985, p=0.118 -
Q13 F(2,30)=8.42, p=0.001 0.317 -0.077, p=0.002 1.476, p=0.009 -
Q16 F(2,30)=3.42, p=0.046 0.131 -0.065, p=0.031 1.198, p=0.095 -
Q18* F(3,29)=2.946, p=0.049 0.154 -0.031, p=0.691 -4.725, p=0.071 0.120, p=0.165
Q24 F(1,31)=4.76, p=0.037 0.105 - 1.214, p=0.037 -
Q31 F(1,31)=9.08, p=0.005 0.202 - 1.940, p=0.005 -
contains eight participants over 40 years old, only one of whom is a male.
When effect modification is either not included or does not improve the explana-
tory power of the model(s), two consistent patterns emerge across the questions that
are impacted by age and/or gender: (1) as age increases, participants’ ratings of the
robot tends to decrease, in both the affect-aware and the affect-ignorant condition
and (2) female participants’ ratings tend to be higher than male participants’ ratings
in both the affect-aware and the affect-ignorant condition.
Finally, while it is clear that age and gender impact the participants’ ratings of
the robot, the explanatory power of the regression models remains low; the highest
R2 value was 0.376, which occurred for Question 3, when effect modification was
included. Age and gender of the participant impact the participants’ ratings of the
robot, but on their own, do not explain most of the variation observed in the Likert
scale surveys.
5.3.6 Discussion
Based on the results, all participants prefer to work with the affect-aware robot.
Humans find the affect-aware robot more likable and more trustworthy, as indicated
in the Likert-scale responses and the open-ended questionnaire responses. Based
on the responses, the emotional interaction with the robot can help create a sense
of closeness and enjoyment that makes humans want to continue working with the
robot.
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The results also indicate that the affect-aware robot can better maintain a col-
laborative relationship. Both Likert-scale responses and Open-Ended Questionnaire
responses indicate this. Humans felt a stronger sense of the robot’s commitment
to the collaboration, and greater understanding of their goals and emotions from
the robot. Several open-ended responses also indicated that the robot was able
to successfully motivate people and maintain their commitment to the collabora-
tion, especially when tasks failed. Additionally, as shown in Section 5.3.5, humans
rated the affect-aware case much higher than the affect-ignorant case when asked
which robot’s decisions improved their performance, in essence acknowledging that
their collaborator’s (i.e., the robot’s) decisions had a significant impact on their
performance. As some of the open-ended responses indicated, successfully manag-
ing emotions within the collaboration can help keep the collaboration on track, and
prevent distractions due to guilt and other negative emotions.
Finally, the affect-aware robot developed a stronger sense of partnership through
greater communication. The participants felt better understood by the affect-aware
robot, and felt that the goals were more mutually agreed-upon, refer to Section
5.3.5. As evidenced in the following response, the affect-aware robot was successfully
able to create a sense of partnership through its more open communication style:
“Communication is very important. In the first run (i.e. affect-aware) the robot
states what tasks he is working on, it is clear and straight-forward. Also during the
first run the robot cares about the human(me)’s feelings and cheers me up when
I failed at the tasks, I think that could also improve efficiency of collaboration,
because it would be more like a team or partnership.”
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Discussion
This thesis presents the Affective Motivational Collaboration (AMC) theory and
our computational framework. The AMC is built on the SharedPlans theory of
collaboration [103] and the cognitive appraisal theory of emotions [162] [223]. Our
motivation to develop AMC was the lack of a theory describing the processes in-
volved in a dyadic collaboration as well as their relationship and influences on each
other. In particular, in this thesis we emphasized the reciprocal influence of the
collaboration structure and the appraisal processes in collaboration. We provided
algorithms to compute appraisal variables and their influence on collaboration pro-
cesses, e.g., goal management. In general, our contribution in this thesis was to
provide a theory which describes affect-regulated goal-driven behaviors within a
dyadic collaboration. A further contribution of this thesis is to account for the
influence of motives on the coping processes in collaboration. We validated our
individual appraisal algorithms as well as our overall computational framework by
conducting an online crowd-sourcing user study and a laboratory end-to-end sys-
tem user study, respectively. The first study investigated whether humans and our
appraisal algorithms provide similar answers to questions with respect to factors
involved in our appraisal algorithms. The second study investigated a) the impor-
tance of emotional-awareness in collaboration, and b) the overall functionality of
the AMC framework to autonomously control interactions of a collaborative robot.
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After our introduction in Chapter 1, we presented the theoretical background
on the two major foundations of our theory in Chapter 2. First, we reviewed the
prominent computational collaboration theories including SharedPlans and Joint In-
tentions. We focused on the main concepts characterizing requirements of a collabo-
ration introduced by these theories. We also analyzed the similarities and differences
between these theories in terms of their essential concepts as well as their theoreti-
cal and practical applications. These applications involved the fields of robotic and
artificial agents. Then, we continued discussing what emotions are and more im-
portantly how they can influence one’s cognition and social life. We also discussed
the role of emotions in communicating one’s internal states to others as the basic
rationale behind different social emotions. We confined our discussion about emo-
tion to artificial emotions in social robots or agents. Third, we reviewed existing
computational models of emotions, including appraisal theory, analyzing their sim-
ilarities, differences and applications in robotics and artificial agents. Finally, we
reviewed the concept of motives, work in related fields and described three social
motives based on the psychological theories.
Next, we introduced Affective Motivational Collaboration theory in Chapter
3. We discussed all the mechanisms involved in our theory. These mechanisms
include various processes, each of which provides particular information required
in overall operation of the system. Among these mechanisms our focus was on
the Collaboration, Appraisal and Coping mechanisms. However, other mechanisms
such as Motivation also play important roles in influencing the overall behavior of
the agent using our framework. We also discussed the events that we consider in
a collaborative environment including utterances, primitive actions and observable
behaviors. We described how each mechanism handles these events. We believe it
is important to focus on functions of emotions and their influence on collaboration
processes. Therefore, we briefly described a set of emotion functions and how they
are related to the collaboration context. Then, we continued by explaining the input,
output and function of each mechanism involved in our architecture as well as the
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Mental State, knowledge-base required by all the mechanisms, containing beliefs,
intentions, motives, goals and emotion instances. We presented different attributes
of each element of mental state.
In Chapter 4, we introduced our computational framework based on AMC theory
in more detail. As a major part of our contribution, we explained our algorithms to
compute the values associated with the appraisal variables. We use these algorithms
to compute the values of relevance, desirability, expectedness and controllability of
an event occurring during the collaboration. All of these algorithms process data
provided by the collaboration structure. Reciprocally, we provided the details of
how we use the outcome of the appraisals to influence the collaboration structure,
specifically by providing inputs to our algorithm for goal management. Then, we
explained details of the coping strategies, e.g. Active Coping, involved in our Coping
Mechanism and the underlying processes associated with these coping strategies.
We also included details about the Motivation mechanism, the types of motives we
considered and how we compute their values. Finally, we describe the elicitation of
different emotion instances in our framework and how they are interpreted according
the different contexts during collaboration.
We carried out two user studies which validated our framework. The first study
was designed to test whether humans and our appraisal algorithms perceive certain
factors in our algorithms similarly. The results, which validated our algorithms, are
presented in Chapter 5. Our second study, which was designed to test the overall
functionality of AMC framework, was also presented in Chapter 5.
6.2 Future Work
This work paves the way for a number of potential extensions. In particular, we
believe that extensions to the system could be made by exploring how to employ the
emotion functions we discussed in Chapter 4 with respect to the human’s affective
state. The AMC framework currently employs emotion functions including social
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regulation, motivation, goal management and focus of attention. By acquiring these
or other emotion functions, the agent improves the quality of collaboration. How-
ever, each emotion can have a different impact on different emotion functions in a
given collaboration context. For instance, the agent can interpret the meaning of
the perceived emotion, e.g., anger, while the collaborators are negotiating (context)
pursuing or abandoning a given goal. This interpretation can be different for goal
management and motivation as emotion functions; i.e., human’s perceived anger can
cause the agent to choose a relatively easier goal to pusue, and to postpone motivat-
ing the human to pursue more difficult goals for the moment. Since the meaning of
many social emotions are defined in the field of psychology, the agent can use these
meanings to improve likability or other important factors in the collaboration.
Secondly, while our main contribution focused on enabling an agent to improve
different aspects of collaboration (e.g., collaborator’s satisfaction, likability, trust,
etc.), another possible area of future work would be to explore ways in which the
agent can improve a chosen aspect of the collaboration such as trust or performance
at any given time. In particular, an interesting extension would be to enable the
agent to perceive which aspect of the collaboration is suffering (e.g., lack of trust)
and needs to be improved. For example, if the human collaborator is losing her
trust in the agent to achieve a given goal, the agent can try to improve the human
collaborator’s sense of trust by showing an appropriate behavior, e.g., improving the
precision or helping the human to achieve a goal.
Finally, in addition to expanding the adaptability of the agent to the human
collaborator’s internal state, future extensions are also possible in the other mech-
anisms as well. For example, an interesting area to explore is the ability to employ
more elaborate computational models of motivation and theory of mind. These ex-
tensions could provide more information about the human collaborator and help the
agent to act on a more accurate model of the human’s internal state.
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APPENDIX A
Instructions & Questionnaires for Crowd-Sourcing Study:
You are preparing for hiking. You are supposed to make two different snacks, a
peanut butter and jelly sandwich and a simple boiled egg sandwich, together with
Mary. The peanut butter and jelly sandwich MUST be prepared using peanut
butter and strawberry jam. The egg sandwich MUST be prepared using two boiled
eggs, salt and some pickles. All required ingredients are available to you and Mary,
including:
a) a jar of peanut butter,
b) a jar of strawberry jam,
c) whole wheat bread,
d) two eggs,
e) pickles, and
f) salt.
First Sandwich:
To prepare the peanut butter and jelly sandwich the following steps MUST be taken
in the following order (as shown in the picture):
Spread some peanut butter on one slice of bread. Spread some strawberry jam
on another slice of bread. Press the two slices together, and pass the sandwich to
Mary. Mary uses a knife to cut the sandwich in half. Mary takes a zip lock bag,
and puts the sandwich in the bag.
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You
Mary
(a) Peanut butter sandwich instruction
Mary
(b) Boiled egg sandwich instruction
Second Sandwich:
To prepare the boiled egg sandwich the following steps MUST be taken in the
following order (as shown in the picture):
Boil the water in a pot, and put two eggs in the pot when the water is boiling.
Remove the eggs from the pot after 5 minutes. Peel the boiled eggs and slice them
into a few pieces. Shake some salt on the eggs. Put the sliced eggs on bread. Wait
for Mary to put some pickles on top of the eggs. Press another slice of bread on
top. Grab a zip lock bag and put your sandwich inside of the zip lock bag.
NOTE: The instructions provided above were the same for all four questionnaires,
and are only presented once. The four separate questionnaires are provided in the
following pages.
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Relevance Questionnaire:
In this questionnaire, there are 19 questions about different situations while you
are preparing the two sandwiches together with Mary (as mentioned above). Each
question provides three possible answers regarding the relevance of various situations
to the goal of preparing the sandwiches.
Now, please answer the following questions:
1. Imagine you have just pressed two slices of bread together after spreading
peanut butter and jelly on them. Which of the following two actions is more rele-
vant?
A. Mary takes your sandwich and cuts it in half.
B. Mary looks for a jar of pickles for your second sandwich.
C. Equally relevant.
2. Imagine you want to make the peanut butter sandwich. Which of the following
two actions is more relevant?
A. You trying to find the jar of peanut butter.
B. Mary wants to figure out which knife to use to cut the sandwich you make.
C. Equally relevant.
3. Imagine you have made the peanut butter sandwich and passed it to Mary to
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cut it in half. You begin to boil some water in the pot for the eggs. Which of the
following two actions is more relevant?
A. Mary has cut the peanut butter sandwich and put it in a zip lock bag.
B. Mary asks you whether you have found the jar of peanut butter.
C. Equally relevant.
4. Imagine you have spread peanut butter on one slice of bread and you have just
spread the strawberry jam on the second slice of bread. Now you want to press them
together and pass the sandwich to Mary to cut it in half. Which of the following
two actions is more relevant?
A. Mary asks you to pass the sandwich to her.
B. Mary asks you whether the eggs are done.
C. Equally relevant.
5. Imagine you are about to start making a hard boiled egg sandwich. Which of
the following two actions is more relevant?
A. At the beginning, you discover that you have run out of eggs.
B. You discover that Mary will not be able to find the zip lock bags when the
sandwich is ready at the end.
C. Equally relevant.
6. Imagine you and Mary want to make the hard boiled egg sandwich. Which
of the following two actions is more relevant?
A. Mary tells you that you can not boil the eggs since the stove is broken.
B. Mary tells you that she is going to grab a knife to cut the sandwich in half.
C. Equally relevant.
7. Imagine you want to make the peanut butter sandwich. You open the lid on
both jars of peanut butter and strawberry jam. Which of the following two actions
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is more relevant?
A. You pick a slice of bread to spread peanut butter onto it.
B. You ask Mary whether she has a zip lock bag to put the sandwich inside.
C. Equally relevant.
8. Imagine you and Mary are going to make a peanut butter and a hard boiled
egg sandwich for your hiking trip. Which of the following two actions is more
relevant?
A. You take two eggs and put them in a pot with boiling water.
B. You think of making a snack for your hiking trip.
C. Equally relevant.
9. Which of the following two actions is more relevant?
A. Pressing two slices of bread after spreading peanut butter and jelly on them.
B. Pressing two slices of bread after after putting slices of boiled egg, and adding
some salt and pickles.
C. Equally relevant.
10. Imagine you want to make the peanut butter sandwich. Which of the
following two actions is more relevant?
A. Spreading peanut butter on one slice of bread.
B. Spreading strawberry jam on another slice of bread.
C. Equally relevant.
11. Imagine you have made the peanut butter sandwich and passed it to Mary
to cut it in half. You begin to boil some water in the pot for the eggs. Which of the
following two actions is more relevant?
A. Mary has cut the peanut butter sandwich and put it in a zip lock bag.
B. You put the eggs in the boiling water.
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C. Equally relevant.
12. Which of the following two actions is more relevant?
A. You want to press two slices of bread together after spreading peanut butter
and strawberry jam on them.
B. You want to spread strawberry jam on another slice of bread after spreading
peanut butter on one slice of the bread.
C. Equally relevant.
13. Which of the following two actions is more relevant?
A. Mary tells you that you have run out of eggs when you wanted to make a
hard boiled egg sandwich.
B. Mary tells you that you have run out of peanut butter when you wanted to
make a peanut butter sandwich.
C. Equally relevant.
14. Which of the following two actions is more relevant?
A. You try to find a pot to boil the eggs since you want to make the hard boiled
egg sandwich.
B. You look for the jar of peanut butter since you want to make peanut butter
sandwich .
C. Equally relevant.
15. Which of the following two actions is more relevant?
A. You open the lid on both jars of peanut butter and strawberry jam since you
want to make the peanut butter sandwich.
B. Mary opens the lid on jar of pickles since she wants to add some pickles to
the top of your sliced boiled eggs.
C. Equally relevant.
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16. Which of the following two actions is more relevant?
A. You take two eggs and put them in a pot with boiling water, since you want
to make a hard boiled egg sandwich.
B. You open the lids on the jars of both the peanut butter and strawberry jam
since you want to make the peanut butter sandwich.
C. Equally relevant.
17. Imagine you have made the peanut butter sandwich and passed it to Mary
to cut it in half. Which of the following two actions is more relevant?
A. Mary starts crying since she cut her finger with a knife.
B. You begin to boil the water to boil the eggs for your second sandwich.
C. Equally relevant.
18. Imagine you have spread peanut butter on one slice of bread and you just
spread the strawberry jam on the second slice of bread. Now you want to press them
together and pass the sandwich to Mary to cut it in half. Which of the following
two actions is more relevant?
A. Mary calmly looks at you.
B. Mary begins waving her hands and yelling at you!
C. Equally relevant.
19. Imagine you want to make the peanut butter sandwich. You open the lids
on the jars of both the peanut butter and strawberry jam. Which of the following
two actions is more relevant?
A. You know what to do, but Mary begins to laugh so hard. She can’t say any-
thing, but is pointing at the jar of peanut butter. You want to see what happened!
B. You know what to do, and Mary is not in the kitchen at the moment.
C. Equally relevant.
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Desirability Questionnaire:
In this questionnaire, there are 12 questions about different situations while you are
preparing two sandwiches together with Mary (as mentioned above). Each question
provides three possible answers regarding the desirability of certain circumstances.
Now, please answer the following questions:
1. Imagine you want to make one peanut butter and one hard boiled egg sandwich
for your hike. Which of the following two actions is more desirable?
A. Mary tells you the peanut butter and eggs you used in your sandwiches are
spoiled and out dated.
B. Your peanut butter sandwich is done and ready. Mary tells you to wait for
her to cut the egg sandwich in half and put it in a zip lock bag for you.
C. Equally desirable.
2. Imagine you want to make one peanut butter and one hard boiled egg sandwich
for your hike. Which of the following two actions is more desirable?
A. You have both sandwiches ready to go.
B. Your peanut butter sandwich is done and ready. Mary tells you to wait for
her to cut the egg sandwich in half and put it in a zip lock bag for you.
C. Equally desirable.
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3. Imagine you want to make the egg sandwich. You have sliced the eggs, put
them on one slice of bread, salted them, and are waiting for Mary to put some
pickles on your eggs. Which of the following two actions is more desirable?
A. Mary tells you there are no more pickles left in the jar to put on your sandwich.
B. Mary finds the pickle jar to put some pickles on your eggs.
C. Equally desirable.
4. Imagine you pressed two slices of bread together with peanut butter and
strawberry jam on them, and passed them to Mary. Which of the following two
actions is more desirable?
A. Mary cuts the peanut butter sandwich in half and put it in a zip lock bag.
B. Mary can not find a knife to cut the sandwich in half.
C. Equally desirable.
5. Imagine you have put two eggs in a boiling pot. Which of the following two
actions is more desirable?
A. You go back to the pot to remove the eggs from the pot, but the egg shells
are broken and the eggs are mixed with water.
B. You decide to wait for two more minutes for the eggs to boil.
C. Equally desirable.
6. Imagine you want to make the egg sandwich. You have put eggs in the pot
to boil. Which of the following two actions is more desirable?
A. You come back to the pot and you see that you have forgotten to turn on the
stove.
B. You come back to the pot and eggs are boiling, and ready to be removed from
the pot.
C. Equally desirable.
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7. Imagine you have pressed the two slices of bread together (one covered with
strawberry jam and one covered with peanut butter) and passed it to Mary. Which
of the following two actions is more desirable?
A. Mary puts two pieces of the sandwich into a zip lock bag after cutting the
sandwich in half.
B. You go ahead and begin to boil the water to make the boiled egg sandwich.
C. Equally desirable.
8. Imagine you want to make one peanut butter and one hard boiled egg sandwich
for your hike. Which of the following two actions is more desirable?
A. Mary tells you the peanut butter and eggs you used in your sandwiches are
spoiled and out dated.
B. Mary finds some mold on the bread in both sandwiches.
C. Equally desirable.
9. Imagine you want to make the egg sandwich. You have sliced the eggs, put
them on one slice of bread, salted them, and are waiting for Mary to put some
pickles on your eggs. Which of the following two actions is more desirable?
A. Mary tells you there are no more pickles left in the jar to put on your sandwich.
B. Mary finds the pickles are out dated and not edible.
C. Equally desirable.
10. Which of the following two actions is more desirable?
A. Imagine you pressed two slices of bread together with peanut butter and
strawberry jam on them, and passed them to Mary. Mary cuts the peanut butter
sandwich in half and puts them in the zip lock bag.
B. Imagine you want to make the egg sandwich. You have sliced the eggs, put
them on one slice of bread, salted them, and waiting for Mary to put some pickles
on your eggs. Mary puts some pickles on your eggs.
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C. Equally desirable.
11. Imagine you have put two eggs in a pot to boil. Which of the following two
actions is more desirable?
A. You go back to the pot to remove the eggs from the pot, but the egg shells
are broken and eggs are mixed with water and are not edible any more.
B. You go back to the pot to remove the eggs from the pot, but you find out
somebody has removed the eggs before you and eaten them.
C. Equally desirable.
12. Which of the following two actions is more desirable?
A. Imagine you want to make the egg sandwich, but you cannot find the eggs.
B. Imagine you want to make the peanut butter sandwich, but you find the
peanut butter jar empty.
C. Equally desirable.
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Expectedness Questionnaire:
In this questionnaire, there are 10 questions about different situations while you are
preparing two sandwiches together with Mary (as mentioned above). Each question
provides three possible answers regarding how expected the possible situations are.
Now, please answer the following questions:
1. Imagine you have just pressed two slices of bread together after spreading
peanut butter and strawberry jam on them. Which of the following two actions is
more expected?
A. Mary takes your sandwich and cuts it in half.
B. You begin to put the water in the pot without passing the peanut butter
sandwich to Mary.
C. Equally expected.
2. Imagine you have just pressed the two slices of bread together after spreading
peanut butter and strawberry jam on them, and passed it to Mary. Which of the
following two actions is more expected?
A. Mary takes your sandwich and cuts it in half.
B. Mary takes a bite of the given sandwich.
C. Equally expected.
3. Imagine you are spreading peanut butter onto one slice of bread. Which of
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the following two actions is more expected?
A. Mary waits for you to prepare the sandwich and pass it to her.
B. Mary puts some pickles on another slice of bread.
C. Equally expected.
4. Imagine Mary cuts your given peanut butter sandwich in half. Which of the
following two actions is more expected?
A. Mary takes a zip lock bag and put the sandwich inside of the bag.
B. Mary leaves the apartment to buy an energy drink.
C. Equally expected.
5. Imagine you have pressed the two slices of bread (one covered with strawberry
jam and one covered with peanut butter) together and passed it to Mary. Which of
the following two actions is more expected?
A. Mary puts the given sandwich into a zip lock bag after cutting it in half.
B. Mary puts some pickles on another slice of bread.
C. Equally expected.
6. Imagine you have pressed the two slices of bread (one covered with strawberry
jam and one covered with peanut butter) together and passed it to Mary. Which of
the following two actions is more expected?
A. Mary puts some pickles on another slice of bread.
B. Mary begins to cook some chicken for you.
C. Equally expected.
7. Imagine you have pressed the two slices of bread (one covered with strawberry
jam and one covered with peanut butter) together and passed it to Mary. Which of
the following two actions is more expected?
A. Mary puts the given sandwich into a zip lock bag after cutting it in half.
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B. You go ahead and begin to boil the water in a pot, since Mary doesn’t need
your help anymore.
C. Equally expected.
8. Imagine you are spreading strawberry jam onto the second slice of bread.
Which of the following two actions is more expected?
A. Mary wants to cut the one slice of bread which is already covered by peanut
butter.
B. Mary puts some pickles on another slice of bread.
C. Equally expected.
9. Which of the following two actions is more expected?
A. Imagine you have pressed the two slices of bread (one covered with strawberry
jam and one covered with peanut butter) together and passed it to Mary. Mary puts
the given sandwich into a zip lock bag after cutting it in half.
B. Imagine you have shaken salt on the slices of the boiled eggs on the bread.
Mary puts some pickles on another slice of bread.
C. Equally expected.
10. Imagine you have peeled the boiled eggs and sliced them into some pieces.
Which of the following two actions is more expected?
A. Mary leaves the apartment to buy an energy drink.
B. Mary begins to cook some chicken for you.
C. Equally expected.
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Controllability Questionnaire:
In this questionnaire, there are 10 questions about different situations while you are
preparing two sandwiches together with Mary (as mentioned above). Each question
provides three possible answers regarding how controllable the situations are.
Now, please answer the following questions:
1. Imagine you want to quickly make a peanut butter sandwich. You know that
you are supposed to press two slices of bread together that are covered by peanut
butter and strawberry jam, and pass it to Mary to cut it in half. Which of the
following two actions is more controllable?
A. You spread the peanut butter on one slice of bread and strawberry jam on
the other slice of bread to prepare the sandwich.
B. Mary asks you whether you know how to make your own homemade bread
for your sandwich.
C. Equally controllable.
2. Imagine you want to quickly make a peanut butter sandwich. Which of the
following two actions is more controllable?
A. You spread the peanut butter on one slice of bread and strawberry jam on
the second slice of bread. You do not need Mary to cut the sandwich in half. You
press the two slices together and put it in a zip lock bag.
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B. You spread the peanut butter on one slice of bread and strawberry jam on
the second slice of bread. You need to pass the sandwich to Mary to cut it in half
and put it in a zip lock bag.
C. Equally controllable.
3. Imagine you want to quickly make a peanut butter sandwich. Which of the
following two actions is more controllable?
A. You can spread the peanut butter on one slice of bread and strawberry jam
on the second slice of bread.
B. You can spread the peanut butter on one slice of bread and you need Mary
to spread strawberry jam on the second slice of bread.
C. Equally controllable.
4. Imagine you want to quickly make a hard boiled egg sandwich. Which of the
following two actions is more controllable?
A. You want to put the sandwich into a zip lock bag. You check the sandwich.
It is made the way you wanted.
B. You put the sandwich into a zip lock bag. You check the sandwich. You find
out the eggs are not boiled enough in a way you wanted.
C. Equally controllable.
5. Imagine you want to quickly make a peanut butter sandwich. Which of the
following two actions is more controllable?
A. You have a jar of peanut butter and a jar of strawberry jam opened and ready
to use.
B. You cannot find the jar of peanut butter, and Mary tells you that you ran
out of bread.
C. Equally controllable.
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6. Which of the following two actions is more controllable?
A. You spread the peanut butter on one slice of bread and strawberry jam on
the other slice of bread to prepare the peanut butter sandwich.
B. You have boiled, peeled, and sliced the eggs. You put the sliced eggs on a
bread and add some salt to prepare the hard boiled egg sandwich.
C. Equally controllable.
7. Which of the following two actions is more controllable?
A. Imagine you want to quickly make a peanut butter sandwich. You spread the
peanut butter on one slice of bread and strawberry jam on the second slice of bread.
You do not need Mary to cut the sandwich in half. You press two slices together
and put it in a zip lock bag.
B. Imagine you want to quickly make a hard boiled egg sandwich. You have
boiled and peeled the eggs. You do not need Mary to put some pickles on your eggs.
C. Equally controllable.
8. Which of the following two actions is more controllable?
A. Imagine you want to quickly make a peanut butter sandwich. You can spread
the peanut butter on one slice of bread and strawberry jam on the second slice of
bread.
B. Imagine you want to quickly make a hard boiled egg sandwich. You can boil
the eggs, peel them, put them on bread and add some pickles on top without getting
any help from Mary.
C. Equally controllable.
9. Which of the following two actions is more controllable?
A. Imagine you want to quickly make a hard boiled egg sandwich. You want to
put the sandwich into a zip lock bag. You check the sandwich. It is made the way
you wanted.
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B. Imagine you want to quickly make a peanut butter sandwich. You want to
put the sandwich into a zip lock bag. You check the sandwich. It has extra amount
of strawberry jam as the way you wanted.
C. Equally controllable.
10. Which of the following two actions is more controllable?
A. Imagine you want to quickly make a peanut butter sandwich. You have a jar
of peanut butter and a jar of strawberry jam opened ready to use.
B. Imagine you want to quickly make a hard boiled egg sandwich. You have two
eggs, and a boiling pot on the stove.
C. Equally controllable.
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APPENDIX B
Instructions:
• You are going to collaborate with a robot to install a solar panel in a simulated
environment. The robot is going to operate as your collaborative partner.
Therefore, some of the tasks are going to be done by the robot, and some
other tasks will be done by you.
• All the tasks are implemented with labeled pegs. You and the robot are going
to pick up and place these pegs on the predefined spots on the shared table-top
in front of you.
• Pegs that are properly placed in the predefined spots are considered to be
successfully completed tasks.
• Pegs are provided in two colors. Red pegs represent the robot’s tasks and blue
pegs represent your tasks.
• The predefined spots on the board are labeled with tasks and are colored to
match the corresponding pegs.
• The robot is supposed to place its own pegs on the red spots.
• You should place your own blue pegs only in the corresponding blue spots,
i.e., if you have a blue peg labeled A (representing a task called A that you
are responsible for), there will be a blue spot on the shared board labeled A
(see the figure below).
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Success and Failure of Achieving a Task:
• Picking up and placing a peg on the right spot of the shared board means that
particular task has been successfully achieved.
• Task failures are simulated using magnets: a task fails when the magnet in the
board does not let the peg’s settle fully into its spot (see the following figure).
(c) Successful Task (d) Successful Task (e) Failed Task
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Order of Doing Tasks:
The numerical labels on the shared board under each spot provide the correct order
of the task completion.
Your Objectives:
a) Successful completion of installing the solar panel,
b) Expressing yourself to the robot through the interface provided on the screen.
c) Timely completion of the overall task (e.g., if there is a failure that requires the
robot’s supervisor, the extra time will be counted against you).
d) Ensuring overall satisfaction of the robot during collaboration.
e) Avoiding impasse; where there is a failure and the robot supervisor has to come
in, you will lose points unless you are already working on a different task sug-
gested by the robot.
Note 1: The winner’s prize will be sent by e-mail the week after the study finishes.
Note 2: Your overall score will be calculated based on these objectives.
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(f) Human turn (g) Robot turn
Playing Rules:
1. You should not touch the robot under any circumstance.
2. You are responsible for removing a failed the task peg (the robot’s or your own)
from the shared board.
3. You should wait for the robot to inform you that it is your turn through voice
and/or the visual interface (see the figure below the visual interface will change
from what you see in the left to the right condition).
4. When it is your turn to do your own task, you should strictly obey the following:
4.1) Move ONLY one of your pegs according to the current numerical label of your
task, e.g., if the robot’s last move was task 8, you should do task 9 if you are
responsible for it (see the following figure).
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4.2) Based on the failure or success of your task, choose how you feel (i.e., Positive,
Neutral, Negative) about the outcome of your task on the interface provided on the
screen (see the following figure).
4.3) Press the Done button to give the turn back to the robot (see the following
figure).
5. You must not remove any peg from the board unless it is a clear case of a failure
caused by the magnetic field.
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6. It is okay to change the order of the tasks ONLY if the robot makes such a
decision and announces it to you.
7. Do not touch your pegs until it is your turn again.
8. The robot might ask its supervisor to come and help if there is a task failure that
causes an impasse during your collaboration.
9. The robot might want to help you with its own pegs; if so, the robot will place
a peg in the Handoff Area for use during your next turn.
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